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POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER IN THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS AND RECENT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE TERRITORIAL LEGISLATIVE BODY AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

by

© LAVERN A. BURKHARDT

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Political and Economic Power in the Northwest Territories: Relationships between the Territorial Legislative Body and the Federal Government" submitted by Lavern A. Burkhardt in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

This paper reports on research of the political and economic power dimensions in the Northwest Territories with specific reference to the power relationships between the Territorial and Federal Governments. The research was guided by the metropolis-hinterland theory. Data sources included historical data related to the Territories since 1870; observation of the 47th Session of the Territorial Council; interviews with Council Members, residents of Yellowknife, and federal civil servants; and, finally, a content analysis of the Territorial Debates from 1967 to 1972.

The historical analysis revealed that there are discernable parallels between the imperial-colonial relationship of Great Britain to the original members of Confederation and the relationship of the Canadian Federal Government to the North-West Territories prior to the formation of the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan as well as to the Northwest Territories since 1905. The evolution toward self-government in the Territories has involved a lethargic, unresponsive Federal Government and an increasingly more hostile legislative body in the Territories. This evolution has been characterized by Territorial attainment of representative and, subsequently, responsible government. These achievements have inevitably led to the Territorial legislative body insisting on further concessions until provincial status was attained. The Federal Government has, since 1870, considered the Territories as a hinterland to be used to maximize its economic and

political aspirations.

Specific hypotheses related to three general dialectical tenets of the metropolis-hinterland perspective were tested by data from the content analysis of the Territorial Council Debates. Firstly, it was found that as the Territorial Council matures (as the Territorial residents become more politically sophisticated), the degree of confrontation by the Council against the Federal Government (as exhibited in Council Session) also increases. Secondly, sponsorship by the Council's ideologists was found to be directly associated with degree of confrontation with the Federal Government. Thirdly, among Councillors who engaged in sponsoring motions of confrontation with the Federal Government, the degree of confrontation with the Federal Government was directly related to experience on Council. Fourthly, the data revealed that the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner were not direct agents of the Federal Government. They were indirect agents of Ottawa by opposing Council's confrontations with the Territorial Administration.

An interpretative framework was developed from the findings of the content analysis and the historical study. This framework facilitated a clearer interpretation of existing and future confrontations between the Territorial Council and the Federal Government.

The study demonstrated that every gain in political power by the Territorial Council was a short-lived solution to its degree of confrontation with Ottawa. The establishment of a Committee system plus the April, 1974 provision for Council Members' participation in an Executive Council were considered as further steps toward a party system in the Territories and, subsequently, toward responsible government. Finally, the study anticipated that the Federal Government would continue to prevent, as long as possible, the formation of a new Province of the North in order to increase federal economic power by the increasing exploitation of the Northwest Territories' natural resources.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The success of this research endeavor is largely due to the cooperation of numerous Northwest Territories residents and senior federal civil servants who contributed insights into the extant power relationships between the Territorial and Federal Governments. Their willing assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE NATURE OF THE STUDY

THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this study is to analyse the structure of the political and economic power dimensions in the relationship between the Territorial and Federal Government. The major objective is to develop a theoretical model to facilitate prediction of the future power relationship between these two governmental bodies.

Specifically we propose:

1. To elucidate the salient factors in the historical relationships between the Territorial and Federal Governments from 1870 to 1966, the year of the submission of the Report of the Advisory Commission on the Development of Government in the Northwest Territories. These relationships are examined within the framework of the British colonial and parliamentary systems.

2. To systematically analyse the Territorial Council's confrontations with the Federal Government as evidenced during the proceedings of the Council. The resultant data from this content analysis is utilized to test specific hypotheses which derive from our theoretical perspective.

3. To summarize the contemporary power structure with emphasis on describing the major confrontations between the Territorial Council and the Federal Government during 1972.

4. To derive an interpretative framework to guide analysis of relationships between the Territorial Council and the Federal Government. This framework is derived from the historical analysis as well as the content analysis of the Territorial Debates. Finally, we make predictions about the future political and economic power relationships between these two governmental bodies. Emphasis is placed on predicting the potential for confrontations between the Council and Ottawa.

SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS

Prior to World War II the N.W.T. was, by Southern Canadian standards, economically depressed. In the main, this was a result of inactivity of the government in Ottawa and, more basically, the economic priorities of the North American capitalist system.

Even with Ottawa's awakening to its responsibilities in northern Canada and the resultant expenditure of vast sums of money on native education (especially after 1955), health care, social welfare payments, promotion of embryonic industries and handicrafts, and construction of airfields with the resultant temporary employment of unskilled native workers, the North has remained underdeveloped and her inhabitants have been pauperized (Jenness, 1972, 454-459). The Advisory Commission on the Development of Government in the Northwest Territories summarized the record of achievements by the Federal Government from 1953 to 1966 as follows:

> The Department of Northern Affairs since 1953, and other federal government departments, have accomplished much to their great credit in developing the present educational system, including the creation of hostels, in providing housing, in establishing and staffing hospitals and nursing stations, in

> administering welfare, in encouraging industry among the indigenous peoples, and in many other respects. But the fact remains that the people of the north are economically depressed virtually to a subsistence level; yet the land harbours wealth in natural resources. This is one of the major paradoxes of the north (Carrothers, 1966, 172-173).

Jenness argues that the lack of an over-all plan of economic and, by implication, political development meant that the Ottawa sponsored programs for various settlements have contributed neither to community nor regional long-term development. For example, the construction of schools for native education was not preceeded by development of a systematic policy of

> whether she planned to keep her Eskimos [and Indians] segregated in the Arctic and Subarctic and to train them only in those skills and techniques which would enable them to help white Canadians administer and exploit that region, or whether she intended them to become first-class citizens, enjoying all the rights and privileges of other citizens and acquiring, in southern Canada whenever necessary, skills that they could freely exercise anywhere in the Dominion (Jenness, 1968, 27).

Such Federal indecision and inaction has been a major source of discontent exhibited by Territorial legislative bodies since Canada first acquired Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory in 1870.

The Northwest Territories is currently experiencing extensive oil and gas exploration in the Mackenzie Delta region and in the Arctic Archipelago region. Exploitation of various minerals throughout the N.W.T. awaits technological developments in transportation and world demand with resultant sufficiently high prices to make exploitation feasible.

There are a number of major vested interest groups which have an impact on the power relationships within the Northwest Territories. These include the Federal Government, Territorial Administration, Territorial Council, multinational corporations, native people (Indian, Eskimo, and Metis), Northern Businesses, and the "New Northerner" or Eurocanadians for whom N.W.T. is "home". The struggles for power among these groups inevitably must lead to confrontations and conflicts between two or more vested interest groups.

The distribution of political and economic power between the Federal and Territorial Governments is the key dimension in the power structure within the Northwest Territories. The nature of this distribution of power has historical derivations in the nature of British colonialism and the approach of the Canadian Federal Government in dealing with the Territories since 1870.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Two contrasting models are explored in terms of their applicability in an analysis of power in the Northwest Territories. The frontier perspective, the first model, originated with Frederick Jackson Turner's analysis of the relevance of the "Frontier" in American history (1920b). The frontier theory has been described as

> The hither edge of the free land, the constantly expanded frontier of settlement moving into unoccupied regions in a continuous movement from the original hearth of settlement on the Atlantic seaboard (Creighton, 1970, 3).

The settlement of the American frontier, according to Turner, was the source of individualism, and of the democratic system in America.

Some historians have utilized this frontier thesis in analysing Canada. For example, A. R. M. Lower has utilized a frontier thesis similar to Turner's analysis. In 1939 he modified the frontierism perspective which had focused on settlement of the West. His "new hope" for the Canadian North was expressed as follows:

> "The North"--in Canada the words are already charged with the mystery and magnetism that "The West" once held for the United States--may keep her people fresh and young and adaptive long after their frontier settlement has closed (Lower, 1939, 233).

The alternative model for analysis of the N.W.T. is the metropolis-hinterland perspective. Frank utilized this perspective in his studies of Latin America. He has described the basic theme of his perspective as follows:

> My thesis is that these capitalist contradictions and the historical development of the capitalist system have generated underdevelopment in the peripheral satellites whose economic surplus was expropriated, while generating economic development in the metropolitan centers which appropriate that surplus--and, further, that this process still continues (Frank, 1967, 3).

This is an analysis of an exploitive situation in which the colonial power attempts to maximize its economic benefits. The colonial power experiences economic development by utilizing its more powerful military, economic, and constitutional position to exploit the colony's primary resources. These resources are used to enhance secondary industrial development and resultant employment opportunities in the colonial power. The colonized area, as an exporter of staple products, becomes or at least remains underdeveloped compared with the colonial power.

It is the thesis of this work that the metropolis-hinterland perspective is a more fruitful analytical framework than is the frontier model in a study of the Northwest Territories. The relationship between a metropolis and its hinterland has economic, geographic, historical, sociological, and political dimensions. The economic dimension has been given the most attention in previous studies, seemingly because this perspective has been closely tied to analyses of the capitalist economic system. In this study we focus on the economic and the political power dimensions of the metropolis-hinterland relationships in the N.W.T.

PROCEDURE OF INQUIRY

This study utilized a historical perspective in analysing the political and economic power structure of the N.W.T. Historical data related to the Old North-West Territories was analysed to determine the key evolutionary trends in the development of self-government in the hinterland region. These trends were related to the relationships between the Territorial legislative body and the Federal Government. This same historical perspective was utilized in analysing the political and economic power relationships between the N.W.T. Council and the Federal Government since 1905.

The Debates of the Territorial Council were utilized as a source of data for testing specifically derived hypotheses from the more general, dialectical propositions which form an integral part of the metropolis-hinterland theory. The data was systematically collected by content analysis. The categories for the analysis were derived from our theoretical model. The complete list of categories reflected the political and economic vested interests of all the salient groups in the Northwest Territories as well as confrontations and conflicts of interest between these identified groups. Only the data related to the confrontations between the Territorial Council and the Federal Government as well as the Council and the Territorial

Administration were utilized in this study.

Data were also used from this researcher's interviews of Members of the 7th Territorial Council, residents of Yellowknife, and federal civil servants in Ottawa.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The differences between frontierism and metropolitanism in interpreting Canadian history are outlined in Chapter II. The metropolis-hinterland model is outlined and it is argued that this model is most useful in analysing the exploitive relationships which are an integral aspect of the capitalist system. The metropolis-hinterland relationships involving the Northwest Territories within the world capitalist system are tersely outlined. Finally, the method of data collection is outlined.

Chapter III outlines the political and economic power relationships between the Federal and Territorial Governments from 1870 to the formation of the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905. Chapter IV continues this historical analysis by tracing the development of the current political power structure in the Northwest Territories. Chapters III and IV both focus on the political power dimension by studying the evolution of Territorial government toward representative and responsible government and eventual provincial status. The economic power dimension is examined in reference to the controversy concerning ownership of natural resources.

Chapter V outlines the categories and analytical procedures utilized in the content analysis of the Territorial Council Debates.

Subsequently, the specific explanatory hypotheses which are derived from the basic tenets of the metropolis-hinterland dialectical theory are tested by utilizing data collected by the content analysis of the Debates of the Council of the Northwest Territories from 1967 to 1972. The results of this analysis are summarized in Chapter VI.

Chapter VII summarizes the basic findings of the historical analysis of the power relationships between the Northwest Territories and the Federal Government. The constitutional and economic confrontations of the Territorial Council with the Federal Government since the submission of the Carrothers Report are also examined. Finally, this chapter brings the study up to date by analysing the key aspects of this confrontation which have occurred subsequent to the Sessions which were analysed by the content analysis.

In the final chapter an evaluation is made of the metropolis-hinterland perspective's utility in analysing the power relationships in the Northwest Territories. An interpretative framework, which this study developed, is elaborated by the findings of the content analysis and the dialectical method of historical study. The economic and political dimensions of power between the N.W.T. Council and the Federal Government are summarized and predictions are made concerning these two power dimensions. The need for further research to elaborate the political and economic power dimensions based on other vested interest perspectives is outlined. The native striving for power is analysed as an example of how to complete the study of the power relationships between the Northwest Territories and the Federal Government.

CHAPTER TWO

THE METROPOLIS-HINTERLAND THEORY

In this chapter we outline the theoretical model which we utilize in this thesis. We begin by examining the frontier model for interpreting North American history since the invasion by Europeans. We also allude to a few Canadian writers who view the Canadian North as a last frontier in Canada. This chapter subsequently focuses on the staple theory, a portent of our theoretical model, as well as the Laurentian perspective. Thus, we are led to the metropolitanism perspective where the impact of the frontier is de-emphasized in favor of the expansion of the metropolitan influence.

The second section of this chapter discusses our metropolis-hinterland model which is the theoretical basis of our study of social power in the Northwest Territories. We subsequently elaborate the extant metropolis-hinterland structures involving the Northwest Territories. Finally, the method of data collection is outlined.

THE FRONTIER THESIS

The frontier thesis in American History stressed the importance of the western frontier in the emergence of the particular character of American institutions. The key factor in American development, in the view of the frontier historians, was the process of continuous advance of American settlement westward. The pioneer, who was forced into a total reliance upon his individual initiative, became confident of his ability to cope with problems and, as a result, he was opposed to control. In sum, the frontier life resulted in individualism, coarseness, idealism, inquisitiveness, inventiveness, self-confidence and the democratic creed (Edwards, 1938, 227-228).

The frontier thesis has been less deeply rooted in Canadian historiography than in the U.S.A. However, an environmental interpretation of Canadian development was prevalent in the 1920's and 1930's as evidenced by such writers as A. L. Burt (1940), A. S. Morton (1938), W. H. Sage[1] (1928) and F. H. Underhill (1927; 1935). The essence of this approach was that, due to the process of adaptation to the frontier environment, a distinctive American content had developed in Canada within the externally imposed French and, subsequently the British government, society and culture (Careless, 1954, 6).

In a similar manner to Turner's analysis of American democracy and individualism, A. R. M. Lower sought to determine what were the basic conditions in Canada which had nurtured democracy. He argued that social democracy was a pragmatic response to the frontier environment. He asserted that the political democratic system was not the direct result solely of rugged individualism along the frontier. Rather, in the Canadian experience the pioneering era plus the influence of American life resulted in political democracy (Lower, 1930, 70). He attributed the differences between American and Canadian democratic political systems to Canada's shorter frontier experience, stronger ties to Great Britian, and the Canadian inheritance of parliamentary government from Great Britian (Zaslow, 1948; 1959).

According to Lower, the basic question is a consideration of the effect of a new environment on in-migrants from an older, established society. Turner's thesis has limited relevance to this question since he focused solely on the American experience. The society which evolved in New England was clearly not the same as that in New France. While the North American environment did not have the impact of making the resultant societies from these two origins the same, Lower contends that "it has had great power to modify, to change old institutions and give them new form and spirit" (Lower, 1946, 48). That Lower under-estimated social relations and argued on the basis of ideological preconceptions is demonstrated by the following:

> From that time on [1618] the institutions of the English-speaking people in the New World have gone on developing in the light of their own needs but it is in detail rather than principle that they have diverged from those of England itself. Here is a nice example of environment modifying, but not completely changing transplanted forms.
>
> French settlement came from a land that had known little else but authority in church, state and feudal domain. How could any other kind of conception have been taken across the ocean? Yet it is remarkable and a tribute to the essential element of truth in Turner's analysis that French life and society in America departed considerably from authoritarianism and in spirit approached English life and society in America. Where conditions were so uniform as in the settlers' attack on the forest, and where it was the worth of a man as a man, as an axe-swinging, forest-clearing, crop-sowing, animal, that counted, the same qualities came to the fore, the same scale of values tended to prevail. Men were measured by their abilities for the task in hand--the pragmatism of the new world emerged at once--and by their qualities as neighbours. There was not much room for differentiation in skills and still less for differentiation in social class. The gentleman and the scholar did not count for much when it came to stump-pulling. Nor could pioneering skill be bought. It could be and was freely given, as among neighbours but few could rise to wealth and greatness by securing land and hiring others to till it for them. In all pioneer agricultural society, where nature was strong and man was weak, social equality was the rule, a sturdy sense of personal values prevailed, an empiric rather than a traditional measurement of men's values. North American democracy was forest-born (Lower, 1946, 48-49).

While Lower is considered to have made the best use of the Turner frontier thesis, in his later writings he began to place more stress on the "other side of the coin", the metropolitan thesis. Yet, despite his recognition of non-environmental, imported influences, Lower continued to be influenced by the frontier conception of history and, therefore, to over-emphasize geographic factors. In 1939 he argued that Canada is and always has been influenced by numerous geographical determinants. He stated that the greater part of Canada "must" remain a wilderness because of its geography and its climatic extremity. Paradoxically, Lower argued that this weakness may well be Canada's strength. Canada will always have a frontier in the North.

> This great sprawling country, nearly 4,000 miles from east to west, lies along the northern boundary of the United States, which means that at best it can have only a north temperate climate. How far north agricultural settlement of some sort is possible has yet to the determined: perhaps a surprising distance, but certainly to nothing like the full extent of the country. There will always be a belt towards the north, varying in thickness but nowhere less than several hundred miles wide, between the limits of settlement and the Arctic Ocean. Canada must thus, from several points of view, always be a country with a frontier--it must always look out on an unconquered stretch of Mother Nature.
>
> That may be for better or for worse. Nature fights the Canadian's every attempt to create for himself a national house, but she challenges his manhood. This window on the north will always let in fresh air. "The North"--in Canada the words are already becoming charged with the mystery and magnetism that "The West" once held for the United States-- may keep her people fresh and young and adaptive long after their frontier of settlement has closed (Lower, 1939, 232-233).

Others since Lower, have also considered Canada's North as a "New" frontier. Macdonald edited a book called The Arctic Frontier (1966) in which the main emphasis is on the economic feasibility of exploitation of the Arctic's non-renewable resources for national and, more importantly, international markets. Richard Rohmer's vision of a systematic exploitation of Mid-Canada's natural resources reflects a view of the boreal forest as being Canada's new frontier which is capable of re-invigorating the national purpose.

> It is futile to contemplate the orderly growth of a potentially powerful nation unless the people within that nation are working toward a common purpose. The orderly, planned development of Mid-Canada is a national project, a national purpose for Canada.
>
> Mid-Canada consistently stimulates ideas, opinions and discussion. It is a vital thing as it stands now, ready for Canadians to work together in deciding the future.
>
> No other nation has the opportunities which we Canadians possess. We have an enormous habitable Green North, virtually uninhabited in urban terms, and laced with probably the world's richest cross section of natural resources--timber, water, minerals, oil and game.
>
> Canada must be what Canadians make it. Canada must be, in the future, more than it is today; and it is today a fine, attractive nation.
>
> Canada is made up of people of a wide variety of interests, nations of origin, regional concerns, languages, colours and creeds. May it ever be this way. And may Canada find a common purpose behind which all Canadians can gather, to build a humane, productive, equitable nation (Rohmer, 1970, 140, 145-146).

Actually we see here, not so much a frontier which will alter existing societal institutions, but rather the settled areas (i.e. metropolitan corporate interests) moving into the relatively uninhabited and unexploited northern region of Canada in order to establish pockets of colonial settlement to facilitate the production of staple goods for export, with the consequent major economic benefits accruing to the metropolitan centers.

Such a metropolitanism perspective has the opposite focus to the frontier model. The frontier argument implied a moral struggle between native democratic forces and British traditional elements. This moral emphasis resulted in a de-emphasis of the existing conflicts between the eastern urban centers and the western pioneer agrarian interests (eg. the freight rates, Macdonald's National Policy). Thus, rather than referring to the constant expansion of the frontier, a metropolitan perspective refers to the constant extension of the exploiting metropolitan power that is pushing out into the frontier.

The frontier model was useful in interpreting the ubiquitous demands placed on the frontiersmen during the first stages of pioneer settlement, but it does not facilitate an analysis of the pattern of commercial frontiers which have characterized Canadian development (Cross, 1970, 5).

In sum, Canadian environmentalist historians often reflected varying degrees of influence from the frontier thesis. This entailed moral implications of a struggle between native democratic forces and European elements involving privilege, colonial exploitation, and outmoded social institutions. This often led to an oversimplified view of conflict between Western and Eastern Canada--between pioneer agrarian interests and exploitive urban centers. As shall be argued later, such a position ignores the exploitive structure of monopoly capitalism. Also, it is a psychologism-type interpretation in that stress is placed on the role of the actions of frontiersmen rather than on the structure of social relations.

THE STAPLE THEORY

The staple theory, which drew inspiration from Frederick

Jackson Turner, emphasized the importance of the eastern urban centers rather than the frontier outposts (Mackintosh, 1923, 15). The European colonial metropolitan centers' demand for luxury or "exotic" commodities was crucial to the development of the colonial hinterlands. Colonial North America had a limited number of staples to offer the metropoles because of the limitations of climate, geography, and transportation facilities. Initial staple production was concentrated in the production of fish, and especially of cod from the Grand Banks and the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Trade in furs, more specifically the beaver, with the Indians was initially the most profitable staple of the interior. Timber production in the form of square timber for Great Britain and, later, lumber for U.S.A. followed the disappearance of the beaver in the more accessible areas (Innis, 1956, 384).

Other staple commodities included agricultural products of the West and minerals of the Shield. While Innis asserted that the political boundaries of Canada were determined by the exigencies of production of furs for the London metropolis, his basic thesis was that Canada was created by an east-west line of imperial communications, relying on rivers and portages. The European metropoles manufactured goods for sale to the American colonials, while these metropoles were the purchasers of the colonialists' staple production.

Rapid industrialization in U.S.A. meant that it began to replace Great Britain as the major metropolitan importer of Canada's staples. On the other hand, Canada contributed to the industrial growth of the U.S.A. by becoming the gateway for U.S.A. to the markets of the British Empire[2] (Innis, 1956, 386).

THE LAURENTIAN PERSPECTIVE

The Laurentian approach to Canadian history grew from the aforementioned staple theory. Emphasis was placed on the importance of the St. Lawrence trade route in the development of Canada. The St. Lawrence metropolitan area attempted to reach out to include an increasingly larger economic domain. Montreal and, later, Toronto, was the core of this metropolitan area. Its commercial ties to the west and to Europe were the basis of its precarious prosperity (Creighton, 1937; Creighton, 1944).

> Canada, geographically and historically is the hinterland of the St. Lawrence sea-gate.
>
> It is, it might be contended, the hinterland of Montreal. However unpalatable such a claim would be to the hinterland, there is a large element of truth in it. From Montreal the French explorer, missionary and fur-trader set out, and from Montreal his English counterparts went off. In Montreal, fur-trading financiers established the first Bank in Canada, the Bank of Montreal, in 1817. That Bank has been intimately associated with Dominion Government finance, with the Canadian Pacific Railway and with the development of the west. Montreal, the first seat of English commercial interest in Canada, is still its financial headquarters (Lower, 1939, 245).

THE METROPOLITAN THESIS

Metropolitanism moved the emphasis on the staple and the Laurentian interpretation of Canadian history to a theory of urban growth (Cross, 1970, 38). This perspective asserted that capital investment, political ideas, social organization, and culture expand outward from the major urban centers of commerce and industry into the unpopulated and underdeveloped regions.

This represents a reversal of the geographical argument of frontierism. The focus in Canadian history is now on the effects of the East on the West. Businessmen and conservative urban political elements are considered agents of national expansion in opposition to the short-sighted agrarian elements (Careless, 1954, 16). The focus is no longer on the constant expansion of the frontier but, rather, on the constant extension of the metropolitan power via communication and commerce systems. For example, the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway prior to settlement of the West is viewed as the metropolis extending its domination westward, whereas, the frontier perspective concentrated on the contributions of the influx of immigrants into the Canadian western frontier. The latter perspective might lead one to conclude that the growth of militant agrarianism in the West was the result of "hard times" and that these frontiersmen's criticisms of the existing tariff policies and of the Canadian Pacific Railway as a monopolistic corporation owned by distant wealth were merely attempts at scape goating for their misfortunes (Stanley, 1940, 113-114).

Actually, the western agrarian "resistance" to the tariff policies, the land gifts to the C.P.R., and the C.P.R. freight rates was the beginning of a direct confrontation between the economically exploited Territories and the Eastern interests who wielded the salient economic and political power. Scape goating was a minor aspect of these confrontations. It will be argued in the following section that the metropolis-hinterland perspective is most useful in analysing these social relationships.

HINTERLAND VERSUS METROPOLIS

In the last section, we noted that the frontier thesis examined the effects of the frontier on the political system, the individual, as well as the metropolitan centres. We also noted that the metropolis perspective focuses on the eastern urban element as the agent of national growth and development. In this section, we argue that neither of these perspectives is sufficient to facilitate an analysis of the structure of relations between the metropolis and the frontier.

The structure of relations between the metropolis and the area over which it economically dominates, its hinterland, is exploitive. This is the basic characteristic of the metropolis-hinterland perspective, which we posit has greater heuristic utility in an analysis of social power than has the frontier thesis. The metropolis and the hinterland can be distinguished by geographic place as well as by power. Metropolis in North American society refers to the large urban centers which are the focal points of social and economic functions such as the manufacture of goods, provision of services, bureaucratic administration of economic enterprises and of governmental functions, technological innovation, and accumulation and control of capital (Usher, 1972, 5).

The different relative power position of the metropolis compared to the hinterland means that the relationship between them is not reciprocal or symbiotic in the sense of a functional division of the parts of the system being beneficial to the development of all parts. Rather, the relationship is a parasitic one, characteristic of imperialism.

In such an exploitive situation, the colonial power attempts to maximize its economic benefits. The colonial power experiences economic development by utilizing its more powerful military, constitutional, and economic position to exploit the colony's primary resources. These resources are used to enhance secondary industrial development and resultant employment opportunities in the colonial powers. The colonized area, as an exporter of staple products, becomes, or at least remains, underdeveloped compared with the colonial power (Frank, 1967, 3).

Metropolis-hinterland relationships are not found only on an international scale, as between colonial power and colony. The same relationships exist at lower levels of analysis, such as those between metropolitan city exploiting town and countryside (Davis, 1970c), large and small city, charter ethnic groups (Porter, 1965) and ethnic minorities.

We can systematically examine societal structure as a chain-like system of metropolis-satellite relations. In short, the exploitive nature of the capitalist system permeates the totality of social relations between the hinterland and metropolis, as well as within the hinterland.

In our analysis of the North West Territories, we must examine the structure of relations in terms of the world capitalist system. This level of analysis is relevant in determining the global supply and demand of oil, natural gas, and other non-renewable resources. This level of analysis will also direct our attention to those multinational corporations which are reaping benefits from their exploitive relationship with Canada, a hinterland. This situation will be further discussed in the next section.

The emanation of power and the diffusion of innovations from the metropolitan center to the hinterland occur through "entrepots" or intermediate metropoli or intermediate agents. These intermediate metropoli, while subordinate to the major metropoli, exert limited exploitive control over their own hinterlands. Canada has no primary metropoli. Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, and Ottawa are subordinate outposts of New York, Tokyo, Houston, and London.[3] Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver, in the larger American imperium, are intermediate metropoli which also have agents of exploitation in their respective hinterlands.

Agents of the senior metropolis are located in the subordinate metropoles. Irrespective of whether these agents are native to the hinterland, their role is to further the interests of their metropolitan employer. In effect, these agents agree to work within the rules adhered to by the metropolis. However, they establish social roots in the hinterland and, thus, they eventually become ambivalent concerning their defined role.

It has been argued that the metropolis-hinterland perspective is a short-run variation of the long-run Marxian dialectical process of social change (Davis, 1971, 15). Marx's analysis of nineteenth century Great Britain reveals the dynamics of the dialectical process. Capitalists and the proletariat are antinomies in his analysis.

> As soon as the process of transformation has sufficiently decomposed the old society from top to bottom, as soon as the labourers are turned into proletarians, their means of labor into

capital, as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its own feet, then the further socialisation of labour and further transformation of the land and other means of production into socially exploited and, therefore, common means of production, as well as the further expropriation of private proprietors, takes a new form. That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the labourer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many labourers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the centralisation of capital. One capitalist always kills many. Hand in hand with this centralisation, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever-extending scale, the cooperative form of the labour-process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labour into instruments of labour only usable in common, the economising of all means of production by their use as the means of production of combined, socialized labour, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world-market, and with this, the international character of the capital regime. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. Thus integument is burst assunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.

The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era: i.e., on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production.

The transformation of scattered private property, arising from individual labour, into capitalist private property is, naturally, a process incomparably more protracted, violent, and difficult, than the transformation of capitalistic private property, already practically resting on socialised production,

> into socialised property. In the former case, we had the expropriation of the mass of the people by a few usurpers; in the latter, we have the expropriation of a few usurpers by the mass of the people (Marx, 1967a, 762-764).

The metropolis-hinterland perspective is a holistic, dynamic, and long-run approach to the analysis of social structures. The focus is placed on antinomies of the metropolis and the hinterland. Analysis of this exploitive relationship facilitates clarification of possible alternatives in Canada's future development. This perspective is illuminated by the dialectical premise that major institutional changes of a society derive from internal as well as external oppositions within that society and in its milieu. We are referring to the focus on the exploitive relationships at all systemic levels of analysis as discussed earlier. The dialectical approach encompasses the inherent tendency of hinterlands to fight back against their exploiting metropolis.

In summary, the metropolis-hinterland schema does not focus the researcher's attention on all social relationships but rather emphasizes the conflictive and exploitive aspects of these existing relationships. It facilitates analysis of the historical development of a geographical area and predictions of possible future developments. Thus, Davis' use of the terms "overclass" and "underclass" to refer to the metropolis and hinterland, respectively, is warranted since it is attuned to Marx's interpretation of the dialectical process of social change (Davis, 1972, 36-38). However, the use of overclass and underclass is analytically confusing since metropolis and hinterland are not monolithic entities in that exploitation of the hinterland can be on the basis of class or region. On the other hand, there are certain levels of analysis in which it is useful to consider the hinterland structure, as a totality, in terms of its exploitation by the metropolitan structure as a totality.

METROPOLIS-HINTERLAND STRUCTURES IN N.W.T.

Earlier in this chapter we argued that we can identify the chain-like systems of metropolis-hinterland relations at different systemic levels of analysis. The analysis can examine the structure of such exploitive relations in the world capitalist system and follow this chain of relations through the economic exploitation of Canada by the large world metropoles and of the N.W.T by the multinational corporations, Southern Canada (via the Federal Government) and resource development towns like Yellowknife and some of the other large N.W.T. centers. Exploitive relations can also be elaborated in reference to relationships among ethnic groups. These relationships encompass numerous dimensions but we have examined only the political and economic power relationships between the Federal Government and the N.W.T.

It has been argued, albeit often implicitly, that the relationships involving the Federal Government and large corporations in the N.W.T. are intertwined because the Federal Government owns and controls the natural resources of the N.W.T. We suggest that the Federal Government is a metropolitan power exerting exploitive controls over the N.W.T.'s resources "for the benefit of Southern Canada". The multinational corporations are also involved in the exploitation of the N.W.T.'s resources with the benefits accruing to the multinational empires. On the one hand, the metropolis is heuristically defined as Ottawa whereas in the case of the multinationals the metropolis encompasses numerous political entities. However, we speak of them as essentially representing the U.S.A. as the largest industrial nation which takes the lion's share of available natural resources in Canada.[4]

We do not propose to elaborate all the existing metropolis-hinterland relationships which relate to the N.W.T. However, it is important to elucidate the nature of the global exploitive relationships in order to place our study below this link in the chain. These relationships obviously refer to the N.W.T. as the primary resource supply for the multinational enterprises. The N.W.T. has a large mineral potential. The eastern two-thirds of the mainland area and many of the Arctic Islands are covered by the mineral rich Canadian Shield. The western part of the N.W.T. bordering the Yukon is the Cordilleran region which is also potentially mineral rich. The Mackenzie Valley lies between these two mineral potential areas. It is an extension of the Great Central Plains and is considered as having good gas and petroleum potential.

The value of mineral production in the N.W.T. increased from $17.4 million in 1961 to $124 million in 1970. In 1970 this entailed $71 million, $34.8 million, $11.7 million, $4.7 million, $0.6 million and $0.5 million for zinc, lead, gold, silver, copper, and cadmium, respectively (Mines and Minerals, 1971, 39). Major deposits, such as the iron deposit at Mary River on Baffin Island, have not even been tapped, and much of the potential for minerals remains a matter of conjecture. They will become increasingly attractive to the large resource exploiters as improvements are made in mining technology, as transportation becomes less prohibitive in cost, and as metropolitan demand increases for the progressively scarcer high grade raw materials.

The industrialized nations face future critical shortages of energy and petrochemical feedstock and the Northwest Territories is one of the hinterland regions which will assist in alleviating possible economic disaster to these metropolis regions. The N.W.T. is a significant energy resource hinterland. Projected ultimate potentials of natural gas in the N.W.T. and Yukon is 430.7 quadrillion BTU as compared with, for example, Alberta's 85 quadrillion BTU. The estimated ultimate potential of conventional crude oil in Northern Canada (i.e. north of Latitude 60°) is 255.6 quadrillion BTU compared with Alberta's crude potential of 85 quadrillion BTU and heavy oils of 1,450 quadrillion BTU. The ultimate potential of hydro electricity in Northern Canada is 185 quadrillion BTU compared with Quebec's potential of 275 quadrillion and Ontario's 35 quadrillion BTU. Coal of four feet or more in thickness is widely distributed but no estimate of reserves have been made. While uranium deposits in Northern Canada are extensive there is insufficient data available to make estimates of reserves (Hunt, 1974, 163-192; Taylor, 1974, 193-198).

The N.W.T is indeed an important hinterland. The Geological Society of Canada estimated in 1973 that 28% of the ultimate recoverable potential oil reserves for all sedimentary basins of Canada (including the seabed in Canada's continental margin) are in the N.W.T. The

Society also estimated that 44% of the ultimately recoverable potential gas reserves are in the Northwest Territories.[5] These estimates are actually lower than the Geological Society's predictions in 1972. In that year, the Society projected that the N.W.T. contained 52% of Canada's ultimate recoverable conventional oil reserves and 53% of Canada's gas reserves (An Energy P., 1973a, 89; An Energy P., 1973b, 34-40). Based on Western Canadian well head prices in 1970, the value of the deposit in Northern Canada would be $122 billion for oil and $59 billion for gas (Nickle, 1970, 13). Of course their value has increased substantially with the increasing prices charged by OPEC members.

The first significant interest in the N.W.T.'s oil reserves occurred in response to the American Government's concern over fuel supplies to Alaska during W.W.II. The resulting Canol project was aimed at transporting petroleum from the Norman Wells field to a refinery in the Yukon and the transport of fuels to Alaska for use by the military (Stewart, 1946; Hopkins, 1943). During 1959 oil companies began a concerted effort to explore the northern petroleum deposits (Bateman, 1959) and the level of activity has continued to increase. The goal of the large multinational oil companies has been to obtain an assured supply of petrochemical feedstock and heating fuels in order to further the growth of their empires or, in some instances, to secure feedstock for their refineries.

The petroleum industry is the largest, wealthiest, and most powerful industry in the world. The multinational oil companies are economic empires. Seven oil companies produce over half of the world's oil and they include Exxon, Shell, Mobil, Texaco, Gulf, Standard, and

British Petroleum[6] (Yanchula, 1974). The size of these giants can be appreciated when we compare their volume of sales with the gross national product of countries. Switzerland's G.N.P. is about equal to Exxon's sales volume while Shell's is comparable to Ireland, Mobil's and Texaco's to Greece, Gulf's to the Philippines, Standard California's to Peru, and British Petroleum's to Taiwan (Palmer, 1974, 55).

We consider a corporation as foreign-controlled if at least 50 percent of its voting stock is held outside Canada or by one or more Canadian companies which are themselves foreign controlled. Foreign controlled firms dominate over 91% of the assets and over 95% of the sales in the petroleum (oil and gas) industry. Foreign controlled firms' assets increased from 89.8 percent of all petroleum firms in 1960 to 91.3 percent in 1970. Their share of sales increased from 89.8 to 95.9 percent during this same decade while their book profits increased from 88.6 to 92.6 percent. About 80 percent of the non-resident controlled assets in this industry are owned by American residents or U.S. resident-controlled corporations.

Vertically integrated companies refer to those firms which have operations in exploration, development, production, refining, and marketing. All such integrated companies in the petroleum industry in Canada are non-resident controlled. Totally integrated petroleum firms own about one half of the total industry assets. The main source of funding for the predominantly foreign-controlled petroleum industry is revenue which is generated within Canada. For example, 66 percent of the industry's capital came from internal sources between 1961 and 1970 and this proportion is even larger in the case of the integrated multinational operators. About 20 percent of the financing of the industry originated outside Canada during 1966 to 1970 (An Energy P., 1973a, 238-247; An Energy P., 1973b, 218-230).

We can identify the nature of the metropolis-hinterland links in the chain between the N.W.T. and the multinational oil empires. The N.W.T. contains a significant reserve of energy which these corporations require in order to remain viable empires. Since they are multinational they can survive, and in fact, thrive irrespective of possible limitations on exports of Canadian petroleum to the U.S.A. In their accounting systems on a global scale, if Canada insists on utilizing her own oil east of the Ottawa River, this simply frees their oil produced in the countries which exported to Canada which, in turn, can be marketed to the Americans.

Numerous regulatory controls over these corporations are required in their development of the petroleum deposits in the N.W.T. The Territorial Council lacks the political maturity and the Territorial Administration lacks the expertize to deal with these multinationals. While it is often argued that the Federal Government has been unable or unwilling to exert effective controls, it should be better equipped than the N.W.T. Government.

The critical link in the exploitation chain between the Federal Government and the N.W.T. entails at least two salient aspects. One link entails the Federal Government as a buffer separating the multinationals and the N.W.T. In this link would be found the Federal Government's policy guidelines and research for economic development in the N.W.T. An example of this would be the proposed Mackenzie Valley pipeline (Pipeline Guidelines, 1972; Envir.-Soc. Comm., 1972).

A second analytical link in the chain entails the Federal Government's ownership and control of the N.W.T.'s natural resources. The Federal Government has spent large sums in the N.W.T. for social and health services. The level of Federal Government spending in the N.W.T. has grown at a staggering rate, but federal ownership of the vast wealth of minerals and energy will likely produce a sizeable return on this investment. A more accurate picture of this metropolis-hinterland link must focus on the N.W.T. as a raw material pool which will be utilized by factories in Southern Canada (as well as U.S.A. and other metropoles). Major benefits would accrue to the metropolis in terms of increased industrialization whereas the N.W.T. would remain a primary product exporter.

COLLECTION OF DATA

1. Research in Yellowknife

The proceedings of the 47th Session of Council were observed primarily to give the researcher an appreciation of the unrecorded interaction which occurred among Council Members and between members and the Commissioner. The primary purpose was to facilitate interpretation of the analysis of the recorded debate.

Interviews with Council Members were conducted to acquire an understanding of their positions in relation to the various vested interests in the N.W.T., the question of confrontation with the Federal Government, and their vision of the future of the N.W.T. Some of the salient questions asked during the interview included the Council Members' views about the political and economic future of the

N.W.T., resource exploitation in N.W.T., northern entrepreneurs, native peoples in Territorial society, Federal-Territorial and Council-Administration relations, and the nature of cogent problems in N.W.T.

The interviews of Federal officials in Yellowknife centered around their perceptions of the role of the Federal Government in the economic future of N.W.T. Interviews of corporate employees and local businessmen focussed on their perceptions of the political confrontations between Council and the Federal Government, the implications of economic controls being exercised by the distant Federal Government, and their views of the effectiveness of Council in addressing to the salient issues confronting the N.W.T.

2. Research in Ottawa

Senior federal civil servants in the Indian Affairs and Northern Development Department were interviewed to ascertain their perceptions of the political and economic future of the N.W.T. and the degree to which the Federal Administration was prepared to encourage implementation of the Carrother's Commission recommendations. We wished to answer the query, among others, of whether the implementation of the Indian white paper was premised on the transfer of Indian Affairs personnel to Northern Development since, as will be seen later. Territorial residents suspected the Federal Government of becoming "entrenched" in the N.W.T.

Data which was unobtainable in Western Canada was collected in Ottawa in the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Library as well as the National Library and Public Archives. This part of the research was addressed at collection of data for the historical analysis of the N.W.T. from 1870 up to and including the present political and economic structure.

3. Derivation of Hypotheses

Our thesis is aimed at a substantive analysis of the political and economic power structure of the N.W.T. and at an assessment of the heuristic value of the metropolis-hinterland model in such an analysis. This model was utilized in our historical analyses. This researcher was not content to remain at an "esoteric", polemic, Grand Theory or Abstracted Empiricist (Mills, 1959) level of discourse but rather sought insights from empirical data sources in reference to the goal of theory construction. One such data source was the recorded Territorial Council Debates. We treated some of the basic tenets of the metropolis-hinterland model, as evidenced in the literature, as hypotheses requiring testing in specific empirical cases where the basic structure of relations entailed a metropolis exploiting a hinterland.

We derived three general hypotheses from our review of the sociological literature.

1. The hinterland will eventually rebel against the metropolis (Davis, 1971, 16).
2. Hinterland spokesmen emerge and they act as leaders of confrontations against the metropolis.
3. The metropolis has key agents in its subordinate hinterlands and their role is to promote the interests of their metropolitan employers.

Hypotheses which are specific to the Northwest Territories have been derived from these general tenets and are discussed in Chapter VI.

SUMMARY

The metropolis-hinterland model has been utilized by Frank in his studies of Latin America. His description of the "development of underdevelopment" suggests that Latin America is as much a part of the monopoly capitalist system as are the relatively more economically developed areas, such as Canada.

> My thesis is that these capitalist contradictions and the historical development of the capitalist system have generated underdevelopment in the peripheral satellites whose economic surplus was expropriated, while generating economic development in the metropolitan centers which appropriate that surplus--and, further, that this process still continues (Frank, 1967, 3).

We stated earlier that a key aspect of our model is the "nesting" of exploitive systems. The exploitive nature of the capitalist system permeates the totality of social relations within the hinterland as well as between the hinterland and metropolis. Whatever we choose as our level of analysis is arbitrary but, in practice, our decision will be dictated by what we are studying. Wherever we choose in this metropolis-hinterland chain, we must determine where the exploiters and exploited are. We must also examine the nature of the relationship between the two. While the relationship between a metropolis and its hinterland has economic, geographic, historical, sociological, and political dimensions, we will, in this thesis, focus on the economic and political dimensions.

CHAPTER TWO

FOOTNOTES

[1] Sage views the North American westward expansion as a single movement which was not influenced by the international boundary between Canada and U.S.A.

[2] Canada's National Policy under Macdonald plus the Commonwealth Preferential Tariff agreements encouraged American firms to sell to the British Empire via Canada.

[3] Canada may even experience a proliferation of extra-territorial super-metropoli in that Western European metropolitan centers may also become involved in exploiting the Canadian hinterland (Mandel, 1970, 30-34; Hymer, 1972, 30-34).

[4] Of course it is realized that the U.S.A. is being joined by other countries as Canada's metropoles. Japan appears to be a significant metropolis of the future.

[5] A common method of estimating the possible oil and gas potential of relatively unexplored areas is to estimate the volume of sediments within sedimentary basins and compare this estimate with other more developed basins. This approach reveals that the N.W.T. has a much greater oil and gas potential than the Yukon. The Yukon contains about 64,500 cubic miles of sediments whereas continental N.W.T. contains 267,033 cubic miles and the Arctic Islands reveal 663,500 cubic miles (Oil and Gas, 1970, 9).

[6] We should actually label them energy companies as the giants have secured an economic future for themselves by diversifying into permits over coal and uranium deposits.

CHAPTER THREE

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER IN THE NORTH-WEST TERRITORIES, 1870 - 1905

The value of the historical perspective in sociological studies has been demonstrated by the classical sociologists. Our analysis of the structure of power in the Northwest Territories requires a historical perspective to facilitate analysis of the relative power of the Territorial Government in relation to the Federal Government.

In this chapter we examine the relationship between the Federal and Territorial Governments from 1870, the date of the acquisition of the North-West Territories, to the formation of the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905. This survey will cover the terms of provincehood levied on Manitoba, the struggle for responsible government in what is now Alberta and Saskatchewan, and the terms of their provincehood. Our concern is with the constitutional developments as well as the issue of ownership of natural resources.

ACQUISITION OF RUPERT'S LAND AND THE NORTH-WESTERN TERRITORY

Innis has asserted that Canada's boundaries were a result of the westward expansion of the fur trade (Innis, 1956, 118, 401-402). At least it can be stated that the colonialists' interests in expanding contact into the unexplored western and northern territories were motivated by the desire to obtain furs for the European markets in trade for European manufactured goods which were requisite to the colonialists' standard of living. We saw in an earlier chapter that writers such as Benjamin Sulte have posited that the chief, and possibly only, objective of the explorers in Canada was the extension of the fur trade. The traders from Montreal or Hudson Bay penetrated deeper and deeper into the heart of unexplored territory in their search for new and untapped fur regions (d'Eschambault, 1958, 3).

The relationship between France and the New World and, later, between England and her Canadian colonies was that of imperial control by the motherland over the staple-producing colonies.

It has been observed that clear parallels exist between the imperial-colonial relationship of Great Britain to the original members of Confederation and the relationship of the Canadian Federal Government to the North-West Territories in the area that is now Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. It is this colonial relationship which we wish to examine in terms of the Territories' aspirations for representative and responsible government as well as ownership and control of natural resources.

Section 146 of the British North America Act laid the legislative foundation for Canada's territorial expansion.

> XI - Admission of Other Colonies 146. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the advice of Her majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, on Addresses from the Houses of the Parliament of Canada, and from the Houses of the respective Legislatures of the Colonies or Provinces of Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, and British Columbia, to admit those Colonies or Provinces, or any of them into the Union, and on Address from the Houses of the Parliament of Canada to admit Rupert's Land and the North-western Territory, or either of them, into the Union, on such Terms and Conditions in each case as are in the Addresses expressed and as the Queen thinks fit to approve, subject to the Provisions of this Act; and the Provisions of any Order in Council in that Behalf shall have effect as if they had been enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (Driedger, 1967, 42).

As seen in this section, the B.N.A. Act alluded to the existence of both Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory. This Act recognized that Rupert's Land consisted of all of the Hudson Bay drainage basin north of the United States, and that the North-Western Territory existed separate from the Hudson's Bay Company's domain. This latter area, according to Canadians such as William McDougall, was contiguous with Upper Canada and included most of the prairie region from the Red River to the Rockies (Journals H. of C., 1870).

The union of Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, and British Columbia was to be initiated by joint action of the Canadian Parliament and the respective colony. Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory were to be united to Canada by unilateral action of the Canadian Parliament. Formalization of this union was the purview of the British Government.

The relative status of Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory is also evidenced in section 147 of the B.N.A. Act where provision was made for Senate representation of Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island when they joined Confederation, but no such provision was made for the Territories. Finally, we can see in the B.N.A. Act that it was possible for the Imperial and Canadian governments to effect a transfer of Rupert's Land from the Hudson's Bay Company to Canada without prior consultation with this Chartered Company nor with the affected residents living in the Territory.

The Canadian Senate and the House of Commons passed a joint address on December 16 and 17, 1869 in which they formally requested the Queen of England to unite Rupert's Land and the North-West

Territories to Canada. They also expressed a willingness to establish "political institutions bearing analogy, as far as circumstances will admit, to those which exist in the several Provinces . . . " (Oliver, 1915, 946).

Actual transfer was facilitated by the Imperial Parliament's passage of the Rupert's Land Act on July, 1868. This, in effect, was an amendment to the B.N.A. Act. This Act provided for transfer of ownership from the Imperial Government by establishing separately an agreement with the Hudson's Bay Company and with the Canadian government. It also provided for payment of £300,000 to the Company by Canada. Most importantly, it established Canadian federal control over the North-West.

> . . . it shall be lawful for the Parliament of Canada . . . to make, ordain, and establish within the Land and Territory so admitted as aforesaid all such Laws, Institutions, and Ordinances, and to constitute such Courts and Officers, as may be necessary for the Peace, Order, and good government of Her Majesty's Subjects and others therein . . . . (Canadian Statutes, 1869, iv-v).

The Canadian Government was to recognize land titles granted by the Hudson's Bay Company to the inhabitants of the country. It was also to communicate with Great Britain's Government in reference to decisions on Indian claims settlements.

This amendment to the B.N.A. Act, as we have seen, gave the Canadian Government unrestricted authority to formulate plans for local government in the Territories. The Macdonald government adopted an interim measure by passing "An Act for the temporary government of Rupert's Land and the Northwestern Territory when united with Canada" on June 22, 1869. This Act placed despotic rule on the North-West for an indeterminate period of time (Morton, 1938). A Lieutenant-Governor, to be appointed by the Federal Government, would administer local government in the North-West Territories under instructions from Ottawa. A Council of seven to fifteen members could be appointed by the Federal Government and its powers were to be defined by the Governor General in Council.

THE MANITOBA PROVINCE

Actual transfer of the North-West Territories, as it was subsequently called, occurred December 1, 1869. It is common knowledge that the Macdonald Administration did not adequately communicate with the residents in the Red River Settlements to alleviate their suspicions and hostilities regarding this impending transfer (Journals H. of C., 1874, Appendix 6). For example, the Metis settlers were not consulted concerning the land-survey program by Canadian surveyors prior to the transfer of this Territory to Canada nor were they told of the planned method of Territorial Government by the Ottawa Administration.

Negotiations for the transfer were conducted among three parties: the Hudson's Bay Company, Great Britain, and the Canadian Federal Government. Concern was with the transfer of a real estate empire of 2,300,000 square miles. The negotiators ignored the fact that a population had resided in this territory for over thirty years under an established system of government, courts, churches, and schools and that public opinion in the Red River Settlements should be considered or that the local residents might even be consulted. In the absence of such an exchange of reliable information, public opinion among the residents was molded by conjecture and suspicion.

Union with Canada represented a threat to the way of life of the French-speaking Metis. Their semi-nomadic life consisting of buffalo hunting and fur freighting as well as their very cultural existence were threatened by the impending flood of immigrants. At the time of union, this segment of the population numbered about 5,600 compared with 4,000 English-speaking half-breeds and 1,600 white residents (Thomas, 1956, 21). Even prior to the union of the North-West Territories with Canada, the French-speaking half-breed population had felt threatened by the westward advance of an English, Protestant agricultural economy which was incompatible with the economy based on fur and buffalo.

Contrary to popular belief in Canada at that time, the Red River Settlement was not suffering under a yoke of tyranny by the Hudson's Bay Company even though it was a fur and agricultural hinterland region and, as such, subject to economic exploitation. The temporary government which was established by the Canadian Parliament in 1869 was politically a backward step compared to the governmental organization which existed under the Company. The Council of Assiniboia had included local representation whereas the Canadian provision for government included only an appointed governor and council. The governor, as head of the government administration, was appointed and responsible to London under the Hudson's Bay Company and to Ottawa under Canada (Wade, 1955, 396).

The Red River "resistance movement" of 1869-1870 was the result of the failure by the Federal Government to appreciate the extant sense of community in the Red River area. The French Metis viewed themselves as a "new nation". The Temporary Government Act was interpreted by the Metis as a threat to their French language and Roman Catholic faith.

Initially, both the Red River Metis and the Canadian Government assumed that Territorial status would continue after the transfer from the Hudson's Bay Company. Evidence of this was seen in the two Lists of Rights which were drafted by French and English representatives in the Red River area. Six weeks elapsed between the acceptance of the Second List by a constitutional convention meeting during January 27 to February 10, 1870, and the departure of the Red River delegates for Ottawa for negotiation of terms by which the Settlement would join Confederation.[1] This delay was caused by the incorrect assumption that Bishop Tache, who had stopped in Ottawa February 9 on his return to the Red River from Rome, had been given authority to speak for the Federal Government. On March 15 the Council of the Provisional Government, which was composed of English and French-speaking metis, met with the Bishop. On the basis of his advice, the Council redrafted the Second List of Rights and decided to request provincial rather than territorial status at the time of union with Canada.

Political expediency eventually motivated the Macdonald Government to accede to this demand (Thomas, 1956, 43). While it satisfied the Red River residents, it also assured the opening of the remaining part of the large land transfer as a hinterland for immigration[2] (Martin, 1920, 45). One of the conditions of provincehood imposed on Manitoba was that the Federal Government would retain ownership of the public lands. Thus, the Manitoba Act had been drafted with the express purpose of settling the uprising by the least possible alteration to the Territorial status of economic hinterland.

THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND THE MANITOBA ACT

The Federal Government of Canada was concerned with the promotion of immigration into the newly created province of Manitoba as well as into the North-West Territories. This policy underlay the Macdonald Government's position that the Federal Government must retain control of public lands in order to provide free homestead lands to immigrants as well as land inducements to the Canadian Pacific Railroad.

> The success of the undertakings [immigration, building the C.P.R., and the identification of school lands out of crown lands] by the Dominion Government in and for the Northwest depends largely upon the settlement of the lands. Combined with a great expenditure in organizing and maintaining an immigration service abroad and at home, Parliament pledged its faith to the world that a large portion of those lands should be set apart for free homesteads to all coming settlers, and another portion to be held in trust for the education of their children. No transfer could, therefore, be made, without exacting from the Province the most ample securities that this pledged policy shall be maintained; hence, in so far as the free lands extend there would be no monetary advantage to the Province, whilst a transfer would most assuredly seriously embarass all the costly immigration operations which the Dominion Government is making in behalf of Manitoba and the Territories (Lingard, 1946, 212).

The Committee of the Canadian Privy Council also expressed the view that the transfer of ownership of public lands to Manitoba would, by precedent, culminate in a similar surrender to any future provinces which might be created from the North-West Territories. This would be tantamount to possibly eliminating such regions as hinterlands for Ottawa's immigration and railroad policies.

This question of the administration of land and the benefits to be derived from land ownership has recurred since the cession of Canada to Britain in 1763. One of Lord Durham's tasks in 1838 was to remedy the problems of poor administration of the public domain. By tracing his recommendations we can see the analogy to the thinking of the Macdonald Administration during the formation of Manitoba's provincehood. Durham proposed that the administration of the public lands and the revenue accruing from them should be retained by the imperial government.

> . . . To provide large funds for emigration, and for creating and improving means of communication throughout the provinces; . . . to encourage the investment of surplus British capital in these colonies, by rendering it . . . secure; to promote the settlement of wild lands and the general improvement of the colonies; . . . to extend the demand for British manufactured goods, and the means for paying for them; and to augment the colonial revenues . . . (Lucas, 1912, 328-329).

The British government did not follow the advice of Durham respecting public lands. The 1840 Act of Union provided for the surrender of all territorial and other revenues of the Crown within Canada to the provinces. Subsequent acts of the British Parliament terminated any existing theoretical claims of Britain to territorial revenues which derived from Crown lands as well as ending its veto power over provincial bills which pertained to the public domain in the United Canada. In a similar manner, the imperial government relinquished rights over public lands in the Maritime Provinces in the 1840's when they attained responsible government.

The Manitoba Act of 1870 was drafted in Ottawa in consultation with Rev. J. N. Ritchot, Judge Black, and Alfred Scott from the Red River Settlement. The negotiations by these three representatives were not based upon the adopted second List of Rights of the Red River Constitutional Convention but rather upon a secret list of rights which was drafted at Bishop's Palace at St. Boniface. Even that list had called for the Legislature of the proposed Manitoba Provinces to have control over and ownership of all public lands.

Section 30 of the Manitoba Act alluded to the public land question.

> All ungranted or waste lands in the Province shall be, from and after the said transfer, vested in the Crown, and administered by the Government of Canada for the purpose of the Dominion (Statutes of Can., 1870).

This position was contrary to the wishes of all the Red River inhabitants as evidenced in the records of their demands. It contravened the desires of the English-speaking population as well as the lists of rights drafted under Riel's influence. It is noteworthy that section 31 of the Act provided for a grant of land to the French-speaking Metis and, thus, effectively placated their opposition to federal control of provincial land.

We earlier drew an analogy between the imperial policies of Great Britian over her colonies and the relationship imposed on the North-West Territories by the Canadian Federal Government. We are forced to conclude that the colonial policy of the Federal Government pertaining to Crown lands in Manitoba departed very fundamentally from the precedent established by Britain in its colonial empire. Canada's withholding of ownership of Crown lands following the granting of responsible government to Manitoba in 1870 was an exception to the basic British practice of granting ownership of crown lands along with the grant of responsible government. This basic practice had been followed by Britain in reference to every self-governing province and Dominion within the British Commonwealth (Martin, 1922, 44).

We will see later in this chapter that this Federal Government move of retaining control of crown land despite the granting of responsible government became an established policy for subsequent newly formed provinces. In the following chapter, we will also see that this probable course of action is a major source of conflict between the present-day Territorial Council and the Federal Government.

GOVERNMENT IN THE NORTH-WEST TERRITORIES AFTER THE MANITOBA ACT AND THE DRIVE FOR PROVINCEHOOD

The Temporary Government Act of 1869, which, as we have seen, was unpalatable to the Red River settlers, became the basis for administration of the remaining domain called the North-West Territory. One suspects that this was possible because the areas west of Manitoba in 1870 were sparsely populated, communication was difficult, and the resident white population in places like Edmonton and Prince Albert, lacked the social, economic, and political bases of a community structure. Colonial pressure for self-government would have to await the growth of population and the emergence of articulate spokesmen.

The Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba acted as Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Territories. Federal Government indifference to local government was evidenced when Ottawa merely re-enacted the Temporary Government Act in 1871 rather than replacing the original hastily drafted legislation with a new act based on carefully determined policies.

The first Lieutenant-Governor, Archibald, was forced to govern for two years without the appointment of a Council. Perhaps most serious was the Federal Government's reticence in granting Archibald sufficient powers to enable him to govern the North-West Territories effectively. Archibald's frustration with this situation was reflected in his statement to Howe in November of 1871.

> At this moment I am governing that Territory with very undefined authority. It is doubtful what is at this moment Law in the North-West . . . . Meanwhile applications have been made to me with a view to Legislation on several matters connected with the Territory and which ought to be dealt with, but which cannot be touched till Legislative power is conferred (Thomas, 1956, 52).

The first Council was constituted on December 28, 1872 with the appointment of eleven members. An Order in Council of February 12, 1873 established the powers of the provisional government under Lieutenant-Governor and Council. While the territorial legislature was given jurisdiction over areas similar to the other provinces, its legislation had to be approved by the Governor General in Council. In addition, ordinances could be disallowed within two years of their passage. This reflected the Macdonald view of dominance of the central government in territorial administration.

Increasing sentiments toward attaining self-government in the Territories seems to have been inevitable considering its blatant neglect by the Federal Government. The formation of the Mackenzie administration on November 7, 1873 did not mark a change in Federal Government inertia. For example, of eleven Acts passed by the Territorial Council after the Liberals took office, one was approved and no action was taken on the others. The Council was almost totally ineffective. Its weak legislative position dictated that it was unable to establish an administrative programme. In addition, the Council lacked local revenue sources and the federal grant was meagre.[3]

The distinctive political evolution of the North-West Territories commenced with the North-West Territories Act of 1875, which became operative on October 7, 1876. This Act placed responsibility for the administration of Territorial government under the purview of a resident Lieutenant-Governor. He was to be assisted by a North-West Council of no more than five who were to be appointed by the Governor-General in Council. The Lieutenant-Governor possessed executive and legislative powers. The latter included matters of local municipal taxation, property and civil rights, administration of justice, public health, police, roads, highways, bridges, and all matters of a local and private nature. In addition, there was provision for the Lieutenant-Governor to establish an electoral district in any portion of the Territories not larger than one thousand square miles and containing a population of not less than one thousand adults. Such an electoral district would then elect a Council member. When the elected members numbered twenty-one, the Council would then be designated a Legislative Assembly.

The Act was drafted by Prime Minister Mackenzie and the Deputy Minister of Justice. The Minister of the Interior, whose department was responsible for the North-West Territories, had little to do with the writing of this legislation. He did, however, assert that the Act was too hastily prepared. Defects in the Act had to be amended by a subsequent session of Parliament, "the first of a series of piecemeal changes by which the territorial constitution evolved during the next two decades" (Thomas, 1956, 73). For example, the Act did not indicate whether the Council's approval was required for executive matters. Although the Mackenzie administration probably intended it, the Act did not clarify whether the attainment of twenty-one elected members and, thus, the attainment of a Legislative Assembly meant responsible government would be achieved.

From the viewpoint of political evolution, the Act placed some salient restrictions on the Council's legislative power. Parliament attempted to control the organization of municipalities and school districts. Municipalities could only be established in electoral districts and municipal organization had to precede school district organization. A Roman Catholic or Protestant minority could establish a separate school system. The Act also revealed important omissions. It did not provide for future representation of the Territories in Parliament. It did not establish a blueprint of how the Territories or parts of the Territories could gain provincehood. Finally, the Act did not clarify the financial relationship between the Territorial and Federal Governments. The one obvious immediate improvement from the point of view of the Territories was that ordinances no longer required approval of the Governor General in Council prior to becoming operative.

The numerous serious imperfections of the 1875 North-West Territories Act were not rectified in the 1877 amendment to this Act. By repealing the powers of the Territorial Council as enumerated in 1875 and by restoring the system of powers being conferred by federal Order in Council, the federal cabinet was able to list these approved powers on May 11. These new powers of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council included:

1. The establishment and tenure of Territorial Offices, and the appointment and payment of Territorial Officers.
2. The establishment, maintenance and management of prisons in and for the North-West Territories.
3. The establishment of Municipal Institutions in the Territories, in accordance with the provisions of "The North-West Territories Act, 1875-1877".
4. The issue of Shop, Auctioneer and other Licenses, in order to the raising of a revenue for territorial or municipal purposes.
5. The solemnization of marriage in the Territories.
6. The Administration of Justice including the constitution, organization and maintenance of Territorial Courts of civil jurisdiction.
7. The imposition of punishment by fine, penalty or imprisonment for inforcing any territorial Ordinance.
8. Property and civil rights in the Territories, subject to any Legislation by the Parliament of Canada upon these subjects.

   and

9. Generally on matters of a merely local or private nature in the Territories [i.e. municipal powers] (Journals of C., 1878, 9).

The list was selected from the enumerated provincial powers of the B.N.A. Act. Provincial powers which were listed in the B.N.A. Act but withheld from Territorial Government purview included amendment of the constitution of the province (sec. 92, s.s.1), direct taxation (sec. 92, s.s.2), borrowing of money on the sole credit of the province (sec. 92, s.s.3), management and sale of public land (sec. 92, s.s.4), establishment and maintenance of hospitals, asylums, charities, and eleemosynary institutions (sec. 92, s.s.7), local works and undertakings (sec. 92, s.s.10), and the incorporation of companies (sec. 92, s.s.11).

The federal Order in Council did not alter the extant restrictions on the Territories with reference to municipal institutions, property and civil rights, administration of justice, and the imposition of punishment by fines. The retention of the 1875 restrictions on the organization of municipalities and school districts was more significant. The stipulation of a requisite of one thousand adults within a similar number of square miles was too restrictive for both the election of a Council member as well as the formation of a municipal and, subsequently, a school district (Journals of C., 1879, 24-26). Retention of this position, despite the existence of smaller constituencies in Manitoba and British Columbia, dictated that the first electoral districts could not be formed until 1880, at which time Salisbury, Kimberley, and Lorne districts were established. It is paradoxical that only Lorne District (Prince Albert and St. Laurent settlements) elected a Council member as the former two districts became part of the enlarged Manitoba province in 1881.

The restrictions on the Council's powers in the area of municipal districts were eliminated with the Macdonald-sponsored consolidation of the North-West Territories Act in 1880. This consolidation did not give Council full reign in the municipal field. In fact, during the 1884 sitting of Parliament two Territorial representatives commuted to Ottawa to attain a declaratory amendment which authorized municipalities to levy taxes. The enforced relationship among electoral districts, municipalities, and school districts was not entirely eliminated by the drafters of this Consolidation Act.

Elimination of the requirement of municipal organization preceding the formation of a school district did not occur until 1885.

The Lieutenant-Governor was a significant force during the 1880's in administration, legislation, and politics. The expense of involving an ever-growing Council in executive-advising functions dictated that it had to permit the Lieutenant-Governor to exercise extensive executive duties. When we also consider his powers as the representative of the Federal Government in Territorial governmental affairs as well as his being the Indian Commissioner, we appreciate the influence of this position. The annual report of the Lieutenant-Governor concerning Territorial and Indian Affairs was the major source of information available to the Federal Government concerning political, economic, and social conditions in the North-West Territories.

From the Council of 1883 onward we see a marked movement on the part of Council members for increased autonomy. By 1883 political parties began to emerge and play a major role in this pressure for representative and responsible government. A majority of Council Members were Conservatives but they were concerned about attaining increased autonomy from the Conservative Macdonald Administration in Ottawa.[4]

By 1884 social conditions in the North-West Territories exasperated the rise of this discontent of Council. A business depression followed the collapse of the land boom of 1882 in Manitoba and the territories. In the agricultural segment early frosts and low prices hit hard. A decline in the rate of immigration reflected the trying economic conditions. There was talk of rebellion and of secession over the monopoly of the C.P.R., grants of large parcels of land for colonization companies, tariff on lumber and agricultural machinery, and bureaucratic inflexibility in the land regulations governing homesteads.

Discontent was most intense in the electoral district of Lorne in the District of Saskatchewan. White and English-speaking half-breed settlers around Prince Albert had been demoralized and economically depressed when it was by-passed by the C.P.R. Federal funds were being disproportionately expended on new settlements along the C.P.R. line. The French-speaking metis had been joined by metis from Manitoba who had moved west in an attempt to retain their nomadic, buffalo-oriented way of life. The disappearance of the buffalo left them economically depressed and unable to switch to an agricultural existence.

Employment of this segment of the population had markedly declined with the decline in immigration and the business depression. Their social situation was seemingly ignored by government representatives and the cumulative result by 1884 was that many were vulnerable to an aggressive leadership in the cause of rebellion. Louis Riel was invited to come to Saskatchewan to organize a powerful movement with the goal of shocking Ottawa into giving attention to their legitimate grievances. In the fall, Lieutenant-Governor Dewdney informed Prime Minister Macdonald that the metis unrest could be settled if the government addressed itself to the Metis land claims and the creation of work for the unemployed. Macdonald considered that the answer was not to deal with the grievances but rather to strengthen the police force to quell the impending uprising (Thomas, 1956, 130).

RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

The British North America Act of 1867 does not address the question of responsible government. The sections pertaining to the executive powers in the Federal Government, if taken literally, indicates an arbitrary monarchial rule.

> 9. The Executive Government and Authority of and over Canada is hereby declared to continue to be vested in the Queen.
>
> 10. The provisions of this Act referring to the Governor General extend and apply to the Governor General for the Time being of Canada, or other the Chief Executive Officer or Administrator for the Time being carrying on the Government of Canada on behalf and in the Name of the Queen, by whatever Title he is designated.
>
> 11. There shall be a Council to aid and advise in the Government of Canada, to be styled the Queen's Privy Council for Canada; and the Persons who are to Members of that Council shall be from Time to Time chosen and summoned by the Governor General and sworn in as Privy Councillors, and Members thereof may be from Time to Time removed by the Governor General (Driedger, 1967, 3-4).

To fully comprehend the evolutionary rather than constitutional basis of responsible government in the British Parliamentary system we can examine the British transition from arbitrary government, deriving from divine right of the monarchy, to a form of government in which the elective parliament aspired to control the executive function of government. Close to 400 years of parliamentary evolution occurred prior to the demands in 1641 for ministers who possessed the confidence of Parliament. Responsible government was attained 150 years later. The change was so gradual that even by the early 1800's responsible government was not a written political doctrine. With specific reference to the British colonial system, the key difference between the old colonial governance and self-government was responsible government (Martin, 1923, 42).

An Act of the British Parliament or a written constitution did not accomplish the establishment of responsible self-government in Canada. It was rather achieved merely by a change in perspective or in convention on the part of Lord Elgin, the Governor in Canada in 1852. He merely followed the advice of his Canadian ministers in implementing the Rebellion Losses Bill. Thus, established practice made section 9 of the B.N.A. Act mean exactly the opposite of what it states. 'Behind this phraseology lie two centuries of history and "unwritten" convention from Pym and Hampden to Walpole and Chatham and Rockingham and Addington and Durham and Elgin and Joseph Howe' (Martin, 1923, 49).

Section 63 of the B.N.A. Act refers to the provincial executive power.

> 63. The Executive Council of Ontario and of Quebec shall be composed of such Persons as the Lieutenant Governor from Time to Time thinks fit, and in the first instance of the following Officers, namely,--the Attorney General, the Secretary and Registrar of the Province, the Commissioner of Agriculture and Public Works, within Quebec the Speaker of the Legislative Council and the Solicitor General (26) (Driedger, 1967, 18).

Actual practice is again opposite to the stated clause in that the Executive Council was composed, from the outset, of persons who had the respect of the majority in the Legislature rather than those the Lieutenant Governor thought to be "fit".

In summary, then, our analysis of the North-West Territories in terms of its striving for responsible government is not an analysis of a drive for the rewriting of the B.N.A. Act or of the Northwest

Territories Act. It is rather an analysis of the aspirations of the population in the North-West Territories to move from colonial status to the practice of British Parliamentary government.

The initial objective of the people in the Territories was for responsible government rather than for provincial status. The North-West Territories Act of 1888, which came into force on May 22nd, was another "example of the makeshift legislation which had plagued the Territories since the Temporary Government Act of 1869" (Thomas, 1956, 152). The Act provided for a Legislative Assembly of twenty-two elected and three appointed members. The legislative function of the Assembly in terms of its relationship to the Lieutenant Governor approximated the provincial model. The executive function was a different matter. An advisory council of four persons was established with jurisdiction restricted to the general revenue fund of the Territories. That is, it had purview over the revenue raised from local taxation. Since the federal grant was about ten times the amount collected from local sources, this advisory council was in a weak position.

It was to be expected that the limited powers of the Legislative Assembly of the Territories would not continue to satisfy the aspirations of the population who were accustomed to the expectation of a political evolution toward full self-government as had been struggled for in Eastern Canada prior to Confederation. Following the tradition of British evolution of responsible government, Lieutenant-Governor Royal went beyond the Act of 1888. In the estimates for 1888 - 1889 he submitted estimates for Legislative Assembly approval beyond the mere expenditure of locally-derived revenues. The Assembly was also asked to ratify expenditures of the federal grant. While this concession was considered as a right by the Territorial Assembly, advice from the Territorial legal advisor and from the Macdonald government forced Royal to withdraw from this position. The aftermath of this position was marked by the familiar parliamentary struggle for control of public revenues.

By an amending Act in 1891, Parliament granted almost all legislative powers accorded to the provinces by the B.N.A. Act except the borrowing of money. The Act did not provide for a responsible executive although it did provide for territorial control of the federal budgetary appropriation to the Territories. The Territorial Assembly subsequently approved an ordinance which established an executive committee of four, the leader of which was Premier Haultain. The ordinance had to restrict the Executive Committee to the area of finance in order to gain acceptance from the Justice Department in Ottawa.

Representative and responsible government was formally conceded to the North-West Territories by the North-West Territories Act of 1897. Full powers of a provincial government were not granted but where such powers did exist, the governmental system was similar to that practiced in the provinces.

During the course of the evolution of responsible government, the Federal Government was, as a rule, out of step with the mood and political maturity of the North-West Territories. It was similar to the cautious, tardy approach to self-government that Britain had evidenced toward its colonies.

> From 1870 to 1897, when responsible government was achieved in the "old" North-West Territories, the Canadian government had no clear programme; it had to be prodded into conceding the changes demanded by the steadily more numerous and more vocal settlers of the west. There was a reluctance to surrender power and unwillingness to plan for the developments that must have been relatively obvious as the settlement of the prairies proceeded (Robertson, 1963, 139).

THE PUSH TO PROVINCEHOOD

With the attainment of responsible government, the North-West Territories had come relatively close to provincial status. But the issue of the financial status of the federal-territorial relationship was to underly the ensuing push toward provincial status.

As we stated earlier, the Federal Government placed a high priority on the encouragement of immigration into the North-West Territories. This program was successful as is evidenced by a growth in immigrants of 21,716 in 1896 to in excess of 146,000 in 1905. The rate of growth in population from 1891 to 1901 was 238 percent, and during 1901, 1902, and 1903 the increase was 220 percent. From the point of view of the Federal Government the immigration drive had been successful.

The increasing numbers of immigrants into the Territories placed a severe strain on the Territorial Government's abilities to cope with the provision of requisite services. The need for schools consistently outpaced their availability. Since immigrants tended to favor settling on homesteads away from heavily populated areas, there was an ever-expanding requirement for public works expenditures in order to suppy needed roads, bridges, dams, ferries, fire protection, and hospital services.

In the main, municipal organization was lacking and so was a municipal tax base. The Territorial government was averse to impose heavy taxation on the struggling homesteaders and, objectively-speaking, such taxation could not have met the demands for public funds. Alternative sources of revenue within the Territories were non-existent. The Federal Government had a policy of offering free homestead lands and, perhaps even more disconcerting from the point of view of Territorial legislators, grants of land were made as inducements to railway and colonization companies. The Canadian Pacific Railway was also granted a tax exemption on its land for twenty years and was permanently freed of any governmental taxation on its railroad stations, yards, workshops, buildings, and rolling and capital stock. A defensible argument could be made that the North-West Territories was being forced to subsidize an undertaking which would eventuate in benefits to the whole country.[6] Revenues from mineral rights went to the federal treasury rather than to the Territorial Government.

The only alternative source of revenue for the North-West Territories was the federal grant. This situation was aggravated by the fact that the Territorial Government was not permitted to incur public debt. As such, every expenditure--including capital works projects--had to be paid out of the current operating budget rather than permitting payment of large public works projects over a period of years.

> The closing years of the century found the Territories with a constitution approaching the provincial basis, with enlarged jurisdiction, increased responsibilities, and new duties. Revenues were inadequate, and voted year to year without any guiding principle, by men lacking knowledge of the requirements of the West. The federal government had refused to compute the grant on a provincial subsidy basis. Parliament had been more generous in extending legislative jurisdiction and in supporting a progressive immigration policy than in enlarging appropriations. As the new century dawned, only one plain and open road appeared ahead; the Territorial government must commence a campaign in the West, and enter upon negotiations in the East, looking towards the provincial establishment (Lingard, 1946, 20).

Any expansion of powers of the Territorial government could only further aggravate its financial squeeze and, thus, further the demands for provincehood and control of the public domain. A review of the provincial-type powers under the B.N.A. Act reveals that by 1903 the Territorial Government lacked control of its natural resources; the power to incorporate railway, steamboat, canal, transportation, telegraph, and irrigation companies, ability to borrow money; to amend its constitution; and to administer criminal justice (Lingard, 1946, 84-85).

The inevitable culmination of the North-West Territory's striving toward responsible government was the establishment of Alberta and Saskatchewan as provinces in 1905.

THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN ALBERTA AND SASKATCHEWAN

In 1901 Premier Haltain had feared the Federal Government might utilize the Manitoba case as a precedent for the conditions of provincehood of the North-West Territories. The actual position taken by the Laurier government was not aimed at alleviating the financial squeeze which the Territories had been increasingly forced to cope with. Laurier argued that "from the highest grounds of policy" it was deemed desirable that the Dominion government continue to exercise ownership of the public lands. His key rationale was that the Macdonald position in reference to the same question pertaining to the province of Manitoba was even more applicable with the newly formed Alberta and Saskatchewan provinces. In sum, he stated that he was apprehensive that the province's policies might conflict with the Federal Government's committed immigration policy (Debates H. of C., 1905, 1427-1434).

An analysis of this retention of ownership of the natural resources by the Federal Government must begin by examining established British practices since they should have, in a constitutional sense, served as precedents to be followed by the decision makers. Ownership of the natural resources in the British system was analogous to the formally written position pertaining to responsible government. The public domain was vested in the Crown in the British system although the administration of and benefits from the natural resources was an integral part of the attainment of responsible government. In 1852, the British Parliament had formally conceded that when a colony obtained autonomy in government it also obtained ownership and control of its natural resources.

> In an unsettled colony there is no effectual mode of taxation for purposes of government and improvement, and the whole progress of the Colony depends on the liberal and prudent disposal of the land . . . .
>
> It is clear that colonists of the Anglo-Saxon race look upon the land revenue as legitimately belonging to the "community" (Martin, 1920, 29).

Administration or control of natural resources was a natural consequence attached to the evolvement of responsible government in that an executive within the self-governing Dominion or Province would administer the public domain during the period of time it retained the confidence of its legislature.

Immediately following the announcement of the formation of Alberta and Saskatchewan, dissatisfaction was expressed with the Federal Government's retention of the public domain. One aspect of the critique asserted that the Federal Government or the original provinces forming Confederation did not purchase all of the land composing the new provinces from the Hudson's Bay Company. The Hudson's Bay Company possessed a charter over Rupert's Land but not over the North-Western Territory. Part of the land which composed the new provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan were within the North-Western Territory. Evidence of this fact is suggested by historical maps (Nicholson, 1954, 35; Burpee, 1927, 55). This area, it can be argued, became Canada's possession by cession from the British Crown under section 146 of the 1867 B.N.A. Act. In sum, Canada did not purchase the North-Western Territories and, thus, could not claim its natural resources. This argument was given further credence by the empirical case in which part of British Columbia was formed out of this Territory and yet it was given full administration of and benefit from the public domain in 1871.

Of course, by far the largest amount of Alberta and Saskatchewan were formed out of what had been the Hudson's Bay Company's Rupert's Land. Canadian historians have generally missed the implications of the fact that, legally-speaking, Canada did not purchase Rupert's Land from the Hudson's Bay. Great Britain seemingly established a constitutional precedent when it opposed the Hudson's Bay Company's proposal to have the Red River district established as a Crown Colony. This position, it would appear, confirms the interpretation that during the ensuing negotiations between the Crown and the Hudson's Bay Company concerning the union of Rupert's Land to Canada, the Company's claim for a payment of money could not have been in reference to a purchase of real estate. It could only logically be a moral claim upon the British nation and by implication the Canadian Confederation for some form of monetary adjustment to the Hudson's Bay Company in exchange for termination of its Charter rights. Conceivably, the British Parliament could have granted Rupert's Land to Canada and the Company's claims for compensation would have been subsequently under the purview of the Canadian courts.

In sum, the Canadian government payment of £300,000 was not, constitutionally-speaking, a purchase of Rupert's Land from the Hudson's Bay Company. It was rather a practical prerequisite to cession of this land from the British Crown under the terms of the British Parliament's Rupert's Land Act. The British House of Commons had amended the original bill to assert that the Crown could not award monetary compensation from Britain to the Hudson's Bay Company. Further, in negotiations with the Colonial Office, the Canadian representatives posited that this sum was synonymous with out of court settlements in private affairs which would merely cover legal fees (Martin, 1920, 32).

In a formally legal sense, the Canadian delegation did not directly negotiate the settlement with the Hudson's Bay Company. Transfer was effected firstly by the Rupert's Land Act of 1868 in which the Hudson's Bay surrendered its Charter rights over Rupert's Land to the British Crown. Canada subsequently received Rupert's Land by an Imperial Order in Council on June 23, 1870, in which the Crown ceded it to the Canadian Confederation. There was no constitutional requirement that both Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory be granted to Canada by the same cession Order in Council. It is possible that if they would have been granted to Canada separately, the legislators in 1905 would have had greater difficulty defending the retention of ownership of natural resources by the Federal Government.

It is perhaps a moot point that the ensuing Federal Government grant to the provinces in lieu of ownership of the natural resources was not adequate compensation. Payment of $1.50 per acre of settlement land was much below its real value. Also, the calculation was based on a questionable figure pertaining to the total number of acres which could be settled. The new provinces were to continue as hinterlands for the eastern metropolis' benefit as they had been when their land was utilized to pay for the C.P.R. "national dream", for Indian lands settlements, grants to the Hudson's Bay Company, etc. When we take account of the tariffs on manufactured goods and the use of these province's lands to entice a rapid rate of immigration into the West, we see further evidence that the hinterland was destined to support the industrial development of the metropolis region.

SUMMARY

In this chapter we have examined the constitutional developments in the North-West Territories from their acquisition in 1870 to the formation of the provinces of Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchewan. We delineated the salient aspects of the British colonial system and concluded that the Canadian Federal Government was equally reluctant to grant increased autonomy to its Territories colony. Ottawa had to be prodded into permitting increases in political autonomy in the areas which became the latter two provinces. This prodding entailed confrontations of the Territorial Legislative Assembly with the Federal Government. In accord with the British tradition, provincial government was established before these confrontations evolved into armed conflict. Robertson has summarized the lack of a federal plan for political development of the North-West Territories as follows:

> From 1870 to 1897, when responsible government was achieved in the old North-West Territories, the Canadian government had no clear programme; it had to be prodded into conceding the changes demanded by the steadily more numerous and more vocal settlers of the west. There was a reluctance to surrender power and unwillingness to plan for the developments that must have been relatively obvious as the settlement of the prairies proceeded (Robertson, 1963, 139).

All three prairie provinces were initially granted provincial status by the Federal Government but were not given the requisite economic power to finance these increased political powers. They remained dependent on federal grants for their revenue sources. These grants were always insufficient to meet the needs of these new provinces. The hinterland status of these provinces was especially evident in the economic dimension.

> With regard to public lands, therefore, the "colonial policy" of the dominion has been, in some respects, more reactionary than that of George III with regard to the old province of Quebec. More than 20,000,000 acres of lands in Manitoba have been alienated from provincial control. Over Six million acres in Alberta were granted to railway companies for the construction of railways in other provinces. In this respect, Manitoba since 1870 and Saskatchewan and Alberta since 1905 have been not provinces but "colonies" of the Dominion (Martin, 1922, 46).

Eventual settlement of the natural resources question in Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1930 recognized the provincial rights to the public domain. These ownership rights were awarded retroactively to 1905 when they had gained provincehood. That the courts rejected their claims for compensation of alienated natural resources prior to September 1, 1905 will, in subsequent chapters, shed possible light on the delay tactics currently being utilized by the Federal Government in granting responsible government to the Northwest Territories.

CHAPTER THREE

FOOTNOTES

[1] Lamb asserts that McDougall, the Canadian Governor-designate over the Settlement, pursued "in December [1869] the same crude and high-handed policy toward Red River with which the Ottawa Cabinet had initiated negotiations weeks before" (1957, 24). This "high handed" approach of the Federal Government was exemplified by the fact that there was no attempt to generate support for union within the Territories. For example, the established structure of formal power involving the Hudson's Bay Company personnel was ignored. Also, the Canadian Government notified the Imperial Government on November 29 that it would not accept responsibility on December 1 for the North-West until the extant turmoil was settled. The Macdonald cabinet viewed military intervention by British forces as a better solution than negotiation with the Riel insurgents.

[2] Prime Minister J. A. Macdonald asserted in 1870 that the "impulsive half-breed" in the Red River Settlements would be "swamped by the influx of settlers" (Pope, 1894, 63).

[3] For example, the federal expenditure in the Territories including the Lieutenant-Governor's salary was less than $3,000 in 1873.

[4] An Order in Council in July of 1886 gave the Council two more provincial-type powers. Council was given the power to incorporate territorial companies. It was also given the power to impose direct taxation.

[5] The Territories could not charter railways.

[6] Not only was the North-West Territories subsidizing the railways but it also had no control over them.

CHAPTER FOUR

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER IN THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, 1905 - 1966

In the previous chapter we examined the historical development of the structure of political power in the North-West Territories from its acquisition by Canada from Great Britain to the formation of the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan. The resident population of the Territories had to pressure the Federal Government to grant it responsible government and, subsequently, provincehood. A nationally-planned critical path of development does not appear to have existed within the Federal Government.

This chapter will continue this historical analysis in order to trace the development of the current political and economic power structure in the Northwest Territories, the residual or remaining Territory not included within any existing provinces. As with the last chapter, this one will focus on the evolution of Territorial government toward responsible government and subsequent provincial status. We will also examine the natural resources question to facilitate an adequate understanding of the contemporary power structure.

THE NEW NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

The formation of Alberta and Saskatchewan as provinces left the Northwest Territories[1] with a sparse population. The Arctic Islands had been added to the old North-West Territories in 1886. The Klondike gold rush stimulated the creation of the Yukon Territory in

1898 to facilitate inclusion of all potential alluvial gold areas within one jurisdiction. The Keewatin district was included in the Northwest Territories in 1906. The southern boundaries of the N.W.T. were delineated in 1912 when Quebec, Ontario, and Manitoba were extended northward to their current boundaries.

Government of the newly created Territories was provided for by the 1905 North-West Territories Amendment Act. This Act provided for a commissioner and a council of no more than four members who were to be appointed by the Governor-in-Council. The Commissioner, a title derived from a North-West Mounted Police position, was the counter-part of the Lieutenant Governor of the Old North-West Territories. He was responsible to the Minister of the Interior in the federal cabinet. The Council's legislative powers remained the same as those of the Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories.

Whereas the constitutional provisions for the government in the newly constituted N.W.T. had remained essentially the same as existed in the old North-West Territories, the actual workings of the federal governing process meant the Territories was reduced to a status inferior to that which existed in 1870 (Reference Paper, 1965, 80). The Comptroller and Deputy Head of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police, Lieutenant-Colonel F. White, was appointed as the first Commissioner. No Council was appointed and no new ordinances were promulgated for the next sixteen years. During this period of time the ordinances of the old North-West Territories government were administered and enforced by the Mounted Police throughout the N.W.T. Many of these ordinances had been adopted in response to the needs of an agrarian society around the turn of the century and were inapplicable to the needs of a northern mining and fur trading economy. This left the Northwest Mounted Police to enforce federal criminal laws.

As a response to increased oil exploration and generally greater interest in the Canadian North as a hinterland of natural resources, the Deputy Minister of the Interior Department was appointed Commissioner in 1919. This practice of appointing the incumbent of the Interior Deputy Ministerial position as Commissioner continued for 43 years (Separation of these two positions occurred in 1963). Early in 1921 a Council of four appointed members was established. This was necessitated by the federal Justice Department's ruling that the Commissioner's proclaimed ordinance in 1921 to control the entry of persons into N.W.T. was not constitutional unless approved by a legislative body. Two additional appointed members were facilitated by the June 4, 1921 Amendment to the 1905 North-West Territories Act. One of these Council members was to be appointed as Deputy Commissioner (Flanagan, 1963, 37).

During the next decade the Council's duties were rather insignificant. In fact, a total of eleven ordinances were passed between 1922 and 1930 and Council sittings were not always held every year. From 1921 to 1946 the Council consisted entirely of federal civil servants who were resident in Ottawa. The meetings of this de facto interdepartmental co-ordination committee were held in Ottawa. This remarkable situation has led one writer to conclude that it is unlikely that any country has established and perpetuated a more bureaucratic regime (Robertson, 1963, 143). The Council members were drawn mainly from the Department of the Interior and the Department of Mines and Resources which succeeded it but also included the Commissioner of the Mounted Police, Superintendents-General of Indian Affairs, and Undersecretaries of the Department of External Affairs. From 1935 until 1947 the Council held up to eighteen regular and special sessions per year. Their function was not really distinguishable as legislative but rather appeared to be treated as a federal administration activity (Robertson, 1963, 145). Since the Council lacked fiscal powers, the implementation of its decisions was dependent upon the budgets and personnel of the Indian Affairs, Mines, Justice, Public Works, National Defense, and the Department of the Interior Federal Government Departments (Zaslow, 1959, 92).

Even up until 1951 there was virtually no pressure placed by the Territorial residents on the Federal Government to alter the structure of government. This was partially due to the relatively small numbers of whites who had immigrated to the N.W.T. Those who did migrate to Northern Canada did not readily have methods of communicating among communities. Perhaps most importantly, these residents were not independent agents as the agrarians had been in the old North-West Territories. Those who had migrated to the Northwest Territories had gone in response to increasing mining activity and oil exploration. They were employees of large corporations such as Imperial Oil, Eldorado Gold Mines, Consolidated Mining and Smelting, and the Hudson's Bay Company and were, thus, agents of the metropolis in exploiting the hinterland. Obviously they had limited concern with constitutional changes or with alterations in the federal system of government administration since many such agents did not consider the Northwest Territories as their permanent home. Their committment was to a corporation rather than to a piece of farm land or a home. Thus, the N.W.T. possessed a much more transient immigrant population than had the North-West Territories. The fact that residents depended on Federal Government assistance or on giant corporations for their basic survival in the N.W.T.'s harsh environment contributed to the development of a dependence status rather than independence among the settlers. This analysis is given credence by the fact that prior to 1930 discontent with the extant government system was voiced only by the small entreprenurial class--the fur traders, prospectors, small businessmen, and white trappers. Even among these elements of the population the question of representative government was rarely voiced. Their concern tended rather to center around issues such as the school system and the liquor laws. In the main, discontent was not expressed by the bureaucratic agents of government and large corporations (Zaslow, 1959, 93).

However, one does not want to overstate the case. People involved in oil exploration, following the discovery of oil at Norman Wells in 1919, did not contribute to the development of settlements of significant magnitude. The establishment of pitchblende mining operations at Great Bear Lake in the early 1930's and the discovery of gold near Yellowknife by 1935 led to the establishment of mining towns (Flanagan, 1963, 47). Mining operations lured both miners and small business entrepreneurs to service the needs of these miners. These newcomers to the N.W.T. brought southern Canadian expectations pertaining, for example, to educational services for their children, cultural amenities, and governmental participation. It was these residents of the mining town of Yellowknife as well as the settlers of Fort Smith who voiced the main challenge to the lack of elective municipal institutions and lack of possible participation in provincial-type and federal affairs.

World War II produced an end to the growth of the District of Mackenzie by terminating prospecting and closing producing gold mines and the emerging drive for greater government participation was also terminated. However, renewed prospecting by 1944 and a new influx of migrants meant an inevitable drive toward local participation in government.

The first basic change in Council from merely an administrative body occurred in 1951 with the establishment of a Council composed of 5 appointed and 3 elected members, and the provision that a minimum of two Council sessions must be held each year. This marked the first vestige of representative government and portended the eventual struggle for responsible government. Only five years previously the appointment of the first territorial member had occurred. In 1954 the number of elected members was increased to four. These elected members represented constituencies in the District of Mackenzie but not in the then Districts of Franklin and Keewatin. The year 1960 marked the beginning of the separation of appointed Council members from the Federal Administration. In that year three Councillors were appointed from the "general public". By 1964 only the Deputy Commissioner remained as a federal civil servant who was also a member of the

N.W.T. Council.

The Northwest Territories Act of 1952, which became operative in 1955, established a Territorial Court and provided for the appointment of police magistrates and justices of the peace.

Fingland concluded in 1964 that the Yukon Council showed a much greater desire to participate in the executive functions of the administration than was evidenced in the Northwest Territories. On the other hand, he asserted that the recent experience of the Northwest Territories provided a partial solution to the "problem of how to integrate the executive with the legislative as a first step towards responsible government".

> There it had been customary for the Commissioner to sit with the Council as a matter of course, and this arrangement contributed immensely to the confidence of the elected members in the territorial administration. The Commissioner of the Northwest Territories was, moreover, the Deputy Minister of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, and consequently, in the minds of the elected members, was in a position to influence the federal government in ways not immediately available to the Commissioner of the Yukon Territory residing in Whitehorse. [A new Commissioner of the Northwest Territories was appointed on July 12, 1963. He is the Director of the Northern Administration Branch of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, so the change is not likely to affect the relevance of this statement.] (Fingland, 1964, 306-307).

QUESTION OF DIVISION OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

The Territorial Council became preoccupied with the constitutional future of the Northwest Territories during the early 1960's. This concern was sparked by the Federal Government's decentralization of governmental administration from Ottawa to the Mackenzie District, during the latter part of the 1950's (Fingland, 1964, 310).

During the debates on the motion of appreciation to the Commissioner for his address to open the 18th session of Council on January 11, 1960, one member asserted that the

> Territories should advance step by step towards responsible government and provincial status by increasing the number of elected representatives and changing the composition of the Council gradually from a majority of appointed members to a majority of elected members (Votes and Proceedings, 1960a, 1).

Knut Lang, the elected member representing Mackenzie-Delta, formally voiced the first expression in Council that consideration should be given to making the Mackenzie District a separate territory. He also alluded to what he considered the best probable boundary of this proposed new territory (Votes and Proceedings, 1960a, 7-8). Lang's suggestion led to the Territorial Administration preparing a sessional paper titled "Possible Evolution of the Northwest Territories" for Council's deliberations during the 19th session in July of 1960. By way of introducing the paper, W. G. Brown, the Deputy Commissioner, asserted that the current size and the varied nature of the N.W.T. produced difficulties in attempts to formulate policies and related legislation which would be suitable for the whole Territory (Votes and Proceedings, 1960b, 74). The Council, while in committee of the whole, formulated five conclusions in reference to its examination of the Administration's sessional paper.

(1) For the time being it was not desirable to provide for representation directly from the Eastern Arctic on the Council;

(2) A New territory embracing most of the present Mackenzie District and related areas in the Western Arctic was desirable but further study of this proposal was required.

(3) Following the establishment of a new territory, the Council formed to administer the remaining areas of the Northwest Territories should be an appointed body initially;

(4) The Council of the new Territory of the Mackenzie should for some time at least include appointed as well as elected members;

(5) Continuing consideration should be given to the division of executive functions in the Territories between the Federal and Territorial Governments (Votes and Proceedings, 1960b, 80).

During the July, 1960 session, the Council seemed in accord that the existing N.W.T. was not ready for provincial status nor would the proposed Mackenzie Territory be ready for such status. One member even advised against hasty action in forming a new territory.

> Provincial status for the new territory would not come for a long time since the new territory would not have sufficient resources, people, or tax revenues for some time[2] (Votes and Proceedings, 1960b, 77).

During his opening address to the January, 1961 Council Session, Commissioner Robertson speculated that during the life of the new Council the historical progression of development of the Northwest Territories since 1872 would likely continue. He was referring to the proposed Territory of Mackenzie (Votes and Proceedings, 1961a, 2). While the Council was sitting in Committee of the Whole to discuss the possible evolution of the Northwest Territories, it adopted three resolutions or recommedations.

(1) When the Territories were divided, the western part be called the Territory of Mackenzie and the Eastern part possibly the Territory of Franklin;

(2) The Northwest Territories Coat of Arms and the Mace would be more suitable for the new Territory of Franklin than for the Territory of Mackenzie;

(3) A paper should be prepared dealing with these points in more detail and with such other points as the status of King William Island, the border, the timing of the formation of the Territory of Mackenzie and the composition of the Councils of both new Territories (Votes and Proceedings, 1961a, 77).

The Council's deliberations continued to steer away from concerns with more representative government by an increase in the ratio of elected to appointed Council members. Their concern appears to have been directed at dividing the existing N.W.T. into two Territories based exclusively on administrative concerns. The Council members evidenced a lack of a historical appreciation of what had been the major sources of conflict between the Federal and Territorial Governments in the old North-West Territories. They also failed to appreciate that evolution of government in the Northwest Territories really would mean the establishment of complete representative government and of a responsible administration and elected Council. The ultimate goal would be provincial status.

The Commissioner brought forward Sessional Paper No. 5, titled "Proposed Mackenzie Territory: Constitution and Extent", at the July, 1961 session of Council. In introducing this document he reiterated the view that it was impossible to administer the Eastern Arctic from Fort Smith and suggested that it was not wise to think in terms of a province the size of the existing N.W.T. as such a province's development would be seriously retarded by its lack of financial resources (Votes and Proceedings, 1961b, 69). The sessional paper suggested that the Constitution of the Council of the proposed Mackenzie Territory should be essentially the same as currently existed in the N.W.T. It proposed that the number of Council members should remain small (9 members), there be a retention of appointed Council members, and that the Commissioner remain head of the administration, Presiding Officer over Council, spokesman for the Territories, and reside in the Territories. It proposed that the Deputy Commissioner should not retain a seat on Council. A tentative time-table for the accomplishment of the division of the territories foresaw the first session of the new Council of the Mackenzie Territory sitting in July or August of 1964.

The Council adopted the Sessional Paper's outline of the proposed new Mackenzie Territory and in so doing reiterated some of its provisions which Council members felt strongly about.

(1) The most favorable boundary appeared to be a modification of the eastern line shown on the map attached to the Sessional Paper. This boundary would include Banks and Victoria Islands in the new territory but south of Clinton it would follow the proposed western and middle lines.

(2) The Commissioner should reside in the Territory.

(3) The choice of a capital should be left open for the time being. Administration of the territory could be centered in Fort Smith, for the first while at least. At some future time, a decision could be taken on a location to serve both as a capital and as an administrative centre.

(4) One more elected member should be provided for on the new Council and one less appointed member.

(5) Appointed members should be retained on the new Council for the first few years at least and they should, as a matter of policy, be appointed from outside the territory (Votes and Proceedings, 1961b, 72-73).

The Council's deliberations reflect an analogous perspective to the concerns of the residents in the North-West Territories. They had been concerned with the development of provincial status of the territory which was settled. The N.W.T. Council of 1961 also had little regard for the "residual" territory. Most of the ordinances considered by Council pertained to the Mackenzie District. Government in the Eastern Arctic was under the purview of the Administrator of the Arctic and his Regional Administrators. These were federal employees.

During its 22nd session, (January, 1962) the Council of the N.W.T. considered several sessional papers which related to the proposed division of the Territories. Through examination of Sessional Paper No. 3, "Boundary--Proposed Mackenzie Territory", the Council agreed to what should be the boundary of the Mackenzie Territory (Votes and Proceedings, 1962a, 35-36). It also adopted the Administration's Sessional Paper No. 5 outlining the government to be established in the "residual Northwest Territories".

The rationale for establishing a Territorial Government for the Residual Territory entailed the need for legislation of a province-type responsibility even though the Federal Government was charged with the responsibility for the Eskimos and for administering the public domain. It was also felt that a Territorial Government would further encourage resource development via investment in exploration in the northern hinterland. Such was deemed to be in the national interest.

Legislative authority in this residual territory would be vested in an appointed Commissioner who would be head of the administration and presiding officer of a Council of seven members, which would likely be a totally appointed body as had existed in the N.W.T. between 1905 and 1951. The seat of government would remain in Ottawa. Executive administration was to be the duty of federal officers who would act on behalf of the Territorial Government in reference to its ordinances.

This Council session of January, 1962 made the first formal representation to the Federal Government to recommend that legislation should be placed before Parliament to establish two new territories to replace the existing Northwest Territories (Votes and Proceedings, 1962a, 111-113). It was a request that the Commissioner and Council for each new territory possess powers and responsibilities which were extant in the Northwest Territories at that time. The Council of the Mackenzie Territory would consist of five elected and four appointed members. The seat of Territorial Government should, it was proposed, be located within the Territory. This resolution also recommended that the residual territory should be given an Eskimo name, the seat of government should be Ottawa, and that the Council should initially be totally appointed and be comprised of three resident Councillors, three non-resident Councillors, and a Deputy Commissioner.

During its 23rd session (July, 1962), the Council attempted to further plan for the impending division of the Territories by discussing the questions of a name for the new eastern territory, the future capital of the Mackenzie Territory, redistribution of constituencies in the proposed Mackenzie Territory, and allocation of the existing Territorial Symbols between the two new Territories (Votes and Proceedings, 1962b, 60-68). The 24th session of Council in January of 1963 continued deliberations respecting these issues. Despite the apparent reluctance of the Council, over the years, to formulate definitive conclusions concerning the various aspects of the proposed division, this Council session resulted in proposals for the disposition of existing Territorial Symbols and Appurtenances, reconfirmed its earlier choice of Fort Smith as the future capital of the Mackenzie Territory, accepted the Administration's recommendations concerning the establishment of five constituencies in the Mackenzie Territory, accepted the name of Nunassiaq for the residual territory, and adopted the proposal of Walter Dinsdale, the Federal Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, that two electoral districts be established in the residual territory (Votes and Proceedings, 1963a, 98-102, 271-274, 279-290).

The 25th session of Council deliberated over what it deemed to be its final requisite proposals in anticipation of the final draft of the federal legislation to create the two new territories. It considered heraldic symbols for the two territories and adopted without alteration the Administration's proposed solution concerning the division of the assets and liabilities of the N.W.T. between the two new territories (Votes and Proceedings, 1963a, 46-51, 302-358).

We saw earlier that the Federal Government had treated the N.W.T. as solely an administrative task to be carried out by federal civil servants. This continued until at least 1951. It was only in 1956 that revised ordinances of the N.W.T. were published. This revision eliminated all the vestiges of legislation related to the needs of an agrarian community. Robertson's analysis of the Council's desire for a division of the N.W.T. indicated that this move was a major step in the administration of the Territories. He felt it would make the establishment of executive and legislative functions of government within the Territories much easier and that this would gradually result in fully elected Councils. He implied that the federal authorities were concerned with legislative, administrative, and financial arrangements which would produce a "smooth evolution" toward provincehood (Robertson, 1963, 146).

Such an assertion is difficult to assess. Prime Minister John Diefenbaker seemed to voice his support of the drive toward self-government in the N.W.T. in his address to the Territorial Council on July 20th, 1961. Although he did not specifically allude to the notion of responsible government nor of a long term goal of provincial status, he intimated that such developments were in accord with his "Vision of the North".

> . . . I was particularly interested in one view that you expressed. More and more the Council believes that to a greater extent than ever before, self-government should be made available to the people of the north, and I'll join with you in that. Already the field has greatly widened the responsibilities of the Council, and I can assure you of this fact: that having seen at first hand something of the achievements of the past, something of the things that have already been done, anything that you may suggest--and the members of the Council--to increasing the field of your responsibility, and also providing, to a measure not before known, of self-government, will receive my warmest approval and support . . . .
>
> When you mentioned that you hoped that there would be, not too far away, a division of this vast northern area into two districts, I think that too is something that deserves the most sympathetic consideration on the part of the federal government . . . (Votes and Proceedings, 1961b).

In the Speech from the Throne on September 27, 1962, the Federal Government first made public its committment to proceed with legislation which would divide the N.W.T. In Dinsdale's reply to the Council's resolution requesting such division, he also seemed to exhibit a willingness to seek and, in fact, comply with the Council's suggestions related to the pending division. It is interesting to note that he was even ahead of the Council in the case of representative government in the residual territory. He proposed that the Council of the territory should not be totally appointed but rather should have two elected members (Votes and Proceedings, 1963a, 183-185).

We must ask whether this represented a break from lethargy and unresponsiveness to Territorial representations which was evidenced by the Federal Government since its acquisition of the Territories in 1870. It is clear that Council's proposals for division were rather innocuous in terms of altering the hinterland status of the N.W.T. In fact, the proposals were designed to make the two new territories easier to administer and more attractive to corporate developers. No changes in the Council's constitutional powers were requested and, as we saw earlier, the proposal that all Councillors of the residual territory be appointed would have reverted this area to a status synonymous with that of the N.W.T. from 1905 to 1951. This same treatment of the residual territory had occurred in the Northwest Territories following the formation of Alberta and Saskatchewan as provinces.

Another explanation for the federal move toward division of the N.W.T. might be that the federal authorities did not yet appreciate the potential benefits to the metropolis which would ensue from future exploitation of the natural resources of the northern hinterland. This would also help to explain the Federal Cabinet's apparent willingness to grant Parliamentary approval to the Council's desires. It would be misleading, however, to assert that no federal officials had visions of the potential benefits of the N.W.T. to the metropolis.

This was exemplified by the Commissioner's analysis of this potential economic development of the proposed Mackenzie Territory. He sought to demonstrate that, while the responsibilities of provincehood in the two territories would be formidable, there was a future likelihood that the Mackenzie Territory could become self-supporting. He outlined seven salient aspects of this exploitable hinterland.

(1) All of the arable land in the Northwest Territories--about 2,000,000 acres--would be contained in the proposed Mackenzie Territory; good ranching land was available in the south-west part of the proposed territory.

(2) The proposed territory had a better potential for forestry operations than had the Yukon territory.

(3) More than 50% of the total area for fresh-water fisheries in Canada fell within the new territory.

(4) Its mineral potential was already proven in part as a result of the discoveries of lead and zinc at Pine Point and the gold mining operations in Yellowknife.

(5) Oil and gas was there in the form of huge sedimentary formations.

(6) There was hydro-electric power in abundance, on the Slave River particularly, where it was estimated that nearly three-quarters of a million killowatts could be developed.

(7) A proven deposit containing 15% of the world's reserves of tungsten was being developed at Flat River (Votes and Proceedings, 1961b, 70).

The Northwest Territories Council had been at a distinct disadvantage in its deliberations to outline a plan for the division of the N.W.T. and a constitution for the respective Councils of each of the two proposed territories. As evidenced by our earlier examination of this decision-making process, the Council, in the main, merely responded to proposals which were put before it. In fact, the Territorial Administration which was generating these ideas was composed mainly of federal employees headed by the Commissioner of the N.W.T., who was himself accountable to the federal Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources. To add to our earlier analysis of the apparent responsiveness of the Federal Government to the "Council's wishes", it seems more appropriate to suggest that the Federal Government was, in fact, steering the Council in formulating decisions in accord with federal designs. While there is no evidence that the Federal Government began with a master plan of the division, the plan which emerged certainly had much federal input.

In fact, in 1963 Robert Williamson asserted that the idea of division of the N.W.T. had been under consideration in the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources since at least 1958. The initial suggestion was apparently made by a senior official at a meeting and this was discussed "for quite a number of years" during which time Williamson himself was an employee of that Department (Godin, 1963a, 206, 212).

The lack of power of the Territorial Council was also evidenced by the fact that it did not adopt the proposal of division based on an extensive debate of the possible evolution of Territorial Government from that which existed at the time. They did not even fully consider what would be the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed division. It has been observed that most members of Council favoured division from its first concise suggestion by Lang during the first session in 1962. Having accepted the desireability of division, although they were not cognizant of its full implications, they henceforth focussed on the means of implementing this division to attain the assumed positive consequences. The suggested rationale of this proposed step emerged in debate from 1960 to 1963. The key concern was with effecting manageable administrative regions for Territorial Government. It was also felt that the Mackenzie Territory would accelerate in economic development if it was not attached to the Eastern Arctic. The fact that the Mackenzie District was currently more advanced in transportation, communication, and development of minerals and petroleum was deemed to constitute a rationale of division. The only elected members of Council were from the Mackenzie District and their key concern with this area was often evidenced during their debates. Consideration of whether this would further the "evolution" toward responsible government in the Mackenzie District was not seriously considered and never debated by Council nor elaborated in a Territorial Administration sessional paper.

DIVISION OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES REJECTED

Although the Diefenbaker Government had committed itself to introducing legislation during the 25th Parliament to divide the N.W.T., the Parliament was dissolved on February 6, 1963 and, as such, prior to introduction of such legislation (Debates H. of C., 1962). The change in Ottawa to a Liberal Government led by Prime Minister L. B. Pearson did not alter the federal committment to legislate division of the Territories. On July 8, 1963, the Minister of Northern Affairs, Arthur Laing, introduced first reading of Bills C-83 and C-84 to amend the Northwest Territories Act by establishing the Mackenzie Territory, as well as to define government in the residual Nunassiaq Territory.

During debate related to first reading he stressed the urgency of passage of the bills as the term of a Council of the Northwest Territories would expire on April 1, 1964 (Debates H. of C. 1963, 1942). Laing also stated that he would not introduce second reading of these two Bills for a lengthy period of time in order to permit the N.W.T. Council to respond to them.

Accordingly, the Bills were placed on the November 8, 1963 Order Paper for Second Reading. The Opposition refused to consent to "approval in principle" of the Legislation as it had not been studied by a Standing or Special Committee. Their insistence on such a break from the common practice of accepting Second Reading followed by referral to a committee for clause by clause study was motivated, according to Opposition spokesmen, by the fact that this strategy had been agreed to by Laing during First Reading of the two Bills. It is ironical that Rheaume, the Conservative Member of Parliament representing the N.W.T., had criticized the Liberal Government for not introducing the legislation earlier and yet he was one of those who was opposed to ratifying the Legislation in principle prior to clause by clause analysis (Debates H. of C., 1963. 4568-4569).

Rheaume was effectively opposing the position of the Territorial Council as they had concurred that the two Bills reflected the intent of their various sessional papers pertaining to the proposed division of the Territories. The consequence of this Opposition move was that Parliament gave special consent to permit referral of the two Bills to the Standing Committee on Mines, Forests, and Waters without their being given Second Reading.

The testimony of the various northern witnesses during this Standing Committee's deliberations confirmed that the impending division and the implications of Bills C-83 and C-84 had not been adequately communicated to N.W.T. residents by the Territorial Council or by the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources. The four elected Territorial Council members were the first to appear before the Committee.[3] Of course, Knut Lang supported the legislation by asserting that none of the 4,000 people in his constituency had voiced opposition to the proposed division. He voiced the opinion that the only opposition appeared to be a small, well organized group of mining interests in the south-eastern portion of Mackenzie District who feared higher taxation in the new Territory (Godin, 1963a, 9-10). Paul Kaiser and J. W. Goodall concurred with Lang in support of the legislation and in asserting that their constituents were well informed of the proposals (Godin, 1963a, 53-59). Goodall did not favor having the Commissioner responsible to the Territorial Council rather than to the Minister of Northern Affairs. E. J. Gall expressed a dissenting point of view by asserting that the proposed division was premature pending increased industrial development and a larger, employed population (Godin, 1963a, 34-35). The testimony of all four elected representatives made it clear that they did not possess adequate knowledge of the social and economic implications of the proposed division of the N.W.T. nor of the probable increased costs of government. As exemplified by their deference to the "more experienced" appointed members, these representatives seemed to have totally lacked an appreciation of what constitutional evolution would entail.

David Searle, who represented the Yellowknife board of trade, expressed concurrence with the principle of increasing the Territorial residents' participation in a democracy by producing a totally elected Council. He opposed the division of the Territories because the resultant split of population would be retrograde in terms of the evolution toward provincial status, subsequent development of natural resources might prove the boundaries to have been incorrectly but permanently delineated, the Territorial court would be eliminated for the Eskimos who would be subject to provincial courts, division would mean a duplication of administration, the division would produce an enclave of Eskimos (division was effectively based on race), and, finally, the Eastern Arctic would suffer an extreme travesty on its democratic rights. During British colonialism the colony was ruled by a resident governor whereas the Nunassiaq Territory would be ruled by a commissioner resident in Ottawa and possibly by the four appointed Councillors who would form a quorum even without the two elected members (Godon, 1963b, 112-120).

Representations from residents of the Eastern Arctic tended to agree with Searle although not always did they have a clearly delineated proposal. Bryan Pearson of the Frobisher Bay Chamber of Commerce, (Godon, 1963c, 160-180), Robert Williamson of Rankin Inlet (Godon, 1963e, 205-241), Father Lemer of the Cambridge Bay Community Association (Godon, 19633, 242-250), and Mark de Weerdt representing West Baffin Eskimo Co-operative Limited (Godon, 1963f, 276-290) concurred that the question of division of the Territories had not been adequately communicated to the Arctic residents. They favored increased democratic participation of the Eastern Arctic. Williamson, for example, asserted that the current Territorial Council should be re-constituted to contain exclusively elected members representing both the Western and Eastern parts of the N.W.T. This representative Council could then deliberate on the question of division.

During these prolonged deliberations the "sense of urgency" which Laing alluded to during the First Reading had been effectively ignored or, at a minimum, lost. Obviously, both major parties blamed the other for the delays (For example, Debates H. of C., 1964, 9197). In effect, the Bills could not attain Third Reading prior to the expiration of the N.W.T. Council.

The composition of the new Council of the N.W.T., which sat in June of 1964, was substantially altered from the Council which had, during the 22nd session, approved the resolution which requested the Federal Government to divide the N.W.T. Of the four elected members of Council, only J. W. Goodall was back on Council to represent Mackenzie River. The three elected novices to Council included Peter Baker from Mackenzie North, Robert Porritt from Mackenzie South, and Lyle Trimble from Mackenzie Delta. Of the five appointed members, only W. G. Brown, the Deputy Commissioner, remained on the new Council. The newly appointed Councillors included Air Marshall Hugh Campbell, Robert Harvey, Stuart Hodgson, and Frank Valee.[4] Even the Commissioner had changed. B. G. Sivertz had replaced the retiring R. G. Robertson on July 12, 1963.

The new Council did not share similar views with its predecessor concerning the division of the N.W.T. Opposition to the impending alteration of the status of the Northwest Territory was first expressed during debate of the motion of appreciation to the Commissioner for his opening address[5] (Votes and Proceedings, 1964a, 613-4). Porritt and Trimble sponsored a motion at the beginning of the June 11 proceedings which called for the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources to halt all moves to implement Bills C-83 and C-84 (Votes and Proceedings, 1964a, 140-411). Deputy Commissioner Brown forestalled adoption of this motion by insisting that the motion should be tabled at least twenty-four hours prior to its debate. The following day Brown pursued his attack by describing the motion as

> bare of any factual statement or justification for such a motion and [that] he was not prepared to bow before the verbiage of such idols, such political cliches [as "the interest of Canada as a whole"] (Votes and Proceedings, 1964a, 161-162).

Brown out-manoeuvred Porritt by gaining support for a motion to refer the Porritt motion to Committee of the Whole. The motion died on the Order Paper as Council was prorogued on June 12. But this was to be a short-lived success for the Territorial Administration.

An attempt to give the new Council historical appreciation of the development of the previous Council's ratification of the idea of division of N.W.T. was attempted by the Territorial Administration. This "Selective Chronological Narrative" was placed before Council at its 28th Session (Votes and Proceedings, 1964b, 75-81). But even before it had considered this sessional paper, the new and seemingly more aggressive Council ratified a recommendation to the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources that he introduce in Parliament an amendment to the N.W.T. Act to permit enfranchisement of all eligible residents via an enlargement of Council to accommodate new constituencies (Votes and Proceedings, 1964b, 84). During this same session, the Council altered the course of the impending division by approving the following motion:

> That a recommendation be made to the Government of Canada as follows:
>
> (1) That the future of the Northwest Territories be made the subject of a Judicial Commission.
>
> (2) That the Commission be charged with recommending plans for the future of the Northwest Territories covering all aspects thereof, including political, economic, educational, and industrial aspects, the structure of a Territorial Government, the method and interrelationship of the Federal Government activities, etc. (Votes and Proceedings, 1964b, 111).

Goodal and Trimble moved the motion and Hodgson, Porritt and Vallée voiced support of the motion during its debate.[6] No one voiced opposition although it is noteworthy that Baker of Mackenzie North did not voice support for the record.

THE CARROTHERS' COMMISSION REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT IN N.W.T.

The Federal Government moved on this request for a judicial inquiry eleven months later. This was accomplished by a June 3, 1965 Order-in-Council to appoint a three member Advisory Commission on the development of Government in the Northwest Territories. Arthur Laing, the then Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, announced this appointment and the Commission's terms of reference in the House of Commons.

> . . . At this stage, there is general agreement that further constitutional development for the Northwest Territories is needed.
>
> We believe there is need for an impartial and objective fact finding group of persons to consider the questions relating to the immediate and longer term political development of the Northwest Territories. In particular the residents should be given an opportunity to make their views known.
>
> It has therefore been decided to appoint an Advisory Commission on the development of Government in the North-West Territories. The terms of reference of the Commission will enable it to review government in the Northwest Territories and to recommend to the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources the form of government that seems most appropriate consistent with political, economic and social development. Within this general framework the Commission will be expected to give specific attention to the following matters:
>
> (a) the views of residents of the Northwest Territories and other Canadians regarding the foregoing;
>
> (b) the nature of the Federal Government's responsibility for the Territories;
>
> (c) consideration of the political development of the Territories contingent on the size, nature and distribution of population and its ability to pay a significant share of the costs involved having regard to the present and prospective level of social and economic development;
>
> (d) the present forms of government of the Northwest Territories as defined by the Northwest Territories Act and the Northern Affairs and National Resources Act;
>
> (e) The subject matter of the previous proposals affecting the constitutional structure of the Territories; and
>
> (f) other recommendations the Commission considers desireable (Debates H. of C., 1965, 1144).

At the same time Laing re-asserted the Government's stated committment during the Session's Speech from the Throne to adopt amendments to the N.W.T. Act which would facilitate formation of a territorial public service as well as to federally enfranchise all adult residents of the N.W.T. These changes were not accomplished by the 26th Session of Parliament as it was dissolved on June 30th.

Representation was made to this Carrothers' Commission, as it was commonly labelled, by the Council of the Northwest Territories. Initial discussion of the content of such a brief occurred during the June, 1965 sitting of Council. No consensus on a brief was attempted during this session. The record reports that Stuart Hodgson, who was later appointed Deputy Commissioner and is the current Commissioner, claimed that the various provincial premiers, who had been expressing desires of dividing the N.W.T. among various provinces, were not concerned with the people of the north but rather with obtaining an exploitable area. They were "interested in the resources, the oil, the vast storehouse of minerals . . ." (Territorial Debates, 1965a, 26). During the October (31st) session of Council, Lyle Trimble verbalized that the ultimate goal was provincial status. He asserted that Northerners had thus far been denied the basic democratic right of representative government.

> . . . But, sir, the fact again remains that you [the Commissioner] are ultimately responsible, not to the people of the North, but to the Federal Government by whom you are employed. The Public Service carrying out the work of this government, (or perhaps I should say not carrying out the work of this government) is not responsible to yourself or this Council, but through the various offices of the administration up to the Minister of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources. When the administration fails to carry out its Territorial responsibilities, there is nothing this Council can do about it, and likewise nothing the people can do about it, for although they may elect new Members to this Council, the Members continue to remain powerless. This then, sir, means that we in the N.W.T. do not have responsible democratic government but live under the dictatorial hand of an

> autocratic administration, the control of which rests with a few men enjoying the comforts of Ottawa, knowing little, and experiencing even less, of the conditions under which their unwilling subjects exist (Territorial Debates, 1965b, 3-4).

During its January 1966 sitting at Ottawa, the Council unanimously adopted a revised edition of Sessional Paper No. 18. This document was drafted by Commissioner Sivertz supposedly as a master summary of submitted ideas from individual Council members. It was an expression of the Council's views to the Carrothers Commission concerning future development of government in the Northwest Territories. Perhaps the most salient objective advocated in this paper was the Councillors' desire to attain a responsible government in which the legislators would be responsible to the electorate, the executive branch would be responsible to the legislators, and the public service would be responsible to the executive. The ultimate goal was for the N.W.T. to attain provincial status although, at Lyle Trimble's insistence, no dates were adopted for its attainment, even though the initial document had proposed dates.[7] It had posited that the first stage, which would entail a Commissioner, seven elected members, and five appointed members including the Deputy Commissioner, would be attained in 1967. The second stage would be reached in 1970. The Territorial Government would be composed of a Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, and an elected Speaker and other Council members. Government by 1974 would, it was proposed, consist of a Commissioner acting in the function of Lieutenant Governor, a Premier and Ministers responsible to the legislature, a Speaker, and other elected members. All but the Commissioner would be members of the Legislative Assembly. Finally, the original draft of the paper by Sivertz sought provincial status by approximately 1979 (Territorial Debates, 1966a, 622).

Also at Trimble's insistence, the Council did not adopt a position concerning the extent of political and economic powers of the eventual new Province of the North. The Council did not seem to reflect cognizance of the historical conflicts of its predecessor Councils in the old North-West Territories with the Federal Government in reference to the public domain. It was proposed that during the indeterminate period prior to the attainment of provincial status the Federal Government would have jurisdiction over federal matters as defined by the B.N.A. Act. In addition, it

> should retain responsibility for major aspects of northern economic development, land outside municipalities, water power, non-renewable resources, and certain high cost services such as transportation and communication, including trunk roads; responsibility for the financial and policy aspects of Indian and Eskimo affairs; deficits of the Territorial Government (Territorial Debates, 1966b, 218).

Conversely, the Council proposed that the Territorial Government should, in the main, be awarded responsibility for provincial-type governmental functions. The Territorial Government would be responsible for forests and fishing, but the Federal Government was to retain "land and resources" under its sphere of influence. More specifically, the Federal Government was to retain control and, therefore, ownership of the land outside the municipal areas, oil, gas, mineral rights, and water power (Territorial Debates, 1966a, 617).

These were indeed innocuous proposals when we consider the federal perspective. The evolution of government was not given a time frame and, therefore, it would be difficult to accuse the Federal Government of using delay tactics as had been the case prior to 1905.

The proposed division of Territorial and Federal powers did not address the historical issue concerning the public domain. Indeed, the Council's proposals effectively met their enunciated objective that the adopted scheme for the development of government in the N.W.T. should offer maximum benefit to Canada as a nation as compared to loyalties of region, race, religion, and language. Since the term "region" was not defined in the adopted sessional paper or in the Council's debate of this paper one could interpret it as possibly referring to N.W.T. as being a region in Canada. The logical conclusion would be that this Council was officially sanctioning the possible exploitation of the N.W.T.'s resources for the benefit of "all Canada" prior to the attainment of provincial status and that they were unwilling to offer opinion of whether this situation should be altered even following the attainment of provincehood.

THE POLITICAL POWER STRUCTURE IN N.W.T., 1966

The existing political structure in the Northwest Territories in 1966 was defined by the Northwest Territories Act and the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources Act. Partial representative government was provided by the former act. We noted earlier that there were four elected Council members who represented four electoral districts in the Mackenzie region. The Central and Eastern Arctic had remained unrepresented despite infrequent protests by this area's unofficial spokesmen. Responsible government was non-existent. The Commissioner was vested with the executive authority. He was appointed by the Governor in Council and was responsible to the Minister of

Northern Affairs and National Resources. His office was in Ottawa. The Commissioner, according to the Federal Government's analysis, recognized a greater responsibility to the N.W.T. Council than provided for under the Northwest Territories Act. He presided at sessions of Council but was not the chairman during Committee of the Whole debate. However, during such deliberations he did sit with the Committee to explain the details of his administration, seek Council's advice, and answer queries related to the legislation being considered. The Commissioner's leadership of Council was much like the role of cabinet in the provincial governments.

The Commissioner's executive powers were, according to section 5, the same as those exercised by the Lieutenant Governor of the Territories immediately prior to September 1, 1905. The Deputy Commissioner, a member of the Council, was also an appointee of the Governor in Council. He was to perform the functions of Commissioner in his absence or in the event the position of Commissioner became vacant. Prior to the establishment of this position as a full time position, the Deputy Minister had been the chief of the territorial division of the Northern Affairs Department.

The Territorial Council served as the legislative body and acted on matters similar to those of the provincial legislatures excepting regulation of natural resources and lands (Council had jurisdiction over game), local works and undertakings, incorporation of companies, administration of justice and the ability to amend the constitution of the Territories--the Northwest Territories Act.

The Commissioner possessed the power to withhold his assent to

Council's ordinances and the Federal Government could disallow territorial legislation within two years of its passage by Council. Finally, Council's legislative powers were subject to alteration merely by a federal Order-in-Council.

The Territorial Government's only civil service consisted of a Territorial liquor staff and a few contract employees. The employees of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources performed all the remaining administrative work in providing such provincial-type services as education, public works, and social assistance. Provision for federal subsidy of the Territorial Governmental functions had been negotiated (some would say federally-dictated) in terms of five year agreements since 1952. These agreements also outlined the areas of personal and corporate income taxation as well as succession duties which the Territorial Government would concede to the Federal Government. These Territorial funds were held under a Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada and were processed by the Department of Northern Affairs.

Since the Territorial Government was responsible for whites and metis while the Federal Government was responsible for the Indian and Eskimo population (approximately 60% of the N.W.T. residents) the N.W.T. and Northern Affairs and National Resources Acts contained overlapping responsibilities.[8] Essentially the latter Act gave the Minister of that department the usual federal residual authority outlined by the B.N.A. Act, responsibility for Indian and Eskimo affairs, and power over the Territories' natural resources with the exception of game. The Minister also had control and management of vacant Crown land--the bulk of the land in the N.W.T. He was also charged with promoting and recommending measures which would encourage the Territories' economic and political development. Finally, the Minister of Northern Affairs was charged with the duty of co-ordinating the various federal department's activities in the Territories and, as such, his Deputy Minister was chairman of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, which had deputy ministerial representation from most federal departments with activities in the north, the secretary to the cabinet, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff of the military, the R.C.M.P. Commissioner, the president of the National Research Council, the chairman of the Defence Research Board, and a permanent secretary (Reference Paper, 1965, 83-87; Carrothers, 1966, 46).

CARROTHERS COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

It was in light of these extant political conditions, the controversy surrounding the 1963 proposals for division of the Territories, as well as N.W.T.'s unique social and economic factors that the Carrothers' Commission was charged with the responsibility of recommending a course for future Territorial political evolution. The Commission summarized its perspective concerning political development in its first postulate or value.

> 1. Every citizen of Canada has a claim to participate in the institutions of responsible government under the Canadian constitution; it is a goal of political development of the Northwest Territories that the optimum number of Canadian citizens resident in the Territories should, at an optimum speed, participate in government as fully as Canadian citizens resident in the provinces (Carrothers, 1966, 128).

The Commission recommended that the name of Council be changed to Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories and that its ordinances should be called statutes. The Assembly was to be composed of fourteen elected and four appointed members. The Legislative Assembly should sit in the capital which, according to the Commission, should become Yellowknife. The term of the Assembly should be extended to a maximum of five years but dissolution normally be every four years. The three Commissioners recommended that the Legislative Assembly should not be immediately given full legislative powers comparable to those possessed by the provinces. The Federal Government would retain the power to amend the N.W.T. Act with the exception that the Assembly could set its members' indemnity subject to the Commissioner's recommendation. The 1966 N.W.T. Act Amendments related to borrowing money, the consolidated fund, the federal auditing of accounts and other financial matters would be unaltered. The Assembly would be given power over management and sale of surface rights to public lands but the Federal Government would retain control of natural resources. Finally, there would be limitations placed on the Assembly's administration of justice insofar as there would exist higher judicial courts with jurisdiction over the N.W.T. but located outside the Territories (Carrothers, 1966, 163-164).

In reference to executive functions of government, the Commission recommended that the position of Commissioner of the N.W.T. be retained. The incumbent, who would be a federal duputy minister responsible to the Minister of Northern Affairs, would be appointed by the Governor General in Council upon the recommendation of the Northern Affairs Minister. The Commissioner would be chairman of the Legislative Assembly and would preside over it. Additional powers would be conferred on the Commissioner. He would have the power to dissolve the Assembly and to reserve a bill of the Assembly for review by the Governor General in Council--subject to instructions from the Northern Affairs Minister. The Commissioner would continue to possess a tie-breaking vote in the Assembly. Finally, the Commissioner would preside over the executive council.

The members of this executive council would not need to be elected members of the Legislative Assembly but rather would be responsible for one or more departments of the Territorial Administration. These executive council members, who would be appointed by the Commissioner, would

> co-ordinate finance, prepare the budget, prepare legislation in principle, and generally tender advice on any territorial matter on which the Commissioner should seek advice (Carrothers, 1966, 162).

The position of Deputy Commissioner would be retained and he would be appointed by the Commissioner upon the consent of the Northern Affairs Minister. The incumbent of this position would eventually be chosen from among the elected Legislative representatives.

This structure of government was not designed to remain stagnant. The Commissioner, who would originally approximate a provincial premier, would, upon the advice of the Minister of Northern Affairs, eventually remove himself from this office by exercising his powers as though he were responsible to the Assembly. While the Commissioner's position was envisaged as evolving into the role of lieutenant-governor, the Deputy Commissioner's position would eventually become provincial premier when the Commissioner appointed a person who

> has the confidence of the legislature, in the parliamentary sense, and the Commissioner elects not to attend the sessions of the legislative assembly (Carrothers, 1966, 161).

At the time of the evolution of a lieutenant-governor and premier in the N.W.T. the Commission posited that the executive council would be composed of persons elected to the Assembly. This, in provincial terms, would constitute the cabinet.

The Advisory Commission also asserted that the Territorial Government should immediately develop an adequate civil service capability. It recommended the establishment of the departments of economic development and finance, local government, education, social development, justice, public works, and lands and resources (Carrothers, 1966, 170-205).

SUMMARY

The previous chapter focused on an analysis of the relationship between the Federal and Territorial Governments prior to 1905. We found that in the political development of the old North-West Territories as well as in the question of the public domain, the government in Ottawa treated the western "frontier" as a hinterland as defined by our theoretical perspective.

In this chapter, we have outlined the evolution of government in the Northwest Territories since 1905. We saw that the Territories were largely ignored prior to the war effort which recognized the North as of strategic importance. Our somewhat lengthy review of the concern over division of the Territories during the interval from 1960 to 1963 revealed the dangers implicit in a non-representative, non-responsible legislative body." The deliberations of the Council seemed to indicate that most residents of the N.W.T. were informed of the impending division and supported the idea. The records revealed that, in fact, the opposite was true, and that three of the four elected representatives from the Mackenzie were reflecting very specific vested interests. The appointed members either had no way of guaging public opinion in the N.W.T. or were simply immune from such pressures. Most interesting of all is that this Council came close to achieving division of the Northwest Territories.

We have examined the Carrothers Commission recommendations concerning possible evolution of the political sphere in the N.W.T. as a prelude to our empirical analysis of the workings of the Council of the Northwest Territories from 1967 to 1972. Our analysis in this subsequent chapter will examine the impending conflict between the Territorial Council and Federal Government concerning the perceived tardiness of the latter in furthering the evolution of government in the N.W.T.

CHAPTER FOUR

FOOTNOTES

[1] The hyphen in North-West Territories was removed between 1905 and 1906 (Robertson, 1963, 140).

[2] The Territorial Administration placed Sessional Paper No. 18 before the Council outlining the "possible evolution of the Northwest Territories". This document is especially useful in summarizing the existing political power of the N.W.T. in the legislative and executive functions of government (Votes and Proceedings, 1960b).

[3] B. G. Sivertz and Wilfred Brown were also in attendance during testimony by the Council members. While Brown is recognized with the title of Deputy Commissioner in the Committee's Minutes of Proceedings, Sivertz is described as being "Assistant Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs" rather than as Commissioner of the N.W.T. although it was accurate that he was also Assistant Deputy (Godin, 1963a, 6).

[4] This meant that they had not sat on any previous Council session and, thus, were as much novices as the new elected members. The hazard of lack of continuity in Council due to this total change of appointed members reached fruition in subsequent sessions.

[5] Trimble asserted that "very few people in my constituency knew anything about it until after the bills were passed by Council, and even now very little is known by the local people. I am disappointed that such little effort was made to inform the people who would be affected by this split" (p. 14). This seems somewhat unjustified. A paper outlining the Council's views concerning the proposed division was drafted in August, 1961 and its availability was announced in local press (See for example, News of the North, September 14, 1961, 2). The CBC Northern Service also gave coverage to the proposed division on local stations and in short wave broadcasts. The fact that the Commissioner in Council only received two replies may be instructive that the word was not adequately disseminated despite the apparent efforts (Votes and Proceedings, 1962a, 37-40).

[6] Goodall and Gall, both elected members, had expressed concern over the proposed division when it was under initial discussion during 1960 and 1961. It seems possible that Goodall was able to influence the new Council on the weight of his experience as a Councillor. The only other "old" member was the Deputy Commissioner and judging from the debates one can conclude that he did not attempt to gain popularity among his colleagues.

[7] Although Council adopted dates for the attainment of the first three stages and elected not to propose a target date for the establishment of provincial status, the revised sessional paper contains no target date for any of the four evolutionary stages (Territorial Debates, 1966, 627).

[8] That the Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources had been Commissioner of the N.W.T. reflected the interdependence between the Department's and N.W.T.'s federal acts (Reference Paper, 1965, 88).

CHAPTER FIVE

CONTENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

A content analysis was made of the Council of the Northwest Territories Debates, Sessions 35-47. The methodology utilized in the study is outlined in this chapter and the results of the analysis are reported in chapter six.

CONTENT ANALYSIS

The data source for the content analysis included the recorded debates of the Council of the Northwest Territories from 1967 to 1972. Drawing inferences based on an impressionistic reading of this voluminous data source, numbering no less than 11,840 pages, could only result in "slipshod" and likely invalid results (Carney, 1972, 16).

Content analysis offers a more systematic technique for precise determination of the content of these documents. Numerous definitions of content analysis have been offered by social analysts but the most cogent description of this research tool has been offered by Holsti and Stone.

> . . . Content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages (Stone, 1966, 5).

Although content analysis has occupied a minor role in social science, it is, in fact, a data collection device just as interviewing, questionnaires, and various observational techniques are ways of collecting data[1] (Mitchell, 1967, 230). As such, content analysis is amenable to hypothesis testing as compared to hypothesis formation (George, 1959, 25). Our hypotheses, which we elaborate in Chapter 6, are derived from our metropolis-hinterland perspective.

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF TERRITORIAL DEBATES

We made a content analysis of the Council of the Northwest Territories Debates of March, 1967 to June, 1972, inclusively. This entailed analysis of Members' Replies to the Commissioner's Opening Address, all formal motions presented before Council, and the Formal Session debates pertaining to motions which were identified as involving a conflict between the Territorial Council and the Federal Government.

We did not analyse all aspects of the Territorial Debates since we were specifically interested only in the power dimension involved in Territorial-Federal relations. Strictly Territorial matters were not deemed a rich enough source of data to warrant content analysis. Debate during consideration of Territorial and appropriation ordinances was in reference to internal Territorial matters, and, as such, did not provide a good measure of the views of Council members in terms of Territorial-Federal relations. Written and oral questions by Council members and the returns by the Territorial Administration also fitted into the classification of mainly internal Territorial affairs. Tabled documents and petitions might have given some measure of Council's reflection of vested interests but it was often difficult to assess whether the member was merely conveying the vested interest group's petition or concurred with that position. An examination of the debates revealed that many of the documents which were tabled did not clearly reflect a vested interest but rather reflected a Council member's perceived need to "be recorded in the Territorial Debates as being an active member". Further, since the actual content of these documents and petitions was not recorded in the debates, a content analysis could only assess the apparent vested interest reflected in their title. While formal recommendations by the Territorial Administration to Council often were in response to a request by Council at a previous session, they also usually reflected concerns with internal affairs of the N.W.T. rather than Territorial-Federal relations. Finally, the Administration's information items would not provide data to test the specific hypotheses which we derived from the general hypotheses as outlined in chapter two.

Our content analysis has sought to bridge the gap between macrosociology and microsociology (Ford, 1971). Our historical analysis focused on the macrosociological level by examining economic and political structures. Our content analysis focused on the micro-level of a committee as a decision-making body and the discovery of the extent to which the issues identified in the historical analysis were still vital in the debates preceeding decision-making.

It is recognized that the most important decision to be made in a content analysis study is the choice and subsequent specification of categories (Simon, 1969, 281). Standardized categories for analysis are non-existent except in the General Inquirer system which is a compilation of word dictionaries for computer analysis of written data

(Stone, 1966; Holsti, 1969, 11; Pool, 1959, 213-216). In this study we have been guided by our hinterland-metropolis model in the selection and specification of categories for the content analysis of the Territorial Debates.

A second critical aspect of content analysis is precise definition of the item or unit of observation. This unit can be any quantity of verbal behaviour which is classifiable into a single category. The most basic unit could entail a root word, as in the General Inquirer system, or a subject and predicate combination. In our analysis we chose "theme" as the basic unit for classification and utilized two differing definitions of it for different aspects of the debates. Our first definition of a unit of analysis was the formal motion. Thus, in our analysis of the formal motions, which are brought before Council by Council members, we treated each formal motion as an item to be classified in one of our specified categories.

In our second definition an item encompassed verbal behaviour of an actor which addressed to a single theme or topic. Specifically, it incorporated the minimum amount of verbal behaviour which was requisite to make a statement or argument which we could classify into one of our specified categories. With specific reference to the Commissioner's Opening Address and Members' Replies to this Opening Address, each member who spoke was classified with as many items as could be distinguished as arguments or verbalized thoughts.[2]

SPECIFICATION OF CATEGORIES: VESTED INTERESTS

The analysis of the Commissioner's Address, Member's replies to this Address, and formal motions utilized twelve vested interest group categories. These included natives, new northerner, Territorial Council, Territorial Administration, pro Federal Government, Large Corporation, northern business, Territorial Council vs. Territorial Administration, Territorial Council vs. Federal Government, Natives vs. Large Corporation, Natives vs. Federal Government and Natives vs. Territorial Administration. The latter five categories reflected the potential conflict implicit in the metropolis-hinterland perspective and were aimed at measuring the degree to which the N.W.T. Council exhibited conflict orientations in terms of the various vested interests--the extent to which the hinterland was fighting back against the metropolis. The categories also reflected our desire to concentrate on the political dimension in the N.W.T. while at the same time recognizing the importance of ethnicity and economic considerations, for example, in a complete structural analysis of the N.W.T.[2]

The content analysis did not attempt to measure each item in each vested interest category along a continuum of negative to positive. We resorted to merely a frequency count by category but this was in accord with most analyses of verbal expression (Pool, 1959, 194). It must be recognized, however, that for the sake of a more manageable analytical schema we were sacrificing measures of the intensity with which various Council members discuss issues during their Formal Replies and Formal Session debate. Intensity cannot usually be accurately inferred from the written record, however.[3]

Our analyses involved a series of dichotomies of vested interests and conflictual relationships as well as a related sequence of dichotomous judgements (Schultz, 1958, 504-508).

Decision 1.	Pro Territorial Council	Negative Territorial Council
Decision 2.	Pro. Terr. Adm.	Council vs. Adm.
Decision 3.	Pro Fed. Gov't.	Council vs. Fed. Gov't.
Decision 4	Natives	New Northerner
Decision 5.	Pro. Terr. Adm.	Natives vs. Terr. Adm.
Decision 6.	Pro. Fed. Gov't.	Natives vs. Fed. Gov't.
Decision 7.	Pro. Large Corp.	Natives vs. Large Corp.
Decision 8.	Large Corporation	Northern business

The above categories do not include all logical possibilities but rather stemmed from a modification of categories based on a test analysis of the debates utilizing a more comprehensive logical system. The series of decisions presented here are really three distinct pairing entities. The first pairing is represented by decision 1, 2, and 3; the second pairing entails decisions 4, 5, 6, and 7; and the third pairing encompasses decision 8. The analysis proceeds from the most general category down to the most specific choice possible. For example, an item of speech which involved, in some manner, natives would be located in the native vested interest category under decision 4. The analyst then proceeds to decision 5 to determine whether the item can be classified as a pro Territorial Administration statement or a conflict between natives and the Administration. If the item has not been classified in decision 5 the analyst proceeds to decision 6 and 7. If it can not be classified by decisions 5, 6 or 7 it is recorded under the native category. Thus, the number of items under "natives", for example, represented those which involved natives as a vested interest but did not involve a complementary-type statement in reference to the Territorial Administration, Federal Government, or Large Corporation, nor did it involve a conflict of interests between the natives and these three vested interest groups.

1. Vested Interests

Natives, as a vested interest category, referred to an item in the analysis pertaining to Indians, Eskimos, and Metis irrespective of place of residence.

New Northerners included all non-native residents in the N.W.T.[4] This would thus include the extremes of long-term, permanent white residents as well as the transient summer work migrants from Southern Canada.

The Territorial Council category included, in the case of speech, complementary comments about Council as a whole or about individual Council Members. It also entailed, in the instance of formal motions, items which pertained to Council procedures such as hours of sitting, date of Sessions, and changes to Council's rules of debate.

Territorial Administration included items which involved the Territorial Government civil servants and the senior management level of the Government including Commissioner Hodgson, Deputy Commissioner Parker, Assistant Commissioner Gilchrist, and the Departmental heads. It included complementary references, for example, to the competence of the Administration in general and specific references to the achievements of the Administration.

The category of Federal Government included any complementary item being analysed which referred either to federal politicians or federal civil servants.

Large corporation mainly included references to the multinational corporate structures as a vested interest group. It included references to mineral and petroleum exploitation. Large corporation included any reference to "large-scale" investments in N.W.T. by Southern Canada or foreign countries. This vested interest group was also implicated in instances where proposals were made pertaining to large-scale construction projects such as major highway construction. Reference to the Hudson's Bay Company was categorized as Large Corporation.

Entrepreneurial undertakings by new northerners or natives were classified as a northern business vested interest category. References to co-operatives were included in this category. Proposals for construction of airstrips in settlements were northern business vested interests unless it was specified the airstrip would be beneficial to the resident native population (such as emergency evacuations) in which case it would be classified as a native vested interest. Despite the possible contradiction, items about northern air carriers including P.W.A. and Nordair were classified as northern business.

Territorial Council vs. Territorial Administration included all criticisms of the Territorial Administration in terms of lack of competency of the Administration or lack of compliance with Council's requests and directives. In fact, it included all negative references to the Administration except when natives were implicated as a vested interest group.

Territorial Council vs. Federal Government referred to items pertaining to the transfer of responsibilities of government from the Federal Government to the Territorial Government--especially in reference to the proposals of the Carrothers Commission. In the main, the category referred to the Council's expression that transfer of provincial-type responsibilities were no longer occurring, had slowed in pace, or had shifted emphasis. It also contained items addressed at increasing Territorial participation in Federal-Provincial conferences or the desire for consultation by the Federal Government before taking action where the N.W.T. was involved. This category also encompassed items in which reference was made to federal ownership and control of natural resources of the Territories.

Natives vs. large corporation entailed an existent or potential conflict between the interests of resource exploiters and native groups. The conflict could pertain to land use or to the "trade-off" between exploitation and pollution of the native hunting, fishing, and trapping areas. It might be a concern with real or perceived inadequacies in native employment by large corporations.

Native vs. Federal Government consisted of all items which evinced existent or potential conflict between the natives of N.W.T. and the Federal Government. Items asserting that the Federal Government was reticent in some required action, re. natives, were included. One such example would be references to the unfulfilled aspects of Treaties. The land ownership or aboriginal rights topic was a native vs. Federal Government item. Items which compared the housing, utilities, and other conditions of federal employees living in the N.W.T. and native people were also encompassed.

The final category, natives vs. Territorial Administration, implicated items in which it was posited that the Administration was not doing something required by natives, or in which Territorial civil servants were not promoting native cultural heritage programs. An item which charged that Territorial employees were better housed or in some other way favoured by the Territorial Government would be classified in this category.

2. Use of the Vested Interest Categories: Commissioner's Address and Replies

The Commissioner's Opening Address (analogous to the Parliamentary speech from the throne) and Council members' Replies to the Commissioner's Opening Address have been classified according to the vested interest categories described above. The item in this analysis was any amount of verbal behaviour which could be classified into a single vested interest category. Only recorded verbal behaviour could be classified.[5] No inference was made concerning motives of the speakers. When required for clarification purposes, the verbal behaviour was classified in reference to the immediate content of what was being discussed. Addresses were given in Sessions 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 44, and 47 and, thus, this aspect of our content analysis was restricted to these sessions.

Tabulation of this content analysis gave a frequency distribution by vested interest group for each Council member as well as the

Commissioner. A percentage distribution among the vested interest categories for each person was calculated. The cumulated percentage distribution of all members' addresses among the vested interests was also produced.

The content analysis data has been calculated by combining more than one session of Council. Session 34 was kept as a separate entity as it was the only session of the 5th Council that we analysed. Sessions 35 through 43, inclusively, have been tabulated together as they entailed the 6th Council. The 7th Council represented our third grouping for statistical purposes--sessions 44 to 47, inclusively. The division between the 6th and 7th Council was justified, it is argued, since with the 7th Council there was the addition of two new electoral constituencies to produce a Council of four appointed and ten elected members compared with the previous Council of seven elected and five appointed members. We analysed Session 34 as a sample of the 5th Council. Our measure of reliability described below indicates that this sampling device was justified.

3. Use of the Vested Interest Categories: Formal Motions

The initial content analysis of the formal motions entailed their tabulation for Council session in terms of the mover and seconder of the motion and controlling for implicated vested interest.[6] In essence, each motion was an item to be classified. A table for each implicated vested interest by the sponsors of the motions was produced for each of the three Councils which were studied.[7] Also, a summary table was produced which gave a frequency and percentage distribution of formal motions in each of the three groupings of sessions for the various implicated vested interests.

SPECIFICATION OF CATEGORIES: TERRITORIAL COUNCIL'S MOTIONS OF CONFRONTATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Since the major impetus of this thesis is an analysis of the political evolution of the Northwest Territories since 1870 with special reference to the Federal-Territorial relationships, albeit often of a conflict nature, the content analysis was designed to illuminate this issue. Thus, we were not content with merely analysing the motions by vested interest. In fact, the major thrust of the content analysis was designed to offer a microsociological assessment of the continuing issues in the relationship between the Territorial and the Federal Governments.

Motions which were classified as being Territorial Council vs. Federal Government were further analysed.[8] The researcher made a content analysis of debate during Formal Session as well as debate in Committee of the Whole in reference to these motions.[9] The categories by which each classifiable item of verbal behaviour was analysed were modified to suit the specific needs of assessment of a decision-making body (Heyns, 1954, 378) and yet reflect our theoretical model. The unit of analysis, the item, entailed each new complete idea. If a speaker addressed the same topic more than once in the course of debate the items were categorized each time. If a colleague requested that a member repeat a statement, the repeated statement was not scored in addition to its first verbalization.

A classification system of twenty categories was devised and pretested by using them in the analysis of a session of debate. This analysis revealed the need for two additional dichotomies: "will emerge out of the hinterland status--destined to remain hinterland" and "awareness of contemporary hinterland status to the Federal Government--awareness of the historical hinterland status to the Federal Government". These categories are operationally defined below. The classification system was developed with a perspective similar to the logic underlying the vested interest dichotomies. The analyst or judge begins at the top and works downward through the system as far as possible with each item for analysis.

An item of verbal behaviour was not related to the discussion if it did not address to the content of the discussion or to procedures of the committee--such as order of debate. Examples of this category would be a joke or any remark which was not on the topic. Conversely, an item was related to the discussion if it addressed the problem or decision-making process in terms of content or operating procedures.

A solution suggestion could relate to content or procedures. In the former case, it would be a solution to the perceived problem under consideration. A procedural solution would refer to a suggestion to alter the way the committee dealt with the motion before it. The actual motion would be classified into one of the categories below this one. An expression of opposition to a suggestion was a negative response to a content or procedural solution. Support of a solution suggestion recorded all verbal items concurring with a suggested solution pertaining to content or procedure. The seconder of a motion

Categories for Analysis of Formal Session Debate of Formal Motions; Council of the Northwest Territories

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Related to discussion — Not related to discussion

Solution suggestion — Not solution suggestion

Support sugg. — Oppose sugg.

Ask for information, clarification, summary. — Give information, summarize, clarify.

Pro Fed. Gov't. — Aware of hinterland status re. Fed. Gov't.

contemporary awareness — historical awareness

Pro Large Corp. — Exploitation by large corporation

Pro. Northern business — North business powerless compared to Large Corp.

Pro. Terr. Adm. — Powerless compared to Terr. Adm.

Pro. Prov. Gov'ts. — Aware of hinterland status re. Prov. Gov'ts.

Will emerge out of hinterland status — Destined to remain hinterland.

Pro Northern Business — Remain hinterland irrespective of development of Northern Business

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was not recorded as a solution suggestion. If a committee member asked that a vote be recorded as unanimous this item was recorded as a support solution suggestion.

A request for information, for clarification, and for a summary could also relate to content and procedures. A similar case existed in reference to giving of information, clarification, or summarizing items. Pro Federal Government, pro large corporation, pro Territorial Administration,[10] and pro Provincial Governments related to positive or praising statements about these various vested interest groups.

An awareness of hinterland status re. Federal Government entailed items which expressed any form of antagonism toward the Federal Government, an expression of powerlessness compared with the Federal Government, reference to the federal veto power over Territorial ordinances, comments about the delays in federal action, and comments that Council's further action must await the Federal Government. References to the federal ownership and control of Territorial natural resources were also coded as an expression of hinterland status. All of these were categorized as "contemporary awareness". Historical awareness encompassed items of verbal behavior which addressed to the long-term history of the N.W.T., the Carrothers recommendations in a historical context, quasi-colonial political status, the prerequisite of economic self-sufficiency for provincial status, and the models of the provincial political systems.

Exploitation by large corporations referred to items which asserted that the major benefits of primary resource development go to multinational companies or indirectly to the Federal Government. A pro northern business item was elaborated earlier in this chapter. Items which recorded the difficulties that northern business interests, such as small building contractors, faced in competing with large southern businesses for N.W.T. contracts would be classified as north business powerless compared to large corporation.

The category of powerlessness of Council compared to the Territorial Administration included items which asserted that the Administration did not comply with Council's wishes and items which alluded to the executive control by the office of Commissioner.

Hinterland status vs. Provincial Governments would include reference to provincial premiers' proposals for territorial acquisitions of parts of N.W.T. and possible provincial use of N.W.T. resources (such as water flowing into the Mackenzie River system).

An emergence out of hinterland status would include items which predict (or propose a plan of action) that N.W.T. will attain industries, will be developed, etc. The converse would be acceptance of hinterland destiny such as N.W.T. will always be a primary product producer.

This analysis produced a cross tabulation of Council Members by the analytical categories. Since the researcher analysed the Committee of the Whole debate separately from the debate in formal session, it was possible to construct data tables for Committee of the Whole debate, formal session debate, and the combination of these two. This control was maintained to permit examination of the relative merits of our analytical schema for analysing statements of major policy positions (as generally reflected in formal session debate) as compared to the rather more informal decision-making committee.

SPECIFICATION OF CATEGORIES: DEPUTY COMMISSIONER'S RESPONSE TO FORMAL MOTIONS

Since Parker, the Deputy Commissioner, was the only member of the Territorial Administration who was on Council we devised a quantitative measure of his response to Members' formal motions. We did not record his voting behaviour even when unanimous votes occurred as this would have contaminated our findings. Not every unanimous vote was announced by the Commissioner nor were non-unanimous votes recorded unless specifically requested by a member. Also, we were more interested in Parker's overt verbal behaviour in so far as they were attempts to affect the outcome of the decision-making committee. An item in the analysis of his response entailed his total remarks related to one formal motion.

If Parker made no comment about a motion it was recorded as no response. Merely giving information was also recorded as no response unless the information was overtly or covertly directed at supporting someone's argument or was aimed at an evaluation of the merits of the motion.

A negative response included all those verbal behaviours which disagreed with or expressed opposition to a motion. A positive response was an item which supported a motion.

SPECIFICATION OF CATEGORIES: COMMISSIONER'S RESPONSE TO FORMAL MOTIONS

Hodgson's responses were classified according to seven categories. As with Parker's responses, an item encompassed Hodgson's total remarks about a formal motion. A negative response to a motion was recorded as an expression of opposition to the intent of the motion. A positive response was recorded when he concurred with the motion. felt it was timely, or supported it in the ensuing debates.

An assertion that the subject of a motion was not in Council's purview related especially to the reminder that the Council was dealing with a Federal Government responsibility, or with executive powers in the N.W.T. but it could have addressed to any other level of jurisdiction. The comment that such matters should be referred to the Territorial Member of Parliament would fit within this category.

Reserve judgment alluded to the acceptance of a motion as being in order but cautioning that his Administration would not be bound by the outcome of the vote. It would be accepted as advice from Council but not as a mandatory directive to the Territorial Government.

The fifth category was the change of a motion, attaining its deferral to a later date or to Committee of the Whole, or its withdrawal. A threat to declare a motion out of order unless it was modified was categorized in this way as was a more cooperative venture to improve the wording of a motion. If the Commissioner was instrumental in having a motion withdrawn, again by cooperative endeavour or by threat, his response would be classified in this category. Finally, an agreed or coerced deferral of a motion fitted this category.

No response related to the comment that "the motion is in order" or a directive to the mover to open debate. The seventh category, "not in order", declared a motion unacceptable irrespective of the reasons--be they draftsmanship, not within Council's power, or for politically-motivated reasons.

This analysis afforded a frequency distribution of the Commissioner's responses, a tabulation of the Commissioner's response by sponsors of the motion, a tabulation of his responses by mover of the motions, and a cross tabulation of his responses by the implicated vested interest of the motion.

RELIABILITY

The content analysis data which is summarized in chapter 6 was collected solely by the researcher. A desirable design would have this analysis conducted by a minimum of two independent coders or judges. This would facilitate a measure of reliability of their findings. This researcher chose the acceptable alternative of repeating the coding process of a sample of the content after an interval of one month (Angell, 1964, 341).

Sessions 38 and 44 of the Commissioner's Address and Members' Replies to the Address were recoded and the results compared with the initial analysis. Disagreement in coding was not due to coding items in different categories but rather was due to the inclusion of some verbal behaviours as items to be coded in one analysis but not the other. Despite this disagreement, we would argue that our measure of reliability may even be a bit lower than it really was as the formula utilized by one significant study has demonstrated that the percentage of agreement in coding increases with volume of material coded (Angell, 1964, 341). The reliability test showed that there was 95 percent agreement in the analyses of the Commissioner's Address and Members' Replies for the 38th and 44th Sessions. Percentage agreement is not a good measure since it will be biased in instances where a small number of categories are utilized. We can correct for this type of bias by a consistency index, S, which was developed with reference to coding of interview and "individual limited response" questions (Bennett, 1954, 307).

$$S = \frac{K}{K-1} \quad (Po - \frac{1}{K}),$$

Where Po is the observed percentage agreement between two independent coders (or codings) and K is the number of categories. Since our analysis utilized 12 categories, our index of consistency was .94.

The above measure of inter-coder reliability controls for possible bias due to the number of categories utilized in the analysis. An alternative measure of reliability has been designed to control for bias due the number of categories utilized and the frequency with which each category is used in the analysis (Scott, 1955, 323-325).

$$\pi = \frac{Po - Pe}{1 - Pe},$$

Where Po, or observed percent agreement, is the percentage of judgments on which coders agree through independent analysis of the same content and Pe is the expected percent agreement due to chance.[11] π is the ratio of the actual difference between the coders' agreement and agreement due to chance compared to the maximum calculatable difference between obtained and chance agreement. The resultant index of inter-coder agreement for the Commissioner's Address and Members' Replies during Session 38 was also .94.

When we utilized the Bennett reliability measure for the inter-coding agreement of the formal debate of Council vs. Federal Government motions during Session 38 we obtained a consistency index of .91. The same result was obtained with the Scott inter-coder reliability measure.[12] No reliability measure was made of Parker's and Hodgson's response to formal motions nor of the coding of the formal motions themselves.

VALIDITY

Validity is of concern in our content analysis of the Territorial Debates. It has been recognized that communication is often biased to manipulate an audience (Mitchell, 1967, 236). This danger seemed especially applicable to the Territorial Council in which members were concerned about "making an impression" which would be favorably responded to by the media, the constituency electorate, fellow Council Members, and even the Commissioner. Their expressions of policy and the formal motions they sponsored would reflect all of these types of concerns. On the other hand, it was the vested interests that they supported which we were interested to measure irrespective of their motivations and we submit that we have done so.

We have attempted to attain construct validity by deriving our hypotheses and our analytical categories from our theoretical perspective. The metropolis-hinterland theory enables the student of sociology, economics, political science and history to interpret structural data. To the extent that this macro-theory is viable, it should lend itself to more micro-theoretical causal relationships.

We have sought to attain predictive validity in our analysis. As will be demonstrated in chapter 6, we have not been entirely successful but it is argued that we have made a significant contribution towards the establishment of a battery of measures by which an analyst can predict future behaviours related to confrontations in the N.W.T.

MANUAL VERSUS COMPUTER IN CONTENT ANALYSIS OF TERRITORIAL DEBATES

The value of computers in content analysis studies in such areas as sociolinguistics has been clearly demonstrated (Stone, 1966). Manual coding of the data is slow, laborious, and tedious. Analysing large volumes of the Territorial Council Debates has had the added psychological effects associated with total immersion over a prolonged period of time in written verbal behaviour which has both latent and manifest hostility and conflict. A computer analysis would not be possible given the nature of our categories and our unit of analysis. However, this researcher would advise that much time can be saved in the analysis if the computer is utilized to analyse the resultant raw data into tables which reveal covariation of variables.

CHAPTER FIVE

FOOTNOTES

[1] Although we assert that content analysis has played a relatively minor role in social science, it is worthy to note that such studies have been documented as early as the 1740's. Barcus has examined 1719 content analysis studies and has determined that the vast majority of these were empirical data-collecting studies (Holsti, 1968, 607-608).

[2] We specify items later in the chapter in reference to the analysis of formal motion debate in Formal Session.

[3] This loss of data is especially disconcerting in reference to the five above mentioned conflict categories (Mitchell, 1967, 241).

[4] Our theoretical perspective would direct us to utilize the distinction of Northerner and Southerner in which the former refers to permanent residents by birth and in-migrants who have committed themselves to settle in the North while the latter would refer to transients. Northerners perceive Southerners as "opportunists and selfish intruders who are a threat to the well being of the North, coming there to exploit, to exercise power over local people, and to create little or nothing of positive value in or for the area. At best, the Northerners see the Southerners as rather impersonal and disinterested persons, apparently not willing, or giving much of an indication of trying, to interact with or understand the native peoples" (Ervin, 1968, 5). We chose the categories of natives and new northerners for heuristic purposes in that it is difficult to assess verbal behaviours of Council members in reference to a category of "northerner" defined in terms of a committment to settle.

[5] Generalized "motherhood" comments are not categorized.

[6] An amending motion was recorded as reflecting the same vested interest as the original motion. This procedure was also followed in reference to motions which referred a formal motion to Committee of the Whole. If a motion implicated more than one vested interest group a decision had to be made concerning which group was most affected. This became especially problematic in distinguishing between new northerners and natives.

[7] We did not retain control by mover and seconder in the tabulation of the data.

[8] One motion which was classified as Territorial Council vs. Federal Government was not included in this further analysis as it did not pertain to the political evolution of the N.W.T. but rather involved the desire of Council to have a N.W.T. representative at the proposed Federal-Provincial Conference on Indian Affairs--a Canada-wide concern rather than a specific concern with N.W.T. This motion is found in Session 35 (Territorial Debates, 1968b, 532).

[9] We separately tabulated the analysis of debate during Formal Session and Committee of the Whole and then combined their scores. It was determined that inclusion of the Committee of the Whole data merely increased the frequencies in the functional committee categories but not in the substantive, hinterland-metropolis derived categories. Thus, this researcher would advise that replication studies need only analyse the Formal Session debate.

[10] If the Territorial Administration is requested to conduct a study and report back to Council, this is a pro Territorial Administration item.

[11] Pe is calculated as the sum of the squares of the percent of items coded in each category compared to the total number coded. This index was developed as a test of reliability for coding interview data. We have assumed that we can obtain an indication of coding reliability in our study if we compare inter-coder agreement of Session 38 with all applicable sessions of the 6th Council. (It is recognized that we are assuming coding of Session 38 is a sample of all sessions of the 6th Council).

[12] We utilized the category proportions for Sessions 35-43 in calculating Pe.

CHAPTER SIX

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE DEBATES OF THE COUNCIL OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, 1967 TO 1972

As stated in the previous chapter, the content analysis of the Territorial Debates during Sessions 34 and 47 strives to bridge the gap between the historical trends we have seen in the two historical chapters and the influences and trends which are discernable in the decision-making process of the Territorial Council. We have utilized the metropolis-hinterland model in both levels of analysis.

An interpretative framework is presented and tested by eight specific hypotheses related to the three general metropolis-hinterland hypotheses which were identified in the second chapter. We subsequently present a summary table of these findings and draw conclusions related to the analysis.

The data supported, firstly, that the degree of confrontation of the Council with the Federal Government increased with the increase of political sophistication of Council from 1967 to 1972. Secondly, the degree of confrontation with the Federal Government was positively related to sponsorship by the ideologists on Council. Thirdly, among Councillors who engaged in sponsoring motions of confrontation with the Federal Government, the degree of such confrontations was directly related to experience on Council. Fourthly, the Commissioner's and the Deputy Commissioner's negative responses to Councillors motions were directly related to Council's confrontations with the Territorial

Administration but not with Council's confrontations with the Federal Government.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In chapter two we identified the metropolis-hinterland economic relationships between the Northwest Territories and the Federal Government. Davis has conceptualized the metropolis as an "overclass" and the hinterland as an "underclass" (1972, 36-38). This perspective is related to Marx's analysis of class relations in terms of their economic conditions. Marx asserted that the struggle between classes is a political struggle (Bottomore, 1956, 187).

Our historical analyses in chapters three and four have focused on a macrosociological level of analysis. The study reported in this chapter evaluated the degree to which the Council, as the formal constitutional power group in the N.W.T., was engaged in political struggles with the Federal Government.

Three basic tenets of the metropolis-hinterland theory were expressed as "general hypotheses". They were as follows:

1. The hinterland will eventually rebel against the metropolis.
2. Spokesmen emerge from the hinterland and they act as leaders of confrontations with the metropolis.
3. The metropolis has key agents in its subordinate hinterlands and they function to promote the interests of their metropolitan employer.

CONCEPTUAL APPROACH

Specific hypotheses were subsequently derived and tested. The predicted relationships among the variables in these hypotheses were part of an interpretative framework which we developed during this study. The applicable components of this framework for the hypotheses studied in this chapter are as follows:


Political Confrontation Ideology
Political Maturity
+
Consciousness of Hinterland Status
+
Political Confrontations

In our study of the Northwest Territories, political ideology to the dominant ideas which were held by the majority of the Members of the Territorial Council. We were concerned only with this ideology with respect to the political and economic power relations between the Territorial and Federal Governments.

Political maturity was defined as political sophistication of the N.W.T. Council. Our historical analysis of the old North-West Territories from 1870 to 1905, as well as the new Northwest Territories from 1905 to 1967, indicated that, with the passage of time, Territorial legislators became more adept at Parliamentary procedures. The current Northwest Territories was not represented within the Territorial Government prior to 1905. However, as was seen in chapter four, the degree of participation by Territorial residents has moved from non-participation with the totally appointed Council of Federal civil servants after 1905 to an increasing number of elected representatives since 1951. Increased participation of the N.W.T. populace has, it is assumed, resulted in increased political sophistication in the general population. This would be reflected by an increasing political maturity within Council. Also, many Councillors have served more than one term of office with the result that they would become increasingly experienced with the political process. This increased sophistication would be reflected within the whole Council body.[1] In summary, political maturity refers to the degree to which Council Members are cognizant of "what is going on" in Northern politics, procedures to follow within Council Sessions, and the limits on Council's power and actions.

Thus, political maturity was operationally defined as increasing from the 5th to the 6th and the 7th Councils. This was identified as "between-Council" maturity. The 7th Council would be more politically mature than the 6th, and the 6th, in turn, more mature than the 5th. A second operational measure of maturity was also utilized: "within-Council" maturity. This was operationally defined according to the number of years that a Council Member held office. On the basis of our historical analysis, we assumed that Council Members would become more politically mature during their term of office and, thus, in each successive session within a specified Council they would be increasingly more politically mature.

As stated above, our theoretical perspective treats the populace (and the Territorial Council) as an "underclass" and the Federal Government as an "overclass". Our analysis of the degree of

Members' consciousness of this hinterland status is based on Marx's distinction between a class in relation to capital and a class for itself (Bottomore, 1956, 186-188). One of the pre-requisites of Council's confrontations with Ottawa for more economic and political power would be its consciousness of the extant economic relations and the related powerlessness of Council.

The final variable in the interpretative framework is political confrontations. This refers to political struggles in which the "underclass" attempts to wrest political and economic power from the "overclass".

DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES

The analysis of the specific hypotheses which follow is based on data which were collected by a content analysis of the Territorial Council Debates from 1967 to 1972. A detailed description of the method of content analysis was given in the previous chapter. This included identification of the item for analysis, a description of the vested interest categories used in analysis of the hypotheses related to the first and second general hypotheses, a description of the response categories used in the analysis of the hypotheses related to the third general hypothesis, and a measure of the reliability of the data analysis as well as a discussion of validity considerations.

The content analysis collected data from the Members' Replies to the Commissioner's Address, Formal Motions presented by Councillors, and Formal Session debate of Formal Motions which involved a confrontation of the Territorial Council with Ottawa with respect to economic and political power.

FINDINGS

I. General Hypothesis One: The hinterland will eventually rebel against the metropolis.

Our first specific hypothesis was that as the Territorial Council becomes more politically mature, its degree of confrontation with the Federal metropolis will increase.

In the specification of this general hypothesis, rebellion was not defined in terms of military confrontations but, rather, in terms of constitutional struggles for political and economic power. Consciousness of N.W.T.'s hinterland status and confrontation with the metropolis concerning political and economic power were utilized as two empirical measures of the rebellion variable in this hypothesis. The former measure was given two operational definitions. In the case of the content analysis of the Members' Replies to the Commissioner's Address, our measure of consciousness was obtained by tabulating the number of analysed items which were classified as belonging to the Council vs. Federal Government category. This category was operationally defined in chapter five as follows:

> Territorial Council vs. Federal Government referred to items pertaining to the transfer of responsibilities of government from the Federal Government to the Territorial Government--especially in reference to the proposals of the Carrothers Commission. In the main, the category referred to the Council's expression that transfer of provincial-type responsibilities were no longer occurring, had slowed in pace, or had shifted emphasis. It also contained items addressed at increasing Territorial participation in Federal-Provincial conferences or the desire for consultation by the Federal Government before

taking action where the N.W.T. was involved. This category also encompassed items in which reference was made to federal ownership and control of natural resources of the Territories.

A second measure of consciousness of N.W.T.'s hinterland status was obtained from our content analysis of the Formal Session debate of formal motions. In this case, consciousness was operationally defined as Council Members' verbal statements in Council which revealed that they were aware of N.W.T.'s hinterland position to the Federal Government in either the political or economic power dimensions. Statements which were included in this measurement revealed the Councillor's awareness of the historical trends in this metropolis-hinterland relationship or of the contemporary power relationship between the N.W.T. and the Federal Government.

Hinterland confrontation with the Federal metropolis was measured by Council motions which were classified in our content analysis as "Council vs. Federal Government". The operational definition of this category was identical to the definition quoted above.

a. Specific Hypothesis 1: As the N.W.T. Council becomes more politically mature, its degree of confrontation with the Federal metropolis will increase.

i. Between-Council Political Maturity by Councillors' Consciousness

As stated above, our content analysis was designed to obtain two operational measures of Council Members' consciousness of N.W.T.'s hinterland status.[2] The Members' Replies to the Commissioner's Address afforded one of these measures. Since Members' Replies were not given in every session during the Territorial Councils which we studied, we controlled for level of maturity within each Council in our data analysis. Our assumption that political sophistication was a function of time suggested that the Councillors would be most politically mature during the last session of any specified term of Council. We therefore tested the null hypothesis that there were no differences among the 5th, 6th, and 7th Councils' last session which we studied with respect to Councillors' consciousness as measured by confrontation items in the Members' Replies to the Commissioner's Address.[3] The following table summarizes this data.[4]

Table 1

Council Members' Consciousness by Political Maturity during the Last Analysed Session, Councils 5, 6, and 7

Consciousness	Session 34[5]	Political Maturity Session 41	Session 47	Total
Confrontation Fed. Gov't.	17.32%	31.20%	35.90%	25.77%
All Other Motions	82.68	68.80	64.10	74.23
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
N	(127)	(125)	(39)	(291)

Chi square = 8.75; gamma[6] = 0.33

Thus, we were able to reject the null hypothesis with a 0.05 level of confidence.[7]

As can be seen in the above table, 17 percent of the items in the Members' Replies to the Commissioner's Address during Session 34 reflected the Councillors' consciousness of the hinterland status of the N.W.T. We can compare this with 31 percent and 36 percent for the 41st and 47th Sessions, respectively.

Our second measure of the hypothesis that Council maturity is positively related to Council Members' consciousness of N.W.T.'s hinterland status was obtained by the content analysis of Formal Session debate of formal motions of confrontation with the Federal Government. Our null hypothesis, as applied to this operationalization of Councillors' consciousness, predicted no difference among the 5th, 6th, and 7th Councils with respect to items during Formal Session debate which specified the N.W.T. as a hinterland of the Federal Government.

The dependent variable (Councillors' consciousness) was operationally defined as including those items which reflected an awareness of the historical hinterland power relationship as well as the contemporary hinterland status. The independent variable (political maturity) was operationalized according to successive Councils. As there were only 11 items in the last session of the 5th Council (the only session we analysed) we have omitted this data from our analysis. The results of this analysis are outlined in Table 2, which follows on p. 138.

The measured chi square permitted rejection of the null hypothesis at our desired confidence level of 0.05.[8] The table reveals that the Councillors alluded to the hinterland status of the N.W.T., during debate of motions of confrontation with the Federal Government, a larger percentage of items in the 7th as compared to the 6th Council.

Table 2

Debate of Motions of Confrontation with the Federal Government: References to N.W.T.'s Hinterland Status by Political Maturity, Councils 6 and 7

Items of Replies	Political Maturity 6th Council	 7th Council	Total
Confrontation Fed. Gov't.	34.29%	47.71%	38.87%
All Other Items	65.71	52.29	61.13
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
N	(210)	(109)	(319)

Chi square = 4.89; gamma = 0.27

In summary, we conclude that between-Council political maturity was positively related with Councillors' consciousness of the N.W.T.'s hinterland status with respect to the Federal Government. This gave credence to our interpretative framework which asserted that consciousness of the N.W.T.'s hinterland status is one of the causes of political confrontations of Council with the Federal Government.

ii. Between-Council Political Maturity by Confrontation with the Federal Government.

Consciousness can be considered as a measure of the Councillors' degree of predisposition to rebel against the metropolis whereas our content analysis of the formal motions introduced in the N.W.T. Council actually measured Council's attempts to alter N.W.T.'s hinterland power position. These attempts have been labelled confrontations with the Federal Government to distinguish them from the connotation of violence in reference to "rebellion".

The null hypothesis which we tested by the analysis of the formal motions was that there were no differences among the 5th, 6th, and 7th Councils with respect to the relationship of between-Council political maturity and motions of Council's confrontation against the Federal Government concerning economic and political power.[9] The data are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3

Formal Motions of Confrontation with the Federal Government by Political Maturity, Councils 5, 6, and 7

Consciousness	Political Maturity 5th Council	6th Council	7th Council	Total
Confrontation Fed. Gov't.	4.35%	9.73%	15.65%	11.00%
All Other Motions	95.65	90.27	84.35	89.00
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
N	(46)	(298)	(147)	(491)

Chi square = 5.81; gamma = 0.32

The data permitted rejection of the null hypothesis with a 0.0536 level of confidence.[10] Of the motions sponsored by Members of the 5th Council, 4 percent were focused on confrontations with the Federal Government. The 6th and 7th Councils sponsored 10 percent and 16 percent, respectively, of their motions in this confrontation category.

In summary, the data demonstrated that between-Council political maturity was positively associated with Council's degree of confrontation with the Federal Government. Our interpretative framework suggested that political maturity produces Members' consciousness which, in turn, produces political confrontations.

iii. Within-Council Political Maturity by Confrontation with the Federal Government.

Table 3 has summarized the data analysis when we considered maturity among the Councils. Tables 4 and 5 summarize the analysis of political maturity within the 6th and 7th Councils, respectively. The null hypothesis, which we tested in Table 4, predicted no difference among the sessions of the 6th Council with respect to the association of political maturity and degree of confrontation with the Federal Government over political and economic power.

Table 4

Formal Motions of Confrontation with the Federal Government by Political Maturity within the 6th Council

	Political Maturity			
Confrontation	Sess. 35-37	Sess. 38-40	Sess. 41-43	Total
Confrontation Fed. Gov't.	11.56%	21.21%	32.20%	17.79%
All Other Motions	88.44	78.79	67.80	82.21
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
N	(173)	(66)	(59)	(298)

Chi square = 13.5; gamma - 0.43

The null hypothesis was rejected.[11] The data in the table demonstrated that the percentage of confrontation motions increased during the term of the 6th Council. More specifically, 12 percent of the motions sponsored by Council during the first three sessions of the 6th Council entailed confrontations with the Federal Government, as compared with 21 percent and 32 percent during the middle three sessions and the last three sessions of the 6th Council, respectively.

We tested the same null hypothesis with reference to the 7th Council.[12] The data are presented in Table 5 below:

Table 5

Formal Motions of Confrontation with the Federal Government by Political Maturity within the 7th Council

Confrontation	Sess. 44-45	Sess. 46-47	Total
Confrontation Fed. Gov't.	10.71%	22.22%	15.65%
All Other Motions	89.29	77.78	84.35
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
N	(84)	(63)	(147)

Chi square = 2.79; gamma = 0.41

The data permitted rejection of the null hypothesis.[13] The table reveals that, during the second half of the 7th Council, Councillors sponsored twice the proportion of confrontation motions with the federal metropolis than during the first half of the Council.

In summary, data from the 6th and 7th Councils gave empirical support to the positive relationship of within-Council political maturity and degree of confrontation with the Federal Government. Our interpretative framework does not show a direct relationship between political maturity and degree of confrontation of the hinterland with the metropolis. The data in Tables 3, 4, and 5 indicate that it may not be necessary to measure degree of consciousness in replicative studies. We suggest that future work could focus on a more specific operationalization of political maturity,

b. Summary of General Hypothesis One

We found that political maturity of the Northwest Territories Council was positively related with our two operational measures of Councillors' consciousness of N.W.T.'s hinterland status. The strength of this relationship for Members' Replies to the Commissioner's Address and Formal Session debate of motions of confrontation against the Federal Government was a gamma measure of 0.33 and 0.27, respectively. When we analysed formal motions we found that between- and within-Council political maturity were positively related to the degree of Council's confrontation with the Federal Government. Between-Council maturity among the 5th, 6th, and 7th Councils was related to degree of confrontation by a gamma measure of 0.32. The relationship of within-Council political maturity and the dependent variable was a gamma of 0.43 and 0.41 for the 6th and 7th Councils, respectively.

Thus, the general hypothesis has been sustained by the data we have used to test the related specific hypotheses.

2. General Hypothesis Two: Spokesmen emerge from the hinterland and they act as leaders of confrontation with the metropolis.

We began with a derived hypothesis that some members of Council emerge from the hinterland as spokesmen of the N.W.T. in confrontation with the Federal Government concerning political and economic power. Five specific hypotheses were formulated in order to facilitate the beginning of an elaboration of the causal chain which would explain the emergence of Council Members as hinterland spokesmen.

a. Specific Hypothesis 2a: The degree of confrontation by the elected Council Members will be greater than the degree of confrontation by the appointed and elected-appointed members.[14]

We operationally defined Council Members' elective position in terms of the elected-appointed dichotomy. Confrontation with the Federal Government was operationally defined in terms of sponsored formal motions which were classified in this confrontation category. Sponsorship was defined in terms of the mover and seconder of a motion. Thus, the elected category included those motions in which both the mover and seconder were elected Council Members.

Our content analysis provided data to test the null hypothesis that the elected Council Members would not sponsor a greater proportion of motions involving confrontation with the Federal Government than were sponsored by the appointed and appointed-elected Members. These data are tabulated in Table 6, which follows on p. 144.

Table 6

Formal Motions of Confrontation with the Federal Government by Elective Position of Sponsors: Councils 5, 6, and 7

	Elected Position		
Confrontation	Elected	Appointed Elected-Appointed	Total
Confrontation Fed. Gov't.	8.85%	15.79%	11.00%
All Other Motions	91.15	84.21	89.00
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
N	(339)	(152)	(491)

Chi square = 4.48; gamma = 0.32

We were able to reject the null hypothesis relating elected status and confrontation but the relationship was opposite to the direction predicted.[15]

This finding did not support the general hypothesis that spokesmen emerge from the hinterland and act as leaders of confrontations with the Federal Government. We could not reject the related general hypothesis as some of the appointed Councillors of the 5th and 6th Councils were residents in the hinterland. Thus, to adequately test this hypothesis we derived the following hypothesis:

b. Specific Hypothesis 2b: Councillors who are residents of hinterland communities will sponsor a larger proportion of motions of confrontation with the Federal Government.

It was stated in chapter two that the metropolis-hinterland perspective is applicable to the elaboration of the exploitive relationships at all levels of analysis of societal structures. For the purposes of testing hypothesis 2b, we operationally defined hinterland communities to include communities within the N.W.T. with the exception of the Federal Government's sub-metropolis. This latter type of community included the major governmental administration centers of Yellowknife, Fort Smith, Inuvik, and Frobisher Bay. This metropolis-hinterland dichotomy approximated the division we would attain by categorizing Councillors' residence according to the dichotomy of predominantly native--predominantly non-native communities.[16] Sponsor was operationally defined as mover of a formal motion in which a seconder was recorded.

We utilized data from our analysis of the 6th and 7th Councils to evaluate the null hypothesis that there was no difference between Councillors who were residents of metropolis and of hinterland communities with respect to sponsorship of motions of confrontation with the Federal Government. The resultant data are summarized in Table 7, which follows on p. 145.

The null hypothesis was rejected at the 0.05 level of confidence.[17] However, while our hypothesis predicted that the hinterland residents on Council would sponsor a disproportionately larger number of confrontation motions, we found the opposite to be true. Hinterland residents sponsored 6 percent of the total number of motions in this confrontation category whereas the residents of metropolis and sub-metropolis communities sponsored 15 percent in this same category.

Table 7

Council Members' Confrontation with the Federal Government during Councils 6 and 7 by Type of Residence

	Type of Residence		
Confrontation	Hinterland	Sub-metropolis	Total
Confrontation Fed. Gov't.	6.25%	14.62%	11.01%
All Other Motions	93.75	85.38	88.99
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
N	(192)	(253)	(445)

Chi square = 6.98; gamma = 0.44

c. Reformulation of General Hypothesis Two

Our rejection of the predicted direction of hypotheses 2a and 2b led us to reject the related general hypothesis. Marx's analysis of the class struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie classes directed us in altering this general hypothesis. Specifically, Marx stated that a portion of the bourgeois ideologists join the proletarian class as the struggle nears. These ideologists have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole (Marx, 1948, 19).

Our reformulated hypothesis was as follows: Hinterland spokesmen emerge for the hinterland and they act as leaders of confrontations with the metropolis. Specific hypothesis 2c, which is listed below, was derived from this general hypothesis.

d. Specific Hypothesis 2c: The ideologists of the coalition favoring confrontation with the Federal Government, will sponsor a larger proportion of motions involving such confrontation as compared with other Councillors who sponsored at least one motion of confrontation with the Federal Government.

Campbell, Trimble, and Searle were identified as the ideologists of confrontation of the Territorial Council with the Federal Government during our observation of the 47th Session as well as our interviews of Council Members and Yellowknife residents during the summer of 1972. This assessment was also our conclusion as a result of the extensive reading of the Council debates during the content analysis study. Campbell was a resident of Ottawa while Searle resided in Yellowknife. Although Trimble was a resident of Aklavik, he had been a member of the R.C.M.P. and, since leaving this metropolis agency, had been a northern entrepreneur.

For the purpose of our analysis, we have operationally defined those Members who sponsored at least one confrontation motion against the metropolis as members of a de facto coalition of confrontation. We suspect that such a loosely organized coalition did exist and was developed during the informal "caucus" meetings during noon luncheons while the Council was in session.[18]

We tested the null hypothesis that the ideological leaders of confrontation would not sponsor a larger proportion of motions involving confrontation with the Federal Government than would be sponsored by the other members of the coalition of confrontation with Ottawa. Table 8 summarizes the data pertaining to this hypothesis.

Table 8

Leaders of Ideology of Confrontation against the Federal Government by Degree of Confrontation, Councils 5, 6, and 7

	Confrontation Coalition		
Confrontation	Ideologists	All Others	Total
Confrontation Fed. Gov't.	16.19%	5.98%	10.81%
All Other Motions	83.81	94.02	89.19
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
N	(315)	(351)	(666)

Chi square = 16.9; gamma = 0.50

Thus, we rejected the null hypothesis and accepted the existence of a relationship between the ideologists and confrontation with the Federal Government.[19] The ideologists sponsored 16 percent of their motions as confrontations with the Federal Government as compared with 6 percent by the other members of the "coalition of confrontation".

In summary, this finding led us to accept the reformulated general hypothesis that hinterland spokesmen emerge for the hinterland and they act as leaders of confrontations against the metropolis. This lends empirical support to our interpretative framework which related political ideologists and political confrontations.

e. Specific Hypothesis 2d: Experienced Councillors, as compared with novice Members, will sponsor a larger proportion of motions of confrontation with the Federal Government.

Among the three ideological leaders we identified in the analysis of the above specific hypothesis 2c, Trimble and Campbell were Members of the 5th, 6th, and 7th Councils while Searle was a Member of the 6th and 7th Councils. This suggested that the important causal variable might be length of experience on Council which would, in turn, lead to ideological leadership. Thus, we chose to test the hypothesis that experience of Councillors would be positively related to confrontation with the Federal Government.

We tested the null hypothesis that there was no difference between experienced and novice Council Members with respect to sponsorship of motions of confrontation between Council and the Federal Government. The category of experienced councillor was operationally defined as members who had been on a Council prior to the Council being analysed. A novice councillor was defined as a member who was on Council for a first term of office. Sponsorship was defined by mover of those motions in which a seconder was recorded in the debates. The data are summarized in Table 9 on p. 150.

The resultant relationship would not permit rejection of the null hypothesis at our prescribed level of confidence. A one-tailed test of significance indicated that if we rejected the null hypothesis we would do so with a 9 percent probability that we rejected a true

Table 9

Sponsorship of Formal Motions during Councils 5, 6, and 7: Experience of Councillor by Confrontation with the Federal Government

	Experience of Councillor		
Confrontation	Experienced	Novice	Total
Confrontation Fed. Gov't.	11.65%	8.00%	9.98%
All Other Motions	88.35	92.00	90.02
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
N	(266)	(225)	(491)

Chi square = 1.43; gamma = 0.21

hypothesis.[20]

We subsequently queried whether there would be a significant relationship between these two attributes if we operationally defined the independent variable as maturity within Council. This variable was dichotomized into first half-second half of the term of Council. When we examined the sponsored motions of confrontation with the Federal Government by experienced and novice members during the first and second half of the 6th Council, the resultant chi square indicated that the relationship was not significant.

f. Specific Hypothesis 2e: Among those Councillors who sponsored at least one motion of confrontation with the Federal Government during the term of a Council, the experienced Members will sponsor a larger proportion of such motions as compared with the novice Members.

Since experience on Council was not an explanatory variable and since political ideologists were related to confrontations with the Federal Government, we speculated that experience would have an effect among those who participated in confrontations with Ottawa. To determine the membership of the "coalition of confrontation" with the Federal Government, we rank ordered those Council Members who sponsored at least one motion of confrontation with the Federal Government. The result is outlined in Table 10.

Table 10

Movers of Formal Motions of Confrontation with the Federal Government Ranked by the Proportion of Members' Motions Devoted to this Category Compared to All Categories: Council 5, 6, and 7

5th Council			6th Council			7 Council		
Member	f	%	Member	f	%	Member	f	%
Trimble	1	9	Campbell	5	50	Trimble	8	38
Williamson	1	9	Searle	8	20	Kaeser	2	33
			Barber	2	11	Hamlin	2	25
			Williamson	7	10	Parker	1	25
			Trimble	3	8	Searle	4	24
			Stewart	1	4	Campbell	3	23
						Butters	3	8
						Pearson	1	8

We tested the null hypothesis that there would be no difference between experienced and novice Councillors (who were in Table 10) with respect to confrontation with the Federal Government. The resultant data are summarized in the following table:

Table 11

Experienced and Novice Councillors who Sponsored Motions of Confrontation with the Federal Government by Degree of Confrontation: Councils 5, 6, and 7

	Confrontation Councillors		
Confrontation	Experienced	Novice	Total
Confrontation Fed. Gov't.	19.62%	12.74%	16.19%
All Other Motions	80.38	87.26	83.81
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
N	(158)	(157)	(315)

Chi square = 2.26; gamma = 0.25

Since we had predicted the direction of relationship we utilized a one-tailed test and found that the relationship was statistically significant at the 0.05 level of confidence.[21] Within the "confrontation coalition", the experienced Councillors sponsored a larger proportion of motions of confrontation with the federal metropolis than did the novice Councillors.

g. Summary of General Hypothesis Two

Our data led us to reject the general hypothesis that spokesmen emerge from the hinterland. The data led us to accept the general hypothesis that spokesmen emerge for the hinterland and they function as leaders of the hinterland in confrontations with the metropolis. Although experience among the members of the coalition of confrontation with the Federal Government was related to degree of such confrontations, the strength of this relationship was lower than the strength of the relationship between the ideologists and degree of confrontation. Political confrontation ideologists appears, therefore, to be a better explanatory variable to incorporate into our interpretative framework.

3. General Hypothesis Three: The metropolis has key agents in its subordinate hinterlands and they function to promote the interests of their metropolitan employer.

During our examination of the metropolis-hinterland theory in chapter two, we learned that this perspective assumes the existence of agents of the senior metropolis in the subordinate metropoles. We also noted that irrespective of whether these agents are native to the hinterland, their role is to further the interests of their metropolitan employer. In effect, these agents agree to work within the rules established by the metropolis. The Federal Government exercised direct responsibility over numerous provincial-type powers in the N.W.T. during the period studied by our content analysis. Ottawa also exercised power over the N.W.T. indirectly through the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner (Zariwny, 1971, 25-57). Thus, we would anticipate that these two "agents" of the metropolis would function to promote the interests of the Federal Government. The general hypothesis was tested by data which separately considered Commissioner Hodgson and Deputy Commissioner Parker as metropolitan agents.

a. Specific Hypothesis 3a: The Deputy Commissioner, as a de facto metropolitan agent, will support the Federal metropolis in opposition to

Council motions which involve confrontation with the Federal Government.

We tested the null hypothesis that there was no difference between Parker's negative and positive responses with respect to Councillors' motions of confrontation with the Federal Government.[22] The resultant data for the 5th, 6th, and 7th Council Sessions are summarized in the following table:

Table 12

Parker's Negative and Positive Responses to Motions of Confrontation with the Federal Government: Councils 5, 6, and 7

Council's Confrontations	Parker's Response Negative	Positive	Total
Confrontation Fed. Gov't.	4.17%	7.46%	6.09%
All Other Motions	95.83	92.54	93.91
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
N	(48)	(67)	(115)

Chi square = 0.11; gamma = 0.30

No statistically significant relationship was detected and we therefore accepted the null hypothesis which predicted no difference between Parker's negative and positive responses with respect to Councillors' motions of confrontation with the Federal Government.[23]

As stated above, the Federal Government exercised indirect control over the N.W.T. through the Territorial Administration. We would expect that Parker, who was administrative head of the

Territorial civil service and whose salary was paid out of the Federal Consolidated Revenue Fund, would be an indirect agent of the Federal Government. Thus, we tested the null hypothesis that there was no difference between Parker's negative and positive responses with respect to Council's motions of confrontation against the Territorial Administration. This data is found in Table 13.

Table 13

Parker's Negative and Positive Responses to Motions of Confrontation with the Territorial Administration: Councils 5, 6, and 7

	Parker's Response		
Council's Confrontations	Negative	Positive	Total
Confrontation Terr. Adm.	18.75%	0.00%	7.83%
All Other Motions	81.25	100.00	92.17
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
N	(48)	(67)	(115)

Chi square = 11.15; gamma = 1.00

The relationship was statistically significant beyond the 0.05 level of confidence and, thus, we rejected the null hypothesis.[24]

b. Specific Hypothesis 3b: The Commissioner, as a de facto metropolitan agent, will support the Federal metropolis in opposition to Council motions which involve confrontation with the Federal Government.

Specific hypothesis 3b predicted that the Commissioner would be a de facto agent of the Federal metropolis. The incumbent of this position held deputy ministerial rank within the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Our analysis focused on whether he evidenced support for the Federal Government's vested interests in Council. Thus, we tested the null hypothesis that there was no difference between Hodgson's negative and positive responses with respect to Councillors' motions of confrontation with the Federal Government.[25] Data were utilized from the 5th, 6th, and 7th Councils to test this hypothesis. The results are summarized below.[26]

Table 14

Hodgson's Negative and Positive Responses to Motions of Confrontation with the Federal Government: Councils 5, 6, and 7

	Hodgson's Responses		
Council's Confrontations	Negative	Positive	Total
Confrontation Fed. Gov't.	7.89%	3.75%	6.47%
All Other Motions	92.11	96.25	93.53
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
N	(152)	(80)	(232)

Chi square = 0.88; gamma = 0.38

We accepted the null hypothesis and, therefore, rejected the existence of a statistically significant relationship between the Commissioner's support for the Federal metropolis and the Council's confrontations with this metropolis.

During our conceptualization of political maturity as an independent variable in the analysis of the Councillors' confrontations with the Federal Government, we operationally defined "between-Council maturity" as well as "within-Council maturity". We paralleled this operational definition in studying Hodgson's responses since it was predicted that the relative proportion of his negative responses to these confrontation motions would be associated with both types of maturity.[27] Our content analysis of the 5th, 6th, and the 7th Councils demonstrated that no statistically significant association existed with respect to Hodgson's responses measured both by between- and within-Council maturity. This finding suggests the possibility that, although Hodgson was an appointee of Ottawa, his views and image of the North would have changed when he moved to Yellowknife in 1967. One would therefore expect him to become less a direct agent of the metropolis and more an agent of the sub-metropolis in Yellowknife.

Thus, we examined Hodgson's responses to Council's confrontations with the Territorial Administration. Due to his role as head of the Territorial Administration, we might expect Hodgson to support the Administration when it came under attack by the Council Members. The extent to which he did support the Administration could be interpreted as indirect control of the Federal Government over Council. Also, as we saw in chapter four, the Carrothers Commission recommended that the position of Commissioner should evolve toward that of Lieutenant-Governor while the Deputy Commissioner should evolve toward the position of Premier. The degree to which Hodgson continued to support the Territorial Administration in Council would be a measure of the extent to which he had encouraged the "evolution" of his function away from what is, in the provinces, the purview of the Premier and

Cabinet.

We therefore tested the null hypothesis that there was no difference between Hodgson's negative and positive responses with respect to Council's motions of confrontation with the Territorial Administration. As outlined in chapter five, motions of Council's confrontations with the Territorial Administration included those motions which criticized this Administration because of a lack of competency of the civil service staff or a lack of compliance with Council's requests and directives. In general terms, this category included all negative references to the Territorial Administration except in instances where natives' vested interests were implicated. The results of this content analysis are summarized in Table 15.[28]

Table 15

Hodgson's Negative and Positive Responses to Motions of Confrontation with the Territorial Administration: Councils 6 and 7

	Hodgson's Responses		
Council's Confrontations	Negative	Positive	Total
Confrontation Terr. Adm.	8.55%	0.00%	2.46%
All Other Motions	91.45	100.00	97.54
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
N	(152)	(377)	(529)

Chi square = 29.58; gamma = 1.00

We rejected the above null hypothesis with a 0.05 level of confidence concerning the possibility of making a Type I error.[29]

The data revealed that Hodgson did not support any of Council's motions of confrontation with the Territorial Administration while he made negative responses to 9 percent of Council's motions which involved such confrontations. In interpreting these data it must be understood that Table 15 included only those formal motions of confrontation with the Territorial Administration in which Hodgson made a negative or "actively" positive response. Thus, nine of these motions were not included in the analysis since Hodgson made "No Response" to them. The same stipulation applied in his responses to formal motions which implicated all the other vested interests which we categorized under "all other motions".

c. Summary of General Hypothesis Three

Neither Parker nor Hodgson gave the Federal Government a statistically significant degree of support when it was being confronted by the Northwest Territories Council within the Council Chamber. However, their degree of support for the Territorial Administration within the Chamber was statistically significant. We conclude that the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner were not direct but rather indirect agents of the Federal Government. Thus, we can not accept the general hypothesis and suggest that further testing of this relationship would need to give greater focus to the activities of these "agents" when they are removed from public scrutiny.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Our content analysis of the Northwest Territories Council

Debates resulted in the collection of data related to the vested interests extant in the N.W.T. This chapter has examined our analysis of three general hypotheses which have been derived from the metropolis-hinterland theory. The results of the testing of the specific hypotheses, which were derived from these general hypotheses, are summarized in Table 16.

The first specific hypothesis in this table was derived from the general hypothesis that the hinterland will eventually rebel against the metropolis. Our findings with specific reference to the N.W.T. revealed that between-Council political maturity was directly related with Councillors' consciousness of the Northwest Territories' hinterland status. We were unable to operationalize consciousness in terms of attitude scales rather than behaviors in Council since we could only interview members of the 7th Council. Our data also revealed that both between-Council and within-Council political maturity were directly related with Councillors' confrontations with the Federal Government.

We conclude that our interpretative framework, in which political maturity is directly related to consciousness of hinterland status and to political confrontations, is supported by our empirical data.

The second general hypothesis, which we tested, was that spokesmen emerge for the hinterland and they act as leaders of confrontation with the metropolis. The specific hypothesis (2c) which posited a relationship between political ideologists and confrontations with the Federal metropolis was verified. Although the data supported

Table 16. Summary of Content Analysis of N.W.T. Council Debates Involving Confrontations with the Federal Government Concerning Political and Economic Power: March 6, 1967 to October 13, 1972

Specific Hypothesis	Source of Data	Indep. Variable		Dependent Variable	Null Hyp.	Gamma
1. As the N.W.T. hinterland becomes more politically mature, its degree of rebellion against the Federal metropolis will increase	Members' Replies, last Session of Councils 5, 6, 7	Between Council pol. maturity	+	Councillors' consciousness	Reject	.33
	Debate of motions of confront. with Fed. Gov't., Council 5,6,7	Between Council pol. maturity	+	Councillors' consciousness	Reject	.27
	Formal motions, Council 5,6,7	Between Council pol. maturity	+	Confrontation with Fed. Gov't.	Reject	.32
	Formal motions, Council 6	Within Council pol. maturity	+	Confrontation with Fed. Gov't.	Reject	.43
	Formal motions, Council 5,6,7	Within Council pol. maturity	+	Confrontation with Fed. Gov't.	Reject	.41
2a. Elected Council Members will confront the Fed. Gov't. more than appointed and elected-appointed Members	Formal motions, Council 5,6,7	Elective position	-	Confrontation with Fed. Gov't.	Reject	.32
2b. Resident Councillors of hinterland communities will confront the Fed. Gov't. more than metropolis dwellers	Formal motions, Council 6,7	Hinterland residence	-	Confrontation with Fed. Gov't.	Reject	.44
2c. The apparent ideologists of the coalition confrontation will confront the Fed. Gov't. more than other members	Formal motions, Council 5,6,7	Ideologists	+	Confrontation with Fed. Gov't.	Reject	.50
2d. Experienced Members will confront the Fed. Gov't. more than novices	Formal motions, Council 5,6,7	Experience on Council	+	Confrontation with Fed. Gov't.	Accept	-
2e. Among the apparent coalition of confrontation with the Fed. Gov't., the experienced Members will confront the Fed. Gov't more than novices	Formal motions, Council 5,6,7	Experience among confront coalition	+	Confrontation with Fed. Gov't.	Reject	.25
3a. The Deputy Commissioner, as a de facto metropolitan agent, will support the Fed. metropolis in opposition to Council motions which confront the Fed. Gov't.	Formal motions, Council 5,6,7	Negative-positive response	+	Confrontation with Fed. Gov't.	Accept	-
	Formal motions, Council 5,6,7	Negative-positive response	+	Confrontation with Terr. Adm.	Reject	1.00
3b. The Commissioner, as a de facto metropolitan agent, will support the Fed. metropolis in opposition to Council motions which confront the Fed. Gov't.	Formal motions, Council 5,6,7	Negative-positive response	+	Confrontation with Fed. Gov't.	Accept	-
	Formal motions, Council 5,6,7	Negative-positive response	+	Confrontation with Terr. Adm.	Reject	1.00

the specific hypothesis which related experience (among members of the "confrontation coalition") with confrontations with the federal metropolis, the strength of this relationship was only one half the magnitude of the former specific hypothesis. Thus, we chose to only incorporate the relationship between political ideologists and political confrontations in our interpretative framework.

The third general hypothesis stated that the metropolis has key agents in its subordinate hinterlands and they function to promote the interests of their metropolitan employer. Our data only supported the specific hypotheses that the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner were indirect agents of the Federal Government through their support of the Territorial Administration.

We would expect Parker to defend attacks on the Territorial Administration as he was its accepted spokesman on Council and the Carrothers Commission recommended that his role should evolve into that of Premier. Our findings demonstrate, however, that the Commissioner has not moved his role closer to that of Lieutenant-Governor, as was recommended by the Carrothers Commission.

We concluded that this general hypothesis requires further testing with data which is collected by methods other that content analysis of the Territorial Council Debates. We suspect that a more accurate assessment of their role, re. metropolis agent, would be attained by data collected in reference to their activities which are not under public purview. Such sources of data would include, for example, private meetings of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner with Members of Council, planning sessions with the senior civil servants of the Territorial Administration, and the negotiations with the Federal officials concerning future financial appropriations for the Northwest Territories.

In summary, we asserted in chapter two that the metropolis-hinterland theory is useful in the analysis of power relationships in the N.W.T. and we elaborated the exploitive chains which link the Northwest Territories to the Federal Government and the multinational resource-developing corporations. In this chapter, we have tested three hypotheses from this theory with data collected by a content analysis of the Debates of the Council of the Northwest Territories. The data supported two of these hypotheses and only partly supported the third.

CHAPTER SIX

FOOTNOTES

[1] Ideally, the degree of political maturity would be operationalized to facilitate empirical measurement. Practical constraints forced this researcher to reject measurement of this variable in terms of, for example, attitude scales of the participating Councillors for the 5th, 6th, and 7th, Councils. A tabulation of the number of times Councillors referred to N.W.T.'s hinterland status was also considered but rejected because of the small number of such comments. More importantly, this would have created conceptual confusion with the dependent variable, confrontations of Council with the Federal Government. In sum, this researcher chose to operationalize political maturity in terms of succeeding Councils (i.e. a function of time).

[2] We conducted a content analysis of the last session of the 5th Council, all the sessions of the 6th, and the first four sessions of the 7th Council.

[3] We set 0.05 as our acceptable level of confidence in the analysis of the data from the content analysis.

[4] Our content analysis included Sessions 44 to 47 of the 7th Council. This Council's last Session would be the 53rd in 1974. The Deputy Commissioner's remarks were not included in this analysis.

[5] All tables in this chapter express the data in terms of column percentages. The reader may calculate frequencies from the total number (N) in each column.

[6] Throughout the data analysis in this chapter we use Kruskal's gamma measure of relationship. This ordinal measure was used because these variables can be ranked (Blalock, 1972, 415). For example, degree of political maturity can be ranked from low to high and consciousness can be ranked from existence to non-existence of consciousness of the N.W.T. hinterland status.

[7] We could reject the null hypothesis with a 0.0122 level of confidence.

[8] We could reject this hypothesis with a 0.02 level of confidence that we would not be rejecting a true null hypothesis. Chi square was computed by Yates' correction for continuity.

[9] Our analysis of formal motions included only those in which a mover and seconder were recorded in the written debates.

[10] In our tabulation of the data pertaining to formal motions, we have consistently omitted those motions which were moved by the Deputy Commissioner because he was the representative of the Territorial Administration on Council. We analyse his responses to these formal motions in the third general hypothesis which measures the degree to which he is a direct and/or indirect agent of the Federal Government.

[11] The positive relationship between within-Council political maturity and degree of confrontation would be statistically significant at the 0.0011 level of confidence.

[12] Since our hypothesis had predicted direction of the relationship prior to our analysis of the data we used a one-tailed test of significance (Blalock, 1960, 218).

[13] This relationship would be statistically significant at the 0.0574 level of confidence with a two-tailed test. Chi square was calculated by Yates' correction for continuity.

[14] The elected-appointed category referred to motions in which an elected and an appointed member were the mover and seconder. The motions in which Parker was the mover were not included in the analysis of the subsequent four specific hypotheses.

[15] This relationship would be significant at the 0.0231 level of confidence. Chi square was calculated using Yates' correction for continuity.

[16] This latter dichotomy could be further refined by including major resource development towns as sub-metropoles for the multinational corporations and the Federal Government. An example would be Pine Point. Obviously, all Southern Canadian communities were considered to be sub-metropoles for our analysis.

[17] This relationship would be statistically significant at the 0.0052 level of probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it was really correct. Chi square was calculated using Yates' correction for continuity.

[18] This speculation of the existence of such a coalition was based mainly on this researcher's observations of Session 47 and interviews with some of the Members of the 7th Council.

[19] Both the chi square and the gamma measures of statistical significance allowed us to reject the null hypothesis virtually with complete confidence. Significance level to four digits for both measures was 0.0000. Chi square was computed using Yates' correction for continuity.

[20] Chi square was calculated using Yates' correction for continuity.

[21] A two-tailed test would yield statistical significance of this data at the 0.0974 level of confidence. Chi square was computed using Yates' correction for continuity.

[22] We included all formal motions which were introduced irrespective of whether a seconder was recorded.

[23] This data had virtually no value because Parker responded to only a small number of the motions of this type of confrontation. Two cells had expected frequencies less than 5.0. Yates' correction for continuity was used in calculating chi square.

[24] The measured chi square, using the Yates' correction for continuity, indicated that there was a 0.0002 level of confidence that we would not be incorrect in rejecting the null hypothesis. One cell had an expected frequency less than 5.0. Yates' correction for continuity was used in the chi square calculation.

[25] The data in our analysis included those motions to which Hodgson responded negatively and "activity" positive as defined in our methodology chapter.

[26] Motions which were moved by Parker were not included in the analysis of Hodgson as an agent of the metropolis as we wanted to analyse Hodgson's response only to the other Council Members. Parker was a representative of the Territorial Administration.

[27] We speculated that Hodgson would also become more politically mature during his term of office.

[28] There were no motions of confrontation with the Territorial Administration during Session 34, the only Session of the 5th Council which we analysed.

[29] The null hypothesis could actually be rejected with a 0.0000 level of confidence. Chi square was calculated using Yates' correction for continuity. One cell has an expected frequency less than 5.0.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY OF KEY HISTORICAL TRENDS AND CONFRONTATIONS OF COUNCIL WITH OTTAWA FROM 1967 TO THE PRESENT

In this chapter we summarize the salient findings of our historical analysis of political and economic power dimensions of the relationship between the Territorial and Federal Governments. We subsequently trace the confrontations between Council and the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development during the same period of time which was analysed by the content analysis. In this study emphasis is placed on elaborating the key moves and counter-moves of these two levels of government during the 47th Session, a time of important confrontations. Finally, to facilitate more relevant predictions of power confrontations and redistributions between Council and Ottawa, the study is brought up to date by examination of the more recent constitutional and economic power positions which have resulted from the series of confrontations dating back to the submission of the Carrothers Report.

HISTORICAL TRENDS OF POWER IN N.W.T.

Our historical analysis in chapters three and four has examined the Federal Government's constitutional and economic approach to the old North-West Territories and the Northwest Territories since 1905. The relationship between the Federal Government and the Territorial hinterland was found to be analogous to the nature of the imperial-colony structure extant during the British colonial era. The colony's aspirations for increasing self-government were stymied by the Federal Government's ignoring these political initiatives by the Territorial Council. Like the British colonial governor, the lieutenant-governor in the North-West Territories and the Commissioner in the Northwest Territories were the sole governing agents. As occurred in Britain's colonies, Canada's colonies were decreasingly willing to accept autocratic colonial rule as the population of the colony increased and became more politically involved.

The British who migrated to North America facilitated the British goal of colonization and, thereby, utilization of the colony as an economic hinterland supplier of primary products. The Canadian immigration policies also accomplished settlement and, thus, economic exploitation of the N.W.T. In both cases, the colonists brought with them political traditions and aspirations which were destined to lead to pressures on the colonizer for self-government. We noted that the British Parliamentary system reflects an evolution to responsible government. The Canadian Government seemed to be unwilling to accept this tradition in reference to the N.W.T. At the very least, it can be asserted that the Central Government did not attempt to promote self-government in its colony.

We also noted that the British Parliamentary system consists of unwritten practices and conventions rather than a written political doctrine. Traditions of representative and responsible government have become firmly established. As in the British colonies, the initial objective in the N.W.T., both prior to and after 1905, has been representative government. Once a legislature becomes completely representative of the electorate there is an "evolution" to the goal of responsible government. Britain eventually, but reluctantly, permitted the evolution of responsible government in Canada through a change in convention by Lord Elgin, the governor of Canada, in which he followed the advice of his Canadian ministers in reference to the Rebellion Losses Bill. The Canadian Federal Government was also reluctant to permit such a change of approach by the Lieutenant-Governor in the North-West Territories prior to 1897. This same reluctance to promote the attainment of representative and responsible government in the Northwest Territories has been evinced by the Federal Government since 1905. The attainment of responsible government in the British colonies was not sufficient to permanently placate the colonialists' political aspirations, and, thus, they eventually pressed for self-government. Similarly, the old North-West Territories colonists were not permanently content with responsible government. In fact, this was merely a stepping stone in their eventual pressure for provincehood and, thus, self-government as defined by the B.N.A. Act.

The Federal Government's colonial policy related to the natural resources of Manitoba and the North-West Territories radically departed from established British colonial practice. As noted in chapter three, the British practice had been to grant administration and ownership of natural resources to the colony as a natural consequence associated with the evolution of responsible government. The Canadian Federal Government retained control of the natural resources when Manitoba became a province. A similar policy was adopted by Laurier in reference to Alberta and Saskatchewan when they attained provincehood.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC CONFRONTATIONS IN THE POST-CARROTHERS REPORT ERA

In our content analysis of the Territorial Council Debates, we found that only one reference was made to historical constitutional developments in the N.W.T. prior to the Carrothers' Commission Report. The majority of Council Members did not reflect conversance with the historical "lessons" of the Federal Government's approach to the aspirations of self-government in the North-West Territories.

1. Confrontations: 1967-1971

The Carrothers Commission recommendations created considerable optimism within the Northwest Territories that this "blueprint" for the evolution of self-government and the economic development of the N.W.T. would, in fact, be treated as a master plan by the Federal Government. For example, during Session 35 Councillor Campbell asserted that only a few of the major recommendations of the Advisory Commission had been implemented, but he appeared to be optimistic that the others would be duly acted upon by the Federal Government (Territorial Debates, 1967b, 30-31). Trimble, Searle, and Williamson were not quite so optimistic in reference to the public domain. Trimble asserted that financial autonomy was not possible since Territorial revenue flowed to the Federal Government and since the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development adhered to a policy that the resources of the N.W.T. would continue to belong to the Federal Government in the foreseeable future (Territorial Debates, 1967b, 24-26). Williamson predicted that the N.W.T. would eventually become the source of Federal funds for the poorer provinces. He also asserted that the ability to generate sufficient revenue to attain a balanced provincial budget must not be a criterion in the decision of whether N.W.T. could attain provincehood since Newfoundland, for example, was permitted to join Confederation without the ability to pay its own way (Territorial Debates, 1967b, 8-39). Searle outlined a strategy of confrontation with the Federal Government. He asserted that the Territorial Council must pressure the Federal Government to acknowledge its role as a trustee of natural resources for the future province of the N.W.T. and to establish guidelines for an accounting of that trusteeship. He was concerned that the Federal Government might continue to own and control the N.W.T.'s natural resources even after its attainment of provincehood (Territorial Debates, 1967b, 49-51).

The debates reveal that the Territorial Council adopted the recommendations of the Carrothers Commission, which were submitted to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development on August 30, 1966. The Council assumed that, if they were in accord with the recommendations, these proposals for the development of government in the N.W.T. would be followed. However, the Federal Government was not willing to concede to this logic but rather asserted that a white paper on the subject would be prepared for consideration by Council and the Federal Parliament. By the 36th Session some members of Council were becoming anxious about obtaining this "mysterious white paper" (Territorial Debates, 1968a, 26-38). Campbell asserted that the proposed white paper could serve the Federal Government as a delaying tactic (which would legitimate federal inaction, and/or indecision) (Territorial Debates, 1968a, 95).

The White Paper on Development of Government in the Northwest Territories was presented to Council by Chretien on November 10, 1969 (Territorial Debates, 1969c, 313-320). He argued that in developing an Indian Policy there was a simple moral that the discrimination which was in existence against the Indian people must be terminated and that this principle led to specific proposals. Chretien asserted that by comparison "there is no single simple principle around which to build a policy for constitutional development". Such a remark seems incomprehensible in light of our earlier discussions concerning the British Parliamentary system. The basic historical principle that we can delineate from this analysis is that citizens have a basic right of self-government and that the attainment of responsible government must be accompanied by the economic means of self government.[1]

The White Paper outlined proposed constitutional changes but did not reflect any over-all plan of action. Chretien asserted that provincial status to the N.W.T. was not a realistic alternative in the foreseeable future and that it should not be divided territorially. He proposed to amend the Northwest Territories Act to add two elected members to Council, to extend the term of Council to four years, to permit Council to set its members' indemnity, to reduce the period for possible Federal disallowance of Council Ordinances to one year, and to reduce the voting age in Territorial elections. He also concurred with Council's recommendation that a Council Committee System be established and he proposed that a Standing Committee on Finance should be established prior to the next session of Council. He also set the establishment of an expanded Territorial Public Service and the "further" development of local government as prerequisites of any further development of Territorial self-government and responsible government.

Chrétien declared that the ownership and management of natural resources in the N.W.T. would remain with the Federal Government for the foreseeable future. He justified this position by stating that for the 1969-1970 fiscal year the Federal Government would spend about $92 million on provincial-type programs whereas provincial-type revenues (including resource development revenue) would be about one fifth that amount.[2] Management of the natural resources would be for the benefit of Northern residents and all Canadians. Basically his Department had few concrete proposals. The White Paper reaffirmed the DIAND's responsibilities for overall planning and co-ordination of Northern development, and asserted that it would entail a co-operative endeavour by the Territorial Department of Industry and Development and the Federal Advisory Committee on Northern Development. It rejected the Carrothers Commission recommendation that a N.W.T. Development Corporation should be established to provide financial and support services to industry.

In reaction to the White Paper the day following its delivery, two of the five elected Council Members who spoke made negative comments while the three appointed Council members had positive comments. Searle described the White Paper as neither a step forward or backward but rather a step sideways.

> Federal control and domination is maintained. The Council of the Northwest Territories remains advisory, and not responsible, and there are no apologies for this. There is no feeling of guilt or regret by the Federal authorities. Colonialism is affirmed for us, yet equality [of races is] proclaimed (Territorial Debates, 1969c, 327).

The Northwest Territories Act was amended in 1970 to accomplish the alterations the White Paper had outlined. The term of office of the Council was extended to four years. The size of Council was increased to fourteen and the number of appointed members was reduced by one. It also permitted the Council to prescribe the qualifications of voters and candidates in Territorial elections. Council members could establish their own indemnity. Finally, the 1970 amendments placed administration of justice under Territorial control (Zariwny, 1971, 14-16).

2. Confrontations: 1972

Our content analysis revealed that there has been an increase in Territorial Council Members' consciousness of the N.W.T.'s hinterland political power during the 7th Council (as measured by the proportion on items in the Members' replies to the Commissioner's Address which were categorized as Territorial Council vs. Federal Government). We noted that 36 percent of the Council Members' items in the Replies during Session 47 were confrontations with the Federal Government. We also noted that 22 percent of the Members' formal motions during Session 47 were confrontations with the Federal Government. This proportion was at least double all other sessions analysed except Session 46 which had 23 percent of its items in this confrontation category.

The researcher's field study concurs with these findings. The Council was evincing confrontations with respect to both economic and political dimensions during Session 47.

During Session 46 the Council passed a motion which sought official federal recognition of its trusteeship role over N.W.T.'s natural resources. It was sponsored by Searle and Sibbeston.

> NOW THEREFORE, I move that the Commissioner make representation on behalf of this Council to the appropriate federal authorities requesting that the federal government acknowledge its role as a trustee of natural resources for the future province of the North and establish guidelines for a proper accounting of that trusteeship when same comes to a close (when the province of the North comes into being) coupled at that time with a transfer of ownership of said natural resources to the said province of the North (Territorial Debates, 1972a, 131-866).

The Federal Government's response to this motion was sent by Jean Chrétien on May 25, 1972.

> At the present time and for the foreseeable future the management of the surface and subsurface rights to lands outside settlements, within the Northwest Territories is the responsibility of the federal government and the federal government is responsible to Parliament for "a proper accounting" of this responsibility. The federal government does not regard the natural resources of the Yukon and Northwest Territories as being held in trust exclusively for the people of those regions, but rather as a trust for all people of Canada.
>
> In discharging this responsibility, the federal government has made substantial investments towards the development of these resources, and is ensuring that the maximum benefit from this development accrues to the residents of the two Territories (Information Item, 1972a).

Searle appears to have become the Council's spokesman in the confrontation with the Federal Government over natural resources. His response to this information item portrayed a sense of bewilderment. He asserted that Council would never recognize that a proper accounting was due only to the federal Parliament and that the N.W.T. resources were held in trust for the people of Canada rather than for the Northwest Territories. Councillor Campbell also echoed a confrontation perspective.

> Mr. Chairman, I was asked what my views on this subject were and how should we go about handling it. I have the same feeling on the subject as Mr. Searle. It seems to me we are meeting head on! I do not think we should take it lying down. We must, out of necessity, go back and in relatively polite but firm language re-express our feelings (Territorial Debates, 1972b, 398).

A strategy of confrontation, as suggested by Searle, was adopted by Council. The natural resources confrontation would be made a part of the constitutional confrontation by specifying that this would be one of the terms of reference of the Committee of Council - Provincial Responsibilities which was established during the 47th Session (Territorial Debates, 1972b, 398).

The Northwest Territories Council also exhibited an aspiration to attain symbolic, if not effective, control over the office of Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner during 1972. It approved a motion which pressed the Federal Government to adopt the Carrothers Commission recommendation that the salaries of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner should cease to be paid by authority of the Governor in Council out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada in favor of payment under authority of the Commissioner in Council out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Northwest Territories. Chrétien's telex reply to Council rejected this proposal on the grounds that they were federal agents.

> WITH REGARD TO THE THIRD OF THESE MOTIONS THE COMMISSIONER AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE NWT AND THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER

> ARE PAID FROM LAND APPROPRIATIONS BECAUSE THEY ARE FEDERAL OFFICERS SUBJECT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL OR THE MINISTER.
>
> THEIR APPOINTMENT AND PAYMENT FOLLOWS THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRINCIPLE THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR PAYMENT SHOULD COINCIDE WITH THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE THE APPOINTMENT.
>
> IT ALSO CONFORMS WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR APPOINTMENT AND PAYMENT OF LIEUTENANT GOVERNORS UNDER THE BNA ACT (Information Item, 1972b, 2).

The last paragraph of this reply would only be applicable to the position of Commissioner since, according to the Carrothers Commission blueprint for the development of government in the N.W.T., the office of Deputy Commissioner would evolve into the office of Premier and this position is paid out of the provinces' revenue fund. The 47th Session of Council did not mount a counter-attack in this dispute. A number of Council Members informed this researcher that in their view this was less of an important issue than concerns with the transfer of more political power from the Federal to the Territorial jurisdictions. There was general agreement that the funding of the salaries of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner would change with such transfers. In sum, Council's strategy of confrontation was to focus on the larger issue of the transfer of provincial-type responsibilities from the Federal to the Territorial Government.

We pointed out earlier that the Council had expressed sentiments of confrontation with the Federal Government in the constitutional and economic spheres during all the Sessions we studied in our content analysis and that this was most evident during the 47th Session. The sentiments of hostility and confrontation during this session were intense. We have noted that Council members were unhappy with the response they received from Chrétien in reference to motions related to natural resources and the source of funding for the salaries of the Commissioner and his Deputy. They were further incensed by the veto by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development of their January 25, 1972 request that the Commissioner prepare a paper which would outline how the remaining provincial-type responsibilities, which were still under federal control, could be transferred to the Government of the N.W.T. (Territorial Debates, 1972a, 642). Chrétien's response indicated that he considered the Commissioner as politically responsible to the federal Minister of the D.I.A.N.D.

> THE MOTION RELATED TO THE TRANSFER OF PROVINCIAL TYPE SERVICES TO THE TERRITORIAL GOVT RAISES MAJOR MATTERS OF POLICY WHICH AFFECT THE MINISTER AND CONSEQUENTLY ANY PAPER SUCH AS THE TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN ASKED BY THE COUNCIL TO PREPARE WOULD REQUIRE HIS APPROVAL BEFORE BECOMING A PUBLIC DOCUMENT.
>
> IN THIS CONNECTION YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT THE MINISTER HAS GIVEN DIRECTION THAT HE DOES NOT ENVISAGE EITHER NOW OR IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE ANY FURTHER MAJOR TRANSFER OF PROVINCIAL-TYPE PROGRAMS SPECIFICALLY IN RELATION TO SURFACE RESOURCES SUCH AS FORESTS ROADS AND LAND EXCEPT FOR THOSE IN AND AROUND COMMUNITIES (Information Item, 1972b, 2).

The Council responded with a Motion which described this veto as a "fettering" of the Commissioner's ability to facilitate Council's activities. It was strongly worded and in the "Whereas" clauses asserted that if the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development persisted in this policy "it is clearly apparent that the cross-roads have been reached necessitating a change on the part of the department and its actions towards the legitimate activities of the Council". The motion, which entailed a telex to Chrétien, was moved by the Dean of the Council, Lyle Trimble, and he asserted that it was being seconded by all of the other Councillors.[3]

> MR. MINISTER, WE THE COUNCIL OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES APPEAL TO YOU TO ALTER THE DECISION OF THE DEPARTMENT WHICH PRECLUDES THE COMMISSIONER FROM COMPLYING WITH THE COUNCIL'S REQUEST FOR HIM TO STUDY AND DEVELOP PROGRAMS REQUESTED; AND FURTHER THAT YOU GIVE DIRECTION TO YOUR DEPARTMENT THAT THEY ARE TO DESIST FROM FETTERING AND RESTRICTING THE LEGITIMATE ACTIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER AND COUNCIL IN THE FUTURE (Territorial Debates, 1972b, 314).

Immediately following the approval of this strongly worded objection, the Council unanimously adopted a motion which sought to circumvent the Department's "fettering of the Commissioner" and at the same time to demonstrate that they were fully prepared for a confrontation with Ottawa.[4] Once again this motion was introduced by the Dean of the Council and seconded by all the Members of Council. The motion established a Committee of Council to identify all the areas of provincial jurisdiction in Canada, to determine which areas were still under federal administration and which of these should be transferred to the Government of the N.W.T., and to recommend to Council a plan of action which would facilitate such transfer to the N.W.T. Government. The motion also directed that the Committee should hold public hearings in the N.W.T. and Southern Canada insofar as such hearings would facilitate accomplishment of its objectives. The Commissioner accepted the motion as in order but asserted he was unsure whether the clause referring to public hearings outside the N.W.T. was contrary to the rules and privileges of Council (Territorial Debates, 1972b, 315-317).

Later in the Session, Trimble introduced a motion which appointed Searle, Butters, Campbell, Hamelin, and Pearson as members of this Committee of Council--Provincial Responsibilities. Searle was appointed the chairman.

This researcher's interviews with the Council Members revealed that they were not all individually as militant as might be suggested by the tone of the motions as well as the unanimity with which the confrontation with the Federal Government was expressed. The four members of native extraction were not fully conversant with the issues and, interestingly, none were included in the Committee.[5] Analysts assessed that the composition of this Committee demonstrated that the elected and appointed members were unanimous in their approach. It was also argued that the composition of the Committee reflected geographical representation (The Eastern and the Western Arctic) (Appendix A). Campbell and Searle, whom we identified as leaders of the coalition of confrontation against the Federal Government in the last chapter, were on the Committee. The third member of this leadership group, Trimble, was not a member of this special committee but he played a key role in developing the strategy of confrontation during the 47th Session. He has remained closely affiliated with this confrontation committee as is exemplified by his participation with the Special Committee--Provincial Responsibilities during the 49th Session. When we examine our rank ordering of Council Members who sponsored formal motions of confrontation with the Federal Government we note that all the members of this Special Committee were on the list. Trimble ranked highest on the list. The Committee members occupied rank positions 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 (Table 10).

Searle stated that the purpose of the Special Committee was really to strive to attain the ultimate goal of provincial status.

His interpretation of the proposed public hearings in Alberta seemed to be that they would be instructive of possible strategies the N.W.T. should adopt in order to wrest ownership and control of its natural resources from the Federal Government. Although resources were not part of the terms of reference of the Special Committee, Searle perceived that resources and provincehood were intertwined concerns (Appendix A). The holding of hearings in Alberta would obviously be aimed at putting political pressure on Ottawa to declare itself the trustee of the N.W.T.'s natural resources. Revealing the Laurier Government's illogical policy of retention of control of Alberta and Saskatchewan's resources, even after they attained provincehood, would make public this injustice to all of Canada (via press coverages of the Committee's hearings) and perhaps make it politically unwise for the Federal Government to withhold the public domain from the future province of the North.

Butters had a relatively clear perception that the Committee was designed to facilitate a renewed thrust at the Federal Government to force it to regain some of its momentum pertaining to the development of government in the N.W.T., which was evidenced immediately following the submission of the Carrothers Report. He felt that the Council had matured sufficiently to warrant the transfer of further governmental responsibilities. This writer would argue that his view of participatory democracy, and of how the N.W.T. residents could show their support for Council in this confrontation, was unimaginative and out of step with the cultural realities of the N.W.T. (Appendix A).

Throughout the post-Carrothers Commission era Campbell had focused on the Commission's recommendations. In fact, Searle asserted that Campbell had taken the lead in the consideration of the Carrothers recommendations (Territorial Debates, 1971b, 104). Hamelin was described by one Council observer as "the out of touch academic" but this researcher would not concur with that assessment. While he was handicapped by his difficulties in communicating in English, he was often the source of new and refreshing approaches to the recurring issues. He felt that the Federal Government was too strong and inflexible in the N.W.T. He also predicted that Council would take an even stronger stand against the Federal Government's entrenchment in N.W.T. in 1973 than it had during Session 47. Hamelin's view of the future for the N.W.T. seemed to be that of a "special" status which no one had yet conceived of. The N.W.T. would have, in his view, more autonomy but would not have provincial status. The final member of the Special Committee, Brian Pearson, was described by another Council observer as the "court jester". This researcher found that he was more concerned with his frustrations produced by the unresponsive Territorial Administration than with the confrontation with the Federal Government.[6]

Although Searle had asserted that the Special Committee would always function under public view, the first subsequent activity of Council in reference to these confrontations was to assemble at Yellowknife on short notice for an in camera meeting with the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.[7] The Council viewed this July 12 encounter as a major battle with Ottawa. Council Members met in a secret meeting the night of July 11 in order to prepare their attacking strategy. They had three items on the agenda.

The first section of agenda item one was, in fact, a polite but forceful way of asking the Minister whether he would instruct his Department to "desist from fettering" the legitimate actions of Council by henceforth permitting the Commissioner to serve the interests of Council. In the second section, the Council asserted that it was not proper for the D.I.A.N.D. or the Commissioner to withhold assent to Ordinances originating in Council which entailed spending public revenues. The third section dealt with the issue of assent in general and Council produced a legal opinion that it was improper for the Commissioner to withhold assent on Ordinances which received third reading. The final section asked the Minister whether he was prepared to take sole responsibility for disallowance of Council Ordinances rather than using the approach of disallowance by instructing the Commissioner to withhold assent (Appendix B).

Councillor Butters, who presented Council's position regarding the second agenda item, alluded to the "disquietude" of the Council during the 47th Session at the replies from the Minister. This submission asked the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development which provincial-type powers he contemplated transferring to the N.W.T. Government in the foreseeable future. The Councillors argued, in reference to agenda item three, that by the next Territorial election there should be fourteen elected Councillors, an Executive Committee should be established which would include forty elected Councillors, and the name of Council should be changed to the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories (Appendix B).

Jean Chrétien's response was conciliatory and generally constructive.[8] He asserted that, while he opposed the Commissioner preparing a blueprint for further transfers of provincial-type powers from the Federal to the Territorial Government, he strongly favored the Council's proposal to conduct its own study. Since it was a political issue he insisted it must be kept in the political arena and away from the Public Service of the Federal and Territorial Administrations. This completely eliminated the basis for the Councillors' hostility which was so evident during the 47th Session. Even at the news conference which followed this encounter, Searle expressed his and his colleagues' feeling of surprise at this conciliatory response to what they considered "such a very bold move at the last Council Session". Searle's remarks indicate that he felt remorseful about Council's actions of confrontation.

> I think the Minister truly felt very badly about the things the Council did at the last session. I think he probably felt very hurt more than anything because he felt he just had been so busy that he hadn't been able to communicate as quickly and probably as effectively as he could have (Appendix C).

The Member who had been a Councillor for the longest duration, Lyle Trimble, was not as readily convinced that the Minister had moved away from the traditional federal lethargy. In his dissenting view, he asserted that the Minister had not answered any of their three questions and that the committment to changes which he did make were similar to promises made two years previously. This researcher concurs with Trimble's perspective. Chrétien made no committment to transfer more powers to the N.W.T. His promotion of the Council's study of the question was joined with the caution that the Federal Government would then need to consider whether it approved of the Council's recommendations. The Council's insistance on obtaining a statement from Chrétien related to assent and disallowance was really a mute point as Council continued to recognize the constitutional right of the Minister to disallow legislation. Their only concern was with the manner in which such disallowance would occur. The Minister made this confrontation rather meaningless by insisting that he didn't intend to withhold assent or instruct the Commissioner to withhold assent from the Councillors' Pension Ordinance and that he would go back to Ottawa and re-evaluate the whole question of disallowance. Finally, the Minister indicated that he favored a move toward increased representative government by the increase in the proportion of elected members but he made no committment as to whether he favored a totally elected Council by the 8th Council. Similarly, he insisted that he could not move toward an Executive Council in the N.W.T. as he was still monitoring the experience in the Yukon Territory.

In summary, the Minister's position was conciliatory but non-committal and it had the effect of reducing the Councillors' militancy. The only dissenting Council Member seemed more disillusioned and frustrated than militant. He now had to cope with an unresponsive Territorial Administration, a Federal Government which was entrenching itself in the N.W.T. in the sphere of natural resource ownership and management, and a Council that was easily swayed.[9]

ON BRINGING THE STUDY UP TO DATE

We can obtain an empirical measure of the extent to which the Council was pacified by the Minister by examining its formal motions of confrontation against the Federal Government. For example, during the 48th Session of Council three motions were of this category, or 7% of all the motions in all the vested interest categories (Territorial Debates, 1973a). In addition, one of these three motions was simply a notice of motion by Trimble on the last day of the Session. It hinted at the area of agreement worked out between Council and the Minister as being an increase in the number of elected Members on Council. In fact, one wonders if the sole purpose of this notice of motion was to allude to the growing reconciliation between Council and the Federal Government (Territorial Debates, 1973a, 1075). None of the fourteen formal motions during the 49th Session was addressed to confrontations between Council and the Federal Government and none of the thirteen formal motions during the 50th Session were of this type (Territorial Debates, 1973b; 1973c).

1. Special Committee on Provincial Responsibilities

The most salient point in this account of the confrontation between the N.W.T. Council and the Federal Government relates to the actual working of the Special Committee on Provincial Responsibilities. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, Trimble replaced Butters as a member on this Committee and his views did not concur with Searle's more conciliatory position. The Committee was unable to attain unanimity in its recommendations for a blueprint for the further transfer of provincial-type responsibilities from the Federal to the Territorial Government.

The Special Committee tabled its interim report on October 19, 1973 and Trimble tabled a minority report. There was no discussion of this interim report at this October Session in Inuvik nor at the winter session of 1974. This confidential document dealt with constitutional matters, financial concerns, and administrative transfers. In terms of constitutional matters the report dealt with the executive committee, the source of funding for the Commissioner's and Deputy Commissioner's salary, the size of Council, the role of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner in terms of their relationship to the Council, and the provision for a Speaker of the House. The report insisted that a new formula must be found to end the way the current budget for the N.W.T. Government was drafted in order to terminate the unwieldy series of Federal interdepartmental meetings and negotiations. Finally, the Special Committee identified nine administrative areas in the N.W.T., which were defined by the B.N.A. Act as provincial responsibilities, that were still controlled by Ottawa. In housing, highways, and health services for natives the Commissioner in Council possessed legislative jurisdiction but administrative control and funding remained the perview of federal departments. Inland fisheries, forestry, hydro electric power, land and inland waters, (surface rights), land and inland waters (subsurface rights), and the attorney general function remained totally under federal control. A blueprint time table for these transfers was also provided with proposals for initial transfers to occur in March of 1974.

The most important aspect of the interim report was its statement of basic policy which, the Committee proposed, should be adopted as a rebuttal of the Chrétien White Paper of November, 1969.

> There are two basic philosophical policy positions of the Government of Canada enunciated by the Minister on the 10th of November, 1969 in his White Paper statements on the development of government in the Northwest Territories, which are totally unacceptable to the committee and which read as follows:
>
> (1) In the first place, I firmly believe that at this time and for the foreseeable future, the granting of provincial status to either territory is not a realistic alternative.
>
> (2) I further believe that the federal government should continue to manage and develop the natural resources of the North for the benefit of both northern residents and all Canadians.
>
> The foregoing two basic policy positions leave no doubt about the position of the Government of Canada, as to what we, in the Northwest Territories, may expect for the foreseeable future. Your committee suggests that everything possible must be done to cause these policies to be changed, for without that, our northern colonial government will continue.
>
> What has to be done is to put the policy in the positive rather than the negative, hence we would suggest a restatement of the basic policy in the positive as follows:
>
> (1) The Government of Canada is committed in principle to the granting of provincehood or other special status to either territory, in time.
>
> (2) At the point of time of provincial or special status a substantial share, at least of the royalties from the Northwest Territories resources would go to that new government (Territorial Debates, 1974b, 93-94).

Trimble observed on March 28, 1974 that the Committee on Provincial Responsibilities had been in "limbo" for about a year while the Council debated "constitutional aspects". He asserted that he didn't know where this committee was heading (Territorial Debates, 1974b, 61). Up to the time of this report the members of the Committee have been unable to agree on the basic tenets of the "Searle Report", the final or major report of this Committee. In a letter to this researcher, dated September 12, 1974, one of the Special Committee members pointed out that "without [the] fight among Councillors, the Searle Report should have been tabled [before now]".

2. Restructuring of Council

We have earlier asserted that, of the three items discussed on July 12, 1974, the only progress Council made with the Minister of I.A.N.D. at that confrontation meeting and at their deliberations in Frobisher Bay in October was in reference to the structure of Council. These successes are not to be under-emphasized since they moved the N.W.T. closer to representative and eventual responsible government. The proposed changes in the structure of Council, which had so pacified Council following its militant perspective in June of 1972, were introduced by Chrétien into the House of Commons on March 11, 1974 for first reading. It was Bill C-9, "An Act to amend the Yukon Act, the Northwest Territories Act, and the Canada Elections Act".[10]

In speaking to the amendments during the bill's second reading on March 18, Chrétien asserted that the most important change to the N.W.T. Act was the establishment of a totally elected Council[11] (Debates H. of C., 1974, 607-608). The Act also increased the number of Councillors to fifteen members. The stipulation that the Deputy Commissioner must be a Council Member was eliminated from the Act. The Council would elect one of its members to be Speaker to preside over the Council while it was in session. The quorum of a Council sitting would be changed from four to constitute a simple majority. The Act amendment also removed the inconsistencies evidenced in reference to jurisdiction over prisons by making it solely the responsibility of the Commissioner in Council. One of the innocuous changes was the placement of authoritative responsibility for Crown lands designated to the "Territories" since April 1, 1955 under the purview of the Commissioner. It was really only an alteration in semantics since the identical clause had existed except that the reference was to the Territories rather than to the Commissioner (Bills H. of C., 1974a, No. 26770).

The Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development also asserted that the power of the Council would be increased by agreeing that two Councillors would be appointed to the Territorial Executive Council.[12] This practice of permitting the Council Members to become members of the Executive Council was not, according to Chrétien, written into the N.W.T. Act for the same reasons that a cabinet is not referred to in the B.N.A. Act. It is part of the unwritten principles which have evolved in the British Parliamentary system (Debates H. of C., 1974, 607-609, 613). Wally Firth, the Member of Parliament from the N.W.T., admitted that the Act represented advancements in the evolution of government in the Northwest Territories, but he gave a scathing critique of the continued power of the Commissioner. He asserted that this "middle level appointed civil servant" had "absolute power over the elected representatives of the People". In his view, this meant a continuation of the "stigma of colonialism" (Debates H. of C., 1974, 610-612).

Although not everyone concurred with the form of the amendments, provision was made for completely representative government (at least in the legislative branch). It could also be argued that the first vestige of responsible government was being established.

The Northwest Territories Council deliberated on these proposed amendments in a two-day session which was specifically called for that purpose and it submitted the resultant Report of the Committee of the Whole to Council on March 28 (Territorial Debates, 1974b; Buchanan, 1974b, 82-84). The Council concurred with the change of fifteen elected Councillors. It supported the clause which established the office of Speaker but approved a motion which would permit the Council, itself, to decide whether the Speaker would be a Councillor or a person from outside Council. Their rationale was that in the absence of party politics all the Councillors might feel that they should refrain from accepting the position of Speaker of Council in order to effectively represent their constituency. In such a case the Council would need to select a Speaker from outside the Chamber. The Council took the view that the office of Deputy Commissioner should be retained but that the incumbent should no longer be a member of Council. Finally, the Council concurred that the Minister's proposal of beginning the practice of having Council Members on the Executive Committee need not be written into the Northwest Territories Act. However, they argued that the number of Council Members on this Committee should not be two but rather consist of four Councillors to provide "ministers" for the four program departments of local government, education, economic development, and social development (Buchanan, 1974b, 38).

The Council also dealt with matters not included in the proposed amendments to the Act. For example, they adopted motions that the name of the Council should be changed to the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories and that its bills be called acts rather than ordinances (Territorial Debates, 1974b, 69-70).

Bill C-9 was returned by the Standing Committee to the House of Commons without amendment. It received third reading on April 8. The Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development added no amendments which were applicable to the Northwest Territories Act. The bill has received Royal Assent. The changes to the structure of Council will be applicable to the 8th Council of the Northwest Territories (Debates H. of C., 1974a, 1233-1234).

SUMMARY

The history of British colonialism and Canada's relationship to its N.W.T. colony since 1870 evinced important parallels. In both cases the colonies increasingly confronted the colonial government in order to wrest representative, responsible, and, ultimately, provincial government. Similar confrontations were evident in the N.W.T. following the submission of the Carrothers Commission Report. These confrontations reached a critical stage during the summer Council Session in 1972. The Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development was able to attain a reduction in this level of confrontation by granting concessions to the Council in reference to its political structure. No economic power concessions were granted.

Our study suggests that this pacification of Council will eventually be replaced by renewed confrontations by the Territorial Council with respect to political and economic power. The next chapter will attempt to anticipate what is likely to occur following the election of the 8th Council.

CHAPTER SEVEN

FOOTNOTES

[1] This principle is close to the Carrothers Commission first postulate which we quoted in chapter 4.

[2] In the House of Commons he asserted that during the fiscal year 1970-71, the N.W.T. Government would spend about 74.5 million dollars whereas local revenues would account for less than 10 percent of this. He stated that the recoveries under cost-shared programs and the provincial share of income tax must be added and would increase the local revenue proportion. These figures contradict those offered for 1969 and, thus, it appears that only part of the accounting system is being revealed (Debates H. of C., 1970, 6925).

[3] Deputy Commissioner Parker was absent from Council Chambers while this motion and the motion establishing the Committee of Council-Provincial Responsibilities were introduced (Personal observation).

[4] Council also adopted a motion while in Committee of the Whole which expressed the desireability of infrequent meetings with the D.I.A.N.D. Minister to discuss matters which the Council considered urgent and requiring his attention (Territorial Debates, 1972b, 835).

[5] One of the native Councillors had no idea of what the confrontation was about or what it entailed. He favored focusing his attention on the conditions in the various settlements of his constituency. Another native member was also confused but he concluded that "Chrétien talks but is not really serious".

[6] This account of some of the views of the Committee members underlines the point that personalities were more important on Council than were policies. Council members were not guided by any kind of political party structure.

[7] It would be interesting to speculate on the cost of such a meeting because the Council members had to fly back to Yellowknife from across the N.W.T. and from Southern Canada. One could also speculate why Jean Chrétien was not able or was unwilling to spare a day for a three hour meeting with Council during its regular Session. For example, to the extent that it is difficult to arrange a meeting with the Minister it would increase the reward value of his eventual presence with Council. Since the Council Members were secretly informed when they left Yellowknife at the close of the 47th Session that they should anticipate a call concerning a meeting with the

Minister, it seems plausible that the Ottawa officials had been informed by the Commissioner that the confrontation motions indicated that they must address to the Council hostility as soon as possible.

[8] This researcher was only able to interview one Councillor following this meeting and, thus, he has had to depend on the statements made by Chrétien when interviewed by C.B.C. Yellowknife, as well as comments by Searle at the Council press conference following the meeting (Appendix C).

[9] Council and the Minister of I.A.N.D. again met in camera during the October sitting of the 47th Session in Frobisher Bay. Numerous agreements were made which further contributed to the pacification of Council. This researcher's informants indicate that the major points of discussion did not deal with economic and political power transfer but rather focused on the alteration of the structure of Council.

[10] Part of the "price of pacification" was that the N.W.T. be given one representative on the federal Senate. This was placed before the House of Commons as Bill C-11 in March 13, 1974 for first reading. Second reading was given it on March 18, 1974 and the bill was referred to the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs. It did not receive third reading and Royal Assent during the 2nd Session of the 29th Parliament (Debates H. of C., 1974, 13, 457, 627-637; Bills H. of C., 1974b, No. 26776).

[11] The Act had last been amended in 1970.

[12] Up to that time there existed an Executive Committee which consisted of the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, and Assistant Commissioner.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY OF STUDY AND THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER RELATIONSHIPS IN THE N.W.T.

This chapter begins with an evaluation of the value of the metropolis-hinterland model in analysing political and economic power. We then develop an interpretative framework which incorporates the results of our content analysis and a dialectical interpretation of the historical study. This framework subsequently guides us in summarizing our findings on the relative political and economic power of the Territorial legislative body and the Federal Government and in anticipating the future distribution of this power.

Finally, we discuss the importance of the study of other vested interest groups in the study of the political and economic power in the Northwest Territories. We briefly review the power position of the native groups in the N.W.T. and conclude that future major confrontations between Ottawa and the Northwest Territories will involve this native vested interest group.

EVALUATION OF METROPOLIS-HINTERLAND PERSPECTIVE

The metropolis-hinterland model has guided our research in concentrating on the political and economic dimensions of power in the Northwest Territories. The perspective was most useful in guiding the researcher to focus on structures of relationships which are exploitive and in which confrontation and conflict are involved.

This model has been especially fruitful in focusing our study on what we consider the key issues in the relationship between the Federal Government and the Northwest Territories Government as well as the N.W.T. and the multinational resource developers.

We utilized the model to guide us in deriving categories for analysis of the Debates of the Territorial Council. While refinements to these categories could be made, this writer argues that this study has demonstrated the heuristic utility of the model in both descriptive studies as well as empirical data gathering and theory building.

The metropolis-hinterland perspective is tied to the dialectical process of structural change. We can elaborate chains of causation and, thereby, refine our predictive abilities.

SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR PREDICTING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER IN THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

We have utilized historical data to identify recurring issues of confrontation between the Territorial and Federal Governments since 1870. This analysis was based on the principle of explanatory emergence which refers to laws of group behavior which are not derivable from laws about individual behavior[1] (Broadbeck, 1966, 307-319). If we admit the possibility of explanatory emergence, it follows that we can consider the possible existence of societal laws which are not reducible to laws about the behavior of individuals. Our historical analysis identified a pattern of directional change in the N.W.T. as a social system which is more than the sum of aggregated data pertaining to its parts (the individuals). The laws of development which we identified were part of the explanations of the colonizer-colony relationship which have been applicable to all empirical instances of this type of collectivity (Mandelbaum, 1966, 333-337).

The content analysis of the Territorial debates was based on the premis that the sociologist must develop composition laws which elaborate how aggregation of data which is derived from an analysis of individual units can be used to specify variables in the social system. This is, most scientists assume that behavior is determined at any given level of aggregation by the attributes, properties, and/or traits of the basic units at the preceeding level. As in the case of this thesis, an analysis of power composition laws must be developed which allows us to infer the behavior of a decision-making group from an analysis of the individual members.

On the basis of the analysis of the historical development of the North-West Territories and the content analysis of the Territorial debates, we have derived an interpretative framework which is illustrated on the following page.

The interpretative framework reveals that political confrontation ideology and political maturity are both independent variables in producing Members' consciousness of hinterland status which, in turn, produces political confrontations.[2] The following diagram incorporates feedback loops to indicate that political confrontations are not merely caused by consciousness of hinterland status but that, in addition, such confrontations have an impact on the Councillors' degree of consciousness. Similarily, consciousness of hinterland status has a feedback loop to political confrontation ideology and political maturity.


Feedback
Feedback
Political Confrontation Ideology
Political Maturity
Consciousness of Hinterland Status
Political Confrontations
Feedback
Feedback
Increase in Political Power
Economic Confrontations
Increase in Economic Power
Feedback
Feedback

Eventually One Of:

a) Integration: N.W.T. as a province owning natural resources
b) Divisions:
  i. Provincial status but not own natural resources (share royalties)
  ii. Provincial status rejected but share royalties
  iii. Provincial status rejected and remain economic colony

This interpretative framework is based on the dialectical method of analysis of historical data. The dialectical process is evident in the basic long-term processes of confrontation, conflict resolution, and structural change. Specifically, political confrontations lead to increased political power in the N.W.T. Council which, in turn, results in economic confrontations between the Council and the Federal Government. The dialectical interpretation explains structural change in terms of the antithesis of extant structural relationships.

Our interpretative framework reveals that the long-term resolution of conflict will be the attainment of provincial status but not necessarily Territorial ownership of natural resources. If this Northern province is granted ownership of its natural resources, we assume that there will be a marked reduction in the degree of political and economic confrontations between this province's legislative body and the Federal Government. However, the tensions between Ottawa and Alberta and Saskatchewan since 1905 suggest that economic confrontations might continue even after the N.W.T. attains provincehood. In this case, it would likely be the Federal Government confronting the Northern province for a share of the royalties from natural resources. Our framework also asserts that confrontations will continue if the Federal Government does not grant the Northern province ownership of its natural resources or if the N.W.T. is prevented from attaining provincehood.

THE POLITICAL POWER DIMENSION IN THE N.W.T.

Some members of the Council of the Northwest Territories had posited, prior to the period we studied in our content analysis, that the N.W.T. should progress from its "colonial" status to a provincial form of government as quickly as possible (Votes and Proceedings, 1958, 4; 1969a, 2; 1959b, 2). We have noted how the Council Members' concerns regarding the relative political and economic power positions of the N.W.T. and the Federal Government led to a major confrontation during June and July of 1972.

1. Carrothers Commission - A Delay Tactic

It has been suggested that the Advisory Commission on the Development of Government in the Northwest Territories was an important instrument in focusing the attention of the Council and N.W.T. residents on the "semi-provincial" status of the N.W.T. One analyst posits that this was mainly due to the Commission's recommendation that a Territorial Public Service should be created and organized by departments (Zariwny, 1971, 69). The subsequent implementation of this proposal by the Federal Government brought into sharp focus the fact that the Council had virtually no power over the admininstrative branch of government. The transfer of the Territorial Civil Service to Yellowknife in 1967 may have initially given western Territorial residents the feeling that their government would no longer be so remote from them. However, the change to a resident Commissioner also made the extent of his powers in the Government of the Northwest Territories much more visible.

It was argued in the preceeding chapter that one of the major sources of the confrontation between the Territorial Council and the Federal Government was related to the Carrothers Report. There is ample evidence that the Federal Government treated the Commission's recommendations as proposals which would be duly considered as part of its policy decision on what would be the future government of the N.W.T. It is equally clear that the post-Carrothers Commission Territorial Councillors assumed that the recommendations were their blueprint and the only question which remained to be answered was that of the timing of their implementation. Of course, the Councillors were in general agreement that this should occur as expeditiously as possible. They were frustrated when the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development did not comply with their expectations.[3] They were incensed when, instead, they encountered terse rebuttals of their representations that the Carrothers recommendations should be adopted.

2. Federal Powers in the N.W.T.

An examination of the government responsibilities that the Federal Government exercised over the N.W.T. reveals the degree to which the Territories was a hinterland of the Ottawa Administration in the political power dimension. A study in 1971 divided those responsibilities which were defined in the B.N.A. Act as Provincial into two categories. Various Federal Government departments exercised direct responsibility, the first category, over the amendment of the Northwest Territories Act, the imposition of personal and corporate income taxes and succession duties, Governor in Council approval of money borrowed by the Commissioner in Council, Attorney General functions and police enforcement of Territorial Ordinances, health services, changing the location of the Territorial capital, the incorporation of a telephone company, and natural resources. The Federal Department of Manpower and Immigration possessed exclusive power to legislate relative to immigration in the N.W.T. This was a concurrent power as defined by the B.N.A. Act.

The second category in which the Federal Government exercised jurisdiction over the N.W.T. was indirectly through the Commissioner.[4]

The powers in this category included those which were assigned to the Commissioner of the Territories rather than the Commissioner in Council. In the former case, the Commissioner, as a federal appointee, acted on the advice of his Minister, the Minister of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. He was also accountable to this Ottawa Administration. The Northwest Territories Act provided the Commissioner with the power to establish accounts with chartered banks in the name of the Northwest Territories Government, determine which intoxicants would be imported to or manufactured within the N.W.T., to arrange for admission of mental patients to institutions in the provinces, and to arrange with any province for the care of neglected children in foster homes or suitable institutions. The N.W.T. Act provided that the Territorial Council would, by ordinance, give the Commissioner powers, duties, or functions which related to provincial responsibilities in the B.N.A. Act. Much of the discretionary power which has been afforded the Commissioner by specific ordinances was comparable to the executive decisions which are made by a provincial premier and his cabinet. Finally, the Act provided for financial control by the Federal Government through the Commissioner. Money bills in the provinces must be sponsored by the party which has the support of the majority in the Assembly. In the N.W.T., no Councillor may sponsor an appropriation or tax levy ordinance unless it has been recommended to the Council by the Commissioner.

In summary, the Federal Government has exercised considerable powers over the N.W.T. in those areas which the B.N.A. defined as provincial responsibilities. These responsibilities include both regulatory and service-providing functions (N.W.T. Act, 1971, 1-20; Zariwny, 1971, 25-57). The situation is unlike the relationship between the provinces and the Federal Government where neither level of power has effective jurisdiction over the other.[5] Our study has examined the most important areas of federal infringement on the hinterland's political power. These have included the power of the Commissioner, control over financing of the N.W.T. Government, and the structure of Council as it relates to representative and responsible government. Our analysis in the next section will deal with the economic power dimension in which the N.W.T. is a hinterland of the Federal Government in terms of ownership and control of its natural resources.

3. Special Committee on Provincial Responsibilities - A Delay Tactic

We intimated earlier that the establishment of the Carrothers Commission was a delaying tactic by the Federal Government. It permitted Ottawa to delay making any effective changes to the political power it held. Similarly, the establishment of the Special Committee on Provincial Responsibilities of the Territorial Council functioned to delay effective confrontation with Ottawa. We noted earlier that the Minister emphatically concurred with the Council's adopting this approach. Two salient points can be observed. First, the Council was composed of members who were not united into party groupings. Conflicts and divisions have inevitably occurred within this Council since the participants exhibit an unusual degree of independence of action during debate.[6] Our earlier analysis demonstrated that the semblance of unity among Council Members in the June-July, 1972 confrontation was more appearance than fact. We also showed that the Special Committee was handicapped by conflicts among the members. Secondly, Chrétien had utilized a wise tactic as is demonstrated by the fact that the 7th Council was only able to obtain changes in the structure of Council but not in the other areas in which it had aspirations. The Committee had been given specific proposals for amendments to the N.W.T. Act in October, 1972 and it had expended its energies in that area at the expense of preparing for major confrontations concerning the other aspects of political as well as economic power. The small total number of Councillors who could participate in the Committee System meant it was impossible for the Special Committee to retain its original membership. The relative ineffectiveness of this Committee and the frustrations experienced by its members was hinted at by its chairman.

> MR. SEARLE: With respect to the alternative of a more extensive thing, quite frankly, I do not think my committee is going to be able to do that before this Council's life is over. I will be honest with you, we have tried to cover the future in dealing with some of these things, but as well, to a large extent the interim report was produced to cover between when we started it and the amendments to the act, which we knew were coming and which we now dealt with. To go very much further, between now and Christmas of next year -- in the next nine months is going to be very difficult. I doubt very much if there is much enthusiasm left in my committee to do it because these negotiations will take some time, and I doubt that we would only get started before in fact, we will be no longer there. I notice the committee is Air Marshall Campbell, Mr. Pearson, Mr. Trimble -- no, Mr. Trimble is not on it, are you? Dr. Hamelin, and Dr. Hamelin has other responsibilities with Mr. Butters' committee for hearings and whatnot. I just do not think it is possible, frankly, for the committee to do much more than it has -- produce this interim

> report, to be quite honest with you (Territorial Debates, 1974b, 89).

The confrontation mood of the Council was diverted from the key issues. The confrontation sentiments and, more importantly, the confrontation actions were replaced by a more compromising approach. Hamelin provided an alternative to the assumption that the N.W.T. was destined to evolve into provincial status and many of the Council Members adopted this more conciliatory perspective (Buchanan, 1974b, 42). He altered his position from calling for another Advisory Commission to examine the N.W.T. Government and suggested, instead, that Council should take a non-violent diplomatic initiative by pressing for a "public and top-level conference" on the N.W.T.'s political future (Edmonton Journal, 1973a). He has subsequently expanded on this "consistent philosophy of independence" by asserting that, rather than having another Advisory Commission study in which ideas would eventually flow from the Federal Government "down" to the Territorial Government and the N.W.T. citizens, the approach should be to have a series of all-level conferences. This would facilitate the emergence of ideas from the bottom of the political structure. That is, ideas would flow from the electorate through grass roots meetings and conferences. The second key aspect of Hamelin's philosophy which has influenced Council, is that the N.W.T.-Federal relationship suggests a need for a political tribunal similar to a judicial ombudsman to facilitate the settlement of disputes between the N.W.T. and Ottawa. This special arrangement is required, according to Hamelin, because the N.W.T. is constitutionally a child of the Federal Government as specified in the N.W.T. Act. This means that disputes can never receive a hearing in the Canadian courts since the Territorial Government is, legally-speaking, not independent from the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the Department of Justice (Hamelin, 1974, 5).

In 1972 Hamelin speculated that the N.W.T. would continue to wrest independence from Ottawa but it would not become a province. He suggested that Councillors must begin to think in terms of some "special" status other than a territory or province. He felt that the most he could suggest was that the N.W.T. would not gain provincial status but would become more independent -- perhaps like the Soviet Republic (Interview, June 29, 1972). This view was not universally accepted by Council Members but even Searle seemed to have tempered his demands for a commitment by the Federal Government that the N.W.T. would attain provincial status within the foreseeable future (Buchanan, 1974b, 35).

THE FUTURE DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL POWER

It has been observed that the 1970 amendment to the Northwest Territories Act had political implications which made the system of Territorial Government more conducive to representative and responsible government (Zariwny, 1971, 67). That same commentary is applicable to the 1974 amendment. For the first time the Northwest Territories will have representative government.

1. Responsible Government

Responsible government is still a considerable distance away. It is yet to be worked out in the new 8th Council whether the addition of the Executive Committee will have any positive effects. This structure breaks with the British Parliamentary system and, as in the case of the Yukon, the executive is separate from the legislative branch of government. The Commissioner will no longer sit in the Council Chamber so he is even less accountable to Council. The Deputy Commissioner will no longer be a Council Member and it is unlikely that he will sit in the Chamber. Thus, the Council Members who are appointed to the Executive Committee will need to answer Councillors' queries on behalf of this Committee. It remains to be demonstrated whether these representatives can have any significant impact on the Commissioner who has become accustomed to wielding great powers indirectly as well as directly for the Federal Government. The second possible difficulty in this new Committee is that it is based on the premis of responsible government in which the members of the Executive Committee would be in charge of government departments and, if the Council was unhappy with the policies and activities of a department, it would censure and force the resignation of the member in charge. This system hints at responsible government but it remains only a representative system. The Councillor can only be given a non-confidence vote by the electorate of his constituency perhaps up to four years after he has lost the confidence of his fellow Council Members.

Hamelin has, in the view of this writer, adequately summarized the situation which the new Council will face as a result of the amendments to the Act.

> The Council may ask to have more power, to have more elected members. The next Council will make more noise; Members will say there are more representatives but they will not be more responsible. Even with two or three Members on the advisory Executive Committee. The legislation does not provide any erosion on the actual power which is the power of the Commissioner and of the Minister. If it is not provided you will not have it. You may be satisfied in you heart but it is a pseudo-Executive Committee, it is just an advisory committee. As it is better than nothing I approve it. It is one small space; it is better than to have nothing. But do not imagine that you have reached the sky (Territorial Debates, 1974b, 49).

It is doubtful, based on the experience of the Yukon which has had such a body since the 1970 amendment to the Yukon Act, that this Executive Committee will be effective in increasing the participation of Councillors in the N.W.T. Government. As long as the Council size remains relatively small and there is an absence of party structures it appears that Members will continue to act as free agents and, as a result, collectively the Council will have less thrust in trying to obtain further changes in Council structure which would begin to give real responsible government. Our historical analysis and our analysis in this chapter have made it abundantly clear that the Federal Government will not voluntarily transfer powers to the N.W.T. Council. If the Council wants more powers it will most assuredly need to organize and confront the Ottawa Administration as occurred during the 47th session.

2. The Prospects for Continuing Confrontations

In this dialectical process of confrontation, compromise, inaction, confrontation, etc. we can be certain that each gain in constitutional power by the Territorial Council is merely a short-lived solution. The Council eventually accepts what it has wrested from the Federal Government as a given and aspires for the next "morsel" of power. A critical change which will occur with the 8th Council is that the appointed members will no longer be on Council. This will effectively remove at least two major participants in the confrontations against the Federal Government. Councillor Campbell has been a strong advocate of increasing Territorial powers. Hamelin appears to have emerged as a dominant force in the confrontation with Ottawa. While some of his proposals are aimed at intellectual exercises it is clear that he has become increasingly conscious of the powerlessness of the Council and has become much more militant. Trimble, an elected member who could continue the struggle for more powers, seems to be increasingly frustrated and, in the view of this researcher, realizes that the Council has been out-manoeuvered by the Minister. He is unlikely to take up the conflict as he would have during his younger days on Council.[7] The only possible leader of confrontation in the new Council would appear to be Searle, if he is re-elected. He would likely have difficulty finding colleagues who have the same level of consciousness of N.W.T.'s hinterland status. Perhaps even more importantly, we have seen evidence that Searle is not quite as "fiery" as he was during the earlier part of the 7th Council. Many residents in Yellowknife believe that he has aspirations to be the first premier of the new Province of the North. Perhaps he is trying to avoid the fate that befell Haultain when Alberta and

Saskatchewan wrested provincehood from the Federal Government.

When a new confrontation coalition emerges, whether it be during the 8th or during a subsequent Council, it might press the Federal Government to appoint another Commission to study the question of Government in the Northwest Territories. Alternatively, the Federal Government might respond by establishing such a Commission on its own volition. The effect would be to facilitate further delays in determining a new policy and a new schedule of transfers of jurisdiction. Our analysis suggests that such a delay would only be a temporary gain for Ottawa. The new Commission would undoubtedly have the effect of sensitizing Council Members as well as Territorial residents to the areas where the N.W.T. still has a colonial political status. An increased level of consciousness, an even more matured Council, a larger population size in the N.W.T., and increased possibilities for paying for self-government would likely eventuate in a formidable confrontation coalition which Ottawa could not easily resist.

The degree of confrontation required to attain further advances will be directly related to how actively the Federal Government pursues its published major goals for Northern Canada. One of these seven major goals is to further the evolution of government in the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories (Borrie, 1972, 6). If the federal officials take a leadership role in furthering this evolution few major conflicts will ensue. However, historical evidence suggests that the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development will continue to be somewhat remote, insensitive, and resistant to the political aspirations of future Territorial Councils. As we will see in the next section, there are economic power explanations for such resistance.

The degree of confrontation will also be dependent on the extent to which the Council can again produce a united front in opposition to Ottawa. We have stated that the united front in June, 1972 was, in the main, more apparent that real. Significant confrontations with Ottawa were only possible in the North-West Territories by the emergence of a party structure within Territorial politics. We would argue that this is equally true today. Without a party structure, including a party whip, the various Council members would continue to evidence independence of goals and action.

3. Emergence of a Party System

There is considerable evidence to suggest the rudiments of a party structure have been forming since the establishment of Standing Committees in Council following the October, 1972 meeting between Chrétien and Council. Members of the Finance Committee tended to become co-opted to support Appropriations Ordinances prepared by the Territorial Administration since this committee was involved in the negotiations with Ottawa for the N.W.T. conditional grants and in the policy decisions pertaining to Territorial financing. These negotiations also entailed a setting of legislative and program priorities. In fact, the Finance Committee members become analogous to the cabinet of the ruling party but they lack any kind of a responsible government mandate. The result tends to be a basic division between the Finance Committee, supported by a few other Council Members, against "the rest". Clearly, the Council would reach an impassé if a simple majority of Council Members consistently opposed appropriation legislation sponsored by the Finance Committee. If this occurred there would be two alternatives. Either the members of the Finance Committee would need to resign and the Commissioner appoint a new Committee which "would have the confidence" of the majority of Councillors, or the Minister could call a Territorial election.

It was apparent during the 48th Session that the Minister's establishment of a Committee system has effectively eliminated the united front of the Council against Ottawa (Edmonton Journal, 1973b). Searle accused the opponents of the Finance Committee of reflecting membership in the "delta axis", a regional alliance composed of Butters, Trimble, Pedersen, Adams, and Rabesca. We would suggest that we are witnessing the first vestiges of a political division of natives versus new northerners.

Although a spokesman of the Territorial Administration speculated, during an interview with an Edmonton Journal reporter, that the internal divisions within Council during the 48th Session may have set back the evolution of responsible government up to three years, this analyst does not agree. Instead, we look to the formation of a political party system as being a prerequisite of British Parliamentary responsible government. With a fully elected Council the way will be cleared for Hodgson to begin taking more direction from the Finance Committee as well as for the Minister to call new

Territorial elections if this Committee can not get the support of the majority and if no new majority coalition can be formed. This situation has similarities to the North-West Territories during the period of time in which the majority in the Assembly refused to vote funds through approval of legislation sponsored by the Finance Committee. The theme that emerges again is that the Federal Government has scored a victory over the Council's aspirations for more political and economic power but, in the long run, it will only be a temporary victory.

In addition to furthering the evolvement of responsible government, the development of a party structure in Council would also reduce the stifling effect that elections have on Council confrontations with Ottawa. We would anticipate that each party would adopt different policies in reference to N.W.T.'s relationship with Ottawa. Debate during the election campaign would publicize the "Territorial cause" to the electorate and, most importantly, the election results could be interpreted as reflecting the views of the electorate in the N.W.T. Effective representative government would begin to emerge.

4. Communication Between the Federal Government and Territorial Council

We would not expect the Federal Government to evince the same degree of remoteness and unresponsiveness to the Territorial Council's communications to Ottawa as was the case when Louis Riel was attempting to alter the terms of Canadian Government over the newly acquired territory or when Haultain was pressing for provincial status for part of the North-West Territories. Today's Council and their

Federal Minister can communicate their views to each other by telex, for example, although we would argue that the terse telex responses by Chrétien in 1972 in reference to the three confrontation motions which were passed during the 46th Session were a critical element in furthering the Council's mood of animosity. The Territorial Council and Administration and the Federal Government can also communicate by telephone or by a more efficient postal system. Most importantly, the aircraft has permitted relatively easy assemblies for meetings between the Minister and Council.

In sum, these communication facilities will permit better communication flow between Council and Ottawa and the transportation facilities will permit the federal officials to become better informed by having personal contacts with Council as well as Territorial residents. We can utilize the confrontations during June of 1972 as an example. The researcher found that federal officials in Ottawa were well aware in August of what had transpired during Council's 47th Session. Another salient factor in the current political situation in the N.W.T. is that the Council can solicit support for their position in the N.W.T. and the rest of Canada by using radio interviews broadcast by C.B.C. and stories by the press to publish their position. Council is no longer dependent on community meetings and regional papers to solicit support as Haultain was required to do.

5. Division of the N.W.T.

Finally, division of the N.W.T. into smaller political units seems inevitable. As the western N.W.T. continues to increase in population size and as primary resource exploitation continues to increase we would expect that the Mackenzie Valley region will again begin to consider the desireability of separation from the less developed Arctic region. When this occurs the eastern residual territory will revert to more of a territorial and less a provincial government. It is doubtful that this retrenchment could be as extreme as occurred in 1905 and as proposed for the residual Nunassiaq Territory in 1963.

THE ECONOMIC POWER DIMENSION IN THE N.W.T.

In chapter three we discussed the metropolis-hinterland relationship between the multinational resource developers and the N.W.T. We outlined the basic economic structure within which the political system in Canada operates. In this thesis we have been concerned with the study of the relationships between the Federal and Territorial Governments in terms of political and economic power dimensions. We have demonstrated that the Federal Government can be conceptually considered as an economic metropolis over the N.W.T. hinterland because the Ottawa jurisdiction owns and manages the Northwest Territories' natural resources.

1. Priorities of the D.I.A.N.D. in Territorial Development

The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development has published its official order of priorities in Northern Canada (Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories) for the 1970's.

(i) To give rapid effect to the agreed guidelines for social improvement.
(ii) To maintain and enhance the natural environment, through such means as intensifying ecological research, establishing national parks, ensuring wild-life conservation.
(iii) To encourage and stimulate the development of renewable resources, light industries and tourism, particularly those which create job and economic opportunities for native northerners.
(iv) To encourage and assist strategic projects (key to increased economic activity in the region or Territory with solid economic and social benefits) in the development of non-renewable resources and in which joint participation by government and private interest is generally desirable.
(v) To provide support for other non-renewable resource projects of recognized benefit to northern residents and Canadians generally (Borrie, 1972, 35-36).

This researcher would argue that the actual order of priorities of the D.I.A.N.D. is the opposite of what was printed in this document. Thus, the number one priority, in fact, appears to be the development of non-renewable resource projects primarily for southern Canadians and secondarily for northern residents. The value of mining in northern Canada increased six-fold from 1964 to 1970 and the future exploitation of the N.W.T.'s oil and gas resources will generate significant revenues for the federal jurisdiction (Debates H. of C., 1970, 6922).

Various Territorial Council Members have referred to the "entrenchment" of the Federal Government in the N.W.T. despite the fact that there have been transfers of administrative powers from Ottawa to the Territorial Government. Such comments refer to the escalating rate of federal involvement in the N.W.T. in response to the increased mining activities as well as oil and gas explorations. Of course, this federal involvement stems from the power of the Federal Government to manage all the natural resources in the

Northwest Territories.

2. Federal View of Territorial Natural Resources

In response to the escalating pace of petroleum exploration an interdepartmental Task Force on Northern Oil Development has been established. Participating federal departments include the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, the Department of the Environment, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, the Ministry of Transport, and the National Energy Board. This task force has established five subcommittees which include the Pipeline Engineering Committee, Economic Impact Committee, Transport Committee, Marketing Committee, and Environmental-Social Committee. There has been about $15 million of environmental studies funded by the Federal Government over a three year period followed by publication of the initial pipeline guidelines in 1970.[8]

A statement which Chrétien made in 1970 concisely expressed what appears to be the major premis in the federal view of the N.W.T.

> Our expenditures on development programs in the North are more and more becoming an investment in realizable potential. The world is beginning to grasp the possibilities for development in the Arctic. The roads, airports, shipping aids, communications systems and other infrastructure are the keys to productive use of resources. However, the North is very large and far more diverse than most realize. Therefore, we must develop a strategic approach which will foresee the future trend of events. We must make sure that the potential is commensurate with the taxpayer's investment (Watson, 1970, 13).

The view that the Federal Government considers the N.W.T. as an economic hinterland was often expressed by new northerners during the researcher's field studies in Yellowknife. It is even more instructive to receive a similar interpretation from federal employees who were posted in Yellowknife. A Yellowknife information officer for the Federal Government concluded that the federal jurisdiction had made a tremendous direct and indirect investment in the North and they would like to get some of this money back. He was certain that there was a cabinet policy committed to retain subsurface rights since it was projected that government revenues from oil and gas developments in the Mackenzie and High Arctic could be in excess of a billion dollars per year by 1980. One of the C.B.C. radio reporters quoted Chrétien as asserting, during a tour of the High Arctic, that he did not want the North becoming another Kuwait with the people of the North becoming oil sheiks.

Chrétien stated before the Special Joint Committee on the Canadian Constitution that his cabinet had not formulated a long term policy on whether it considered the N.W.T. resources as in trusteeship for the residents or whether they would be "shared" by the whole population of Canada (Lamontagne, 1970, 25). That comment appears to be difficult to accept since, as we pointed out earlier in our analysis, Councillor Searle had brought the subject up at almost every Council Session. In addition, this question was one of the confrontation issues between Council and Chrétien in June of 1972, even though it was not on the agenda for their July 12 encounter. There is strong evidence to indicate that this was one of the topics discussed at the October, 1972 meeting between Chrétien and Council. The 7th Council had attempted to utilize every available avenue to pressure the Federal Government into taking a position on the question of N.W.T.

natural resources. This included discussing it in Council, obtaining news media coverage of their views, telex messages to the Minister of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and a submission to the Special Joint Committee on the Canadian Constitution (Council Report, 1971, 5).

This researcher also received indications from interviews with federal D.I.A.N.D. officials in Ottawa that long-term retention of N.W.T.'s natural resources was a very clear federal perspective if not an officially published policy. The basic assumption was that the North's future revenue must be for the direct benefit of all Canadians. A senior official in the Northern Economic Research Group confided that the key issue was the equalization payment arrangement between Ottawa and the provinces. He asserted that about twenty years ago the federal share of all monies spent by the municipal, provincial, and federal governmental levels was about 75 percent. He predicted that by the mid 1980's the federal share would be down to about 25 percent because of required expenditures resulting from powers the B.N.A. Act assigned the provinces. He further speculated that the Federal Government would need to locate funds to transfer to the provinces through the equalization grants in order to meet their requirements and that the N.W.T. and eastern off-shore reserves could be the source of this requisite revenue. This researcher's interviews of other D.I.A.N.D. employees led him to conclude that it was well understood within the Department that the N.W.T. Council's requests for resource control were viewed as effectively asking for provincial status. Finally, the Federal Government would not consider participating in any form of negotiation on possible transfer of ownership and/or control of N.W.T.'s natural resources.

3. Moderation of Council's Position since 1972

We earlier traced the Council's struggle for economic power. The establishment of the Council Standing Committee on Finance was, in fact, a D.I.A.N.D. attempt to pacify the Council which was becoming hostile because of its total lack of monetary control. The effect of this move was really to make it even more obvious to the members of this committee that the Federal Government possessed total economic powers.

Searle's response was to suggest that the Federal Government should grant an unconditional appropriation to the N.W.T. Commissioner in Council equal to the expenditure of the previous year and that the negotiations for increases over that amount be related to bargaining in reference to proposed new programs (Buchanan, 1974b, 32). His experiences on the Finance Committee also provided him with a basis for arguing that the Council must seek ownership of its natural resources if it aspired for independence from Ottawa.

By 1974 Searle had concluded that Council would not be able to attain a recognition by the Federal Government that N.W.T. resources were being held in trust for the N.W.T. and would be transferred within the foreseeable future. The federal opposition to this view had been made so forcefully that he speculated during a Council session that his pushing for recognition of trusteeship status and the related confrontation motion which Council passed during the 46th Session was a tactical error. He posited that the Council should not have taken such a hard line position (Territorial Debates, 1974b, 95). He left no doubt, when addressing the Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern Development, that he had been specifically informed by federal officials that the N.W.T. would be unwise in aspiring for significant increases in economic power and that the Council would have difficulty obtaining even a significant share of the revenue.

> Councillor Searle: When you start talking land, surface, and subsurface rights, it has been made clear to us abundantly - forget it. So when we start talking about some meaningful control, we refer to the possibility of provincial government, and we refer as well to the possibility of some status that may be something less than provincial status. We appreciate - and this will probably be done by people other than us - that whoever is there in the end may have to compromise. He may have to accept something less than full ownership. He may have to accept a shared ownership. He has to share royalties. That is what we mean by "provincial or other status". With the fixation on royalties -- with the smell, as I have often said of oil and gas in the federal nostrils -- at this stage we cannot foresee. There is such a firm position against territorial control of those things that we have to leave the doors open, and we cannot talk about provincial status in the normal sense (Buchanan, 1974b, 42).

THE FUTURE DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC POWER

We have described the Federal Government as a metropolis of the N.W.T. in the political and economic power dimensions. When the Territorial Council was in conflict with the Federal Government concerning the Council's aspirations for increased political power, it was also implicitly involved in a confrontation in the economic dimension. With every step closer to provincial status the Council has also moved a step closer to major confrontations with the Federal

Government over ownership and control of natural resources. Thus, to the extent the Federal Government is conciliatory and grants the Council further legislative powers, alters the structure of Council, and transfers administrative responsibilities to the Territorial Government in order to reduce confrontations with the Territories, it is at the same time moving closer to a major confrontation over natural resources.

We conclude that the Federal Government would have greatest success in postponing the economic confrontation by focusing on political evolution in the N.W.T. and using as many delay tactics as it can during this evolutionary process. As long as the N.W.T. remains a political hinterland there are no precedents from the North-West Territories' experience to support a possible drive for the N.W.T. to attain effective financial independence through gaining control of natural resources. It has been established in the Canadian courts that a Territory does not possess ownership rights over its natural resources prior to its attaining provincehood (Thompson, 1967, 306). We would interpret Searle's frequent overtures to the Federal Government to declare itself as a trustee over the N.W.T.'s resources as an effort to circumvent this precedent. It is even more directly addressed at the imminent confrontation over whether the N.W.T. will gain control of its public domain at the time of achieving provincial status. The confrontation over ownership was also aimed at forcing Ottawa to recognize that an accounting system for the N.W.T.'s resources should be established. This would avoid the difficulties which were faced in Alberta and Saskatchewan when these two provinces gained ownership of their natural resources in 1930.

We anticipate that confrontations over economic power are inevitable. They will be forestalled by the extent to which the Federal Government can convince the Territorial Council that further political evolutionary steps must be delayed until the Council matures, the N.W.T. has financial self-sufficiency, and/or until the population size reaches an unspecified threshold level.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER OF OTHER VESTED INTEREST GROUPS IN N.W.T.

A complete analysis of social power in the Northwest Territories would need to take account of all the various vested interest groups in the Northwest Territories in the struggle for political power and a share of the economic wealth. From our content analysis we can conclude that the confrontations between the Territorial Council and the Federal Government essentially involved new northerners in the N.W.T. attempting to wrest political and economic power from Ottawa for the N.W.T. society.

However, there are many other vested interest groups which are all struggling for social power. The northern business entrepreneurial class is attempting to maximize its economic power and this could lead to conflicts with the large, integrated multinational corporations which operate in the N.W.T. Equally important, the northern business interests are potentially in conflict with the Territorial Government to the extent that this administration engages in activities which the northern bourgeoisie feel should be left to private enterprise. Northern businesses also must struggle against southern contractors for northern contracts. Our content analysis revealed that the Territorial Council has been a strong supporter of the vested interests of the northern business class (Territorial Debates, 1972a, 578-588; Territorial Debates, 1972b, 411, 832-834).

A complete study of social power would also focus on the relationships between the large resource-developing corporations and the other vested interests that we have indentified. For example, one source of potential confrontation is the relationship between the corporate native hiring practices and the regulations of the Federal Government. Some of the potential political and economic power confrontations of these various vested interest groups are clearly seen in the power struggles involving the Native People in the Northwest Territories.

THE NATIVE POWER STRUGGLES IN THE N.W.T.

The native treaty and aboriginal right claims against the Federal Government are tied to the confrontation between the N.W.T. Council and Ottawa for economic power. Ottawa's official position has been that the northern development activities involving road construction, pipelines, oil and gas exploration and mining development need not be affected by the question of settlement of treaties in the N.W.T. as they are two distinct and separable issues[9] (Chretien, 1972e, 7).

1. Separation of Native Political Power from the Council

During our content analysis we noted that the Council dealt with numerous motions from 1967 to 1972 which called for the Federal Government to settle the remaining treaty claims in the N.W.T. We also noted that Commissioner Hodgson often responded by declaring the motions as out of Council's purview or as not being in order unless it was changed to be a recommendation to be taken by Ottawa as advice. A N.W.T. native claims motion was sponsored by Butters and Hamelin on February 5, 1973. It called on the Prime Minister to facilitate an early and equitable settlement of the Treaty 8 and 11 claims by the Indians and the aboriginal land claims by the Inuit of the N.W.T. (Territorial Debates, 1973a, 659-666). James Wah-shee, the president of the Indian Brotherhood of the N.W.T., made it clear in an interview over C.B.C. Mackenzie News the same day that he wanted no favors from the Territorial Council and that the Brotherhood maintained the issue was between the Indian people of the N.W.T. and the Federal Government. "Personally, I think that how the native people want to organize their own organizations and how they want to settle the land issue and also how they want to settle their treaties with the Federal Government is their own business but I don't think that it's the business of the Territorial Council to direct how it should be done, or to tell native people how they should settle their treaties and how they should run their own organizations."

For our analysis we are not as concerned about Wah-shee's actual observation that the Territorial Council was a colonial advisory council as with the implications of his comments in reference to political power in the N.W.T. He asserted that the Territorial Council was not representative of the native people in the N.W.T. and "as far as the Brotherhood is concerned there are only two native people on the Territorial Council". This researcher's field research concurs with this view that the Indian people did not consider the Territorial Council as their representative government. The Indian people considered that their interests were represented by the Indian Brotherhood which held its first constitutional-drafting meeting in October, 1969 and was incorporated as a society in 1970.

This basic division of perspective of where the Indians would invest their political power was also evidenced by their position related to local government. Settlement councils have been encouraged by the Local Government Department of the Northwest Territories. The municipal affairs division of this department had been established to bring local government to every settlement in the N.W.T. but it neglected the existing traditional system of Chief and Band Council government. Their jurisdiction did not necessarily correspond to the settlement geographical boundaries. The Board of Directors of the Indian Brotherhood adopted a motion on March 19, 1971 which opposed the establishment and development of the settlement Council system in the N.W.T. on the grounds that "it ignores and jeopardizes the Indian way of governing with values and methods that are non-Indian." (Brotherhood Directors, 1971a (March 19); Wah-shee, 1971b, 4-5).

In an October 21, 1971 memo to the N.W.T. chiefs and band councillors Wah-shee reported that he had reached a stalemate with the Minister of Indian Affairs. Wah-shee refused to meet with Chrétien if the Territorial Government was present and the Minister refused to attend unless it was represented.[10] Wah-shee used this as supportive evidence that the "Territorial Government is still responsible for Treaty Indians and holding back the progress of the Indian Brotherhood of the N.W.T., because the Government of the N.W.T. does not recognize the Chiefs and Band Councils of the N.W.T. and the special status that Treaty Indians have in the N.W.T." (Wah-shee, 1971a).

2. The Ethnicity Issue

We would argue that Wah-shee was essentially correct that Council Members have been reticent to openly admit racial and ethnic differences in the N.W.T. The Commissioner observed that this difference was unfortunate and that it was healthier to recognize the racial distinctions (Territorial Debates, 1966a, 635). Subsequent sessions did not produce a change in this reluctance to refer to Indians, Eskimos, Metis, and whites in drafting ordinances. This was clearly evidenced in the proceedings in Committee of the Whole dealing with the June, 1972 Game Ordinance. Trimble insisted that the Legislation Standing Committee had adopted the policy that it was discriminatory to make specific reference to Indians and Eskimos in the Game Ordinance (Territorial Debates, 1972b, 576). One of the native Councillors confided to this researcher that such an approach was, in his view, racist since it would not recognize the special rights of natives in hunting, fishing and trapping. Wah-shee also pinpointed this as being a source of discontent for the Indian Brotherhood. He declared that the Territorial Government was helping the Federal people "do away with the Treaty Rights and Treaty Status of the Indian people who are under Treaties 8 and 11". His remarks were obviously in reference to the Federal Indian Policy of 1969 (Indian Policy, 1969) but they also alluded to the fact that the two above mentioned levels of government would like to use '."northerner" whereby everyone in the N.W.T. is a "northerner", not as an Indian, Eskimo or Metis but as a "northerner" where everyone receives the same services and programs'. He called it the myth of "northern equality" (Wah-shee, 1971a, 3-4; Wah-shee, 1971b, 2-3).

3. Confrontations over Native Claims

The native people have had an impact on the Territorial Council's strategies of confrontation with the Federal Government pertaining to economic power. We have noted in the section dealing with economic power that Searle had modified his demands from originally insisting that the Federal Government declare itself a trustee of the N.W.T.'s natural resources to the mere hope that the N.W.T. might be able to obtain a share of the revenue from its resource development for the foreseeable future. Trimble and Pedersen have taken the view that the N.W.T. Council should suspend its demands for administration and for a share of the resource revenue until after the indigenous population has attained a settlement from the Federal Government respecting treaty and aboriginal claims. Hamelin labelled this an "until policy" (Territorial Debates, 1974b, 99-102). This adds an interesting new factor to our earlier anticipation that the Council might press for increased economic powers in direct relation to its increase in political power. While we do not anticipate that this "until policy" will be adopted by the majority of Councillors it is certainly possible that it could have a retarding effect on the speed and intensity with which Council presses for increased economic power. It would appear, in conclusion, that some elected Council Members consider themselves representatives of the native vested interest group even though this view is not shared by the Indian Brotherhood.

A key source of future confrontation in the N.W.T. will likely be the treaty and aboriginal claims. This formally involves a confrontation of the Indians and Eskimos with the Federal Government but the major reason for the occurrence of this confrontation within the foreseeable future relates to the Federal Government's role as owner-manager of the N.W.T. natural resources. Our discussion of this must be divided into Eskimo-Federal Government and Indian-Federal Government confrontations.

The Federal Guidelines for the development of northern Canada during the 1970's placed rapid social improvements as its first priority. It was a commitment to native poeples that their cultural identity would be respected. The guidelines asserted that they would be afforded the opportunities of employment in the industrialized society but the possible choice of remaining in the traditional way of life would also be respected (Borrie, 1972, 37-38). However, it became apparent that the Federal Government did not consider Indian treaty and Inuit aboriginal claims as coming within the terms of reference of its policies for development. Both native groups considered the Federal rather than the Territorial Government as "their" government and they opposed the Territorial Council's confrontations for increases in political powers related to administration of programs for natives. For example, both the Indian Brotherhood and the Inuit Tapirisat, the national organization which was formed in February of 1971 to represent Eskimos, opposed the Federal program to transfer the administration of land around settlements to the Territorial jurisdiction. This position was not merely addressed to the question of administration of this settlement land. Both native organizations interpreted this move as premature until there had been a settlement between natives and Ottawa concerning Indian treaty claims and native aboriginal land claims (Curley 1972a, 1972b, 1972c; Sutton, 1972; Wah-shee, 1972).

As long as significant exploitation of N.W.T.'s resources was a dream of the future the Federal Government remained lethargic to the overtures that native peoples made respecting settlement of the Treaties 8 and 11 land claims and the aboriginal rights claims (Native Press, 1972, 1). However, increased consciousness of the native groups and the escalation in the pace of research, exploration, and development of natural resources (especially oil and gas) forced the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development to alter its position. The Indian Brotherhood of the N.W.T. adopted the position that all corporate exploration and development in the Territories should be terminated until native land and treaty claims were settled (Brotherhood Directors, 1971b; Brotherhood Directors, 1972, 21-22; Wah-shee, 1971b, 8-10). The Inuit were also gaining an increasing awareness that they might have legitimate aboriginal land claims because their forefathers had never signed any treaties with either the British or Canadian Governments. This view was reinforced by the 1970 decision involving the Nishga Tribe, which claimed aboriginal title to the northwest coast of British Columbia, and the resultant decision which established that aboriginal claims were legitimate but the key factor was whether the colonial government had extinguished their rights. The 1971 settlement with the native people in Alaska reinforced the legitimacy of the Inuit claims as the Alaska settlement was made on the basis of aboriginal rights rather than the existence of a treaty with the U.S.A. government. The Alaska government did not want to risk a prolonged battle in court which might delay the construction of oil and gas pipelines as well as further exploration work by oil companies (Cumming, 1970, 506).

A similar concern prompted the Canadian Federal Government to alter its position respecting negotiation with Indians concerning their treaty rights and the Inuit concerning their aboriginal claims. Thus, Chrétien announced on June 28, 1972 that his Department would seek settlement of Treaties 8 and 11 and he suggested that the Indian bands might wish to consider relinquishing their reserve land claims in favor of an assessment of their surface and sub-surface rights (Chrétien, 1972b). The D.I.A.N.D. also made a grant of $100,000 to the Inuit Tapirisat on June 28, 1972 to facilitate preparation of a brief outlining the position of the Canadian Inuit respecting "legal rights and moral claims in respect to the lands and waters of the North." (Chrétien, 1972a). The research proposal which was submitted to the Minister outlined that the funding would be utilized to prepare a position paper on legal rights and moral claims to northern lands and waters but would also address to all aspects of northern development. These other aspects would include conservation and proper management of wild life, land use regulations and other aspects of environmental protection, and employment of Inuit in the development activities. The key premis of the submission was that the Inuit should be involved in the decision-making process of the Federal Government in reference to northern development and that this had been seriously lacking (Inuit Tapirisat, 1972, 11).

An evaluation of the merits of the land claims by the Indians and the Inuit of the N.W.T. is outside the purivew of our analysis except insofar as it relates to the power dimension within the N.W.T. or between the N.W.T. and the Federal Government. There is much potential for conflict between the Federal Government and the natives for economic power. Undoubtedly, the natives will take a position of confrontation in which they will threaten to take court action unless their "legitimate" claims are satisfied. The decision by Justice Morrow of the N.W.T. Supreme Court in the fall of 1973 that the Treaty Indians of the N.W.T. had an interest in the 400,000 square miles of the Mackenzie region and that a caveat was in order has had dramatic effects on Ottawa's approach. Although the caveat on development was not upheld during an appeal procedure, this move motivated the Minister and the Indian Claims Commissioner to begin to establish ground rules for negotiations with the N.W.T. Brotherhood. The Indians are motivated to reach an agreement with Ottawa because it will increase the natives' economic power. The Federal Government is motivated to reach an agreement in order to facilitate primary resource exploitation. The N.W.T. Brotherhood will be in a better bargaining position if it can refute the Treaties 8 and 11 by asserting that they were merely peace treaties rather than agreements to cessation of aboriginal land titles [11] (Edmonton Journal, 1974b, 6).

Native unity is one of the key factors to be considered when attempting a prediction of the potential for confrontation between the Federal Government and the natives. There is still a lack of organization and unity among the natives of N.W.T. We have noted the emergence of the Indian Brotherhood and the Inuit Tapirisat. The Central Arctic Inuit representative on the 7th Council asserted in 1972 that their organization would not ally itself with the Brotherhood because the Indian union was too radical. The Metis remain essentially unorganized. The Metis and non-status Indians may be part of the terms of reference of native claims in what may be interpreted as a broadened point of view by Chrétien (Edmonton Journal, 1974b, 6). The Committee for Original People's Entitlement, which works out of Inuvik, does not have the support of all native groups. It represented the Inuit of Banks Island in their dispute with the Federal Government over seismic exploration work. However, it does not appear to have organized support from Metis and non-treaty Indians nor from the Inuit Tapirisat. It certainly is not accepted as the official spokesman of Treaty Indians. We would argue that to the extent the N.W.T. natives remain disunited the Federal Government will be able to effect a cheaper and more favorable settlement.[12]

4. Native Power on the Territorial Council

In our predictions concerning future native-federal confrontations we must also take into account the political power dimension. We have earlier asserted that the Indian Brotherhood does not support the Territorial Council and, in fact, was often opposed to the Territorial Administration and the Council. We have also elaborated the conflicts that native Councillors experience in wishing to represent their native constituents but, at the same time, needing to realize that the Indian Brotherhood and the Inuit Tapirisat are the official spokesmen of Treaty Indians and Inuit, respectively. Because of the size of the native population in the N.W.T., we anticipate that there will be an increase in the number of native Territorial Councillors unless the Brotherhood opposes native participation. A large number of native Council Members in the completely elected Council would weaken the power of Council to confront Ottawa if these Members continue to view the Brotherhood as their proper confrontation mechanism against the D.I.A.N.D. The Inuit representative from the Keewatin on the 7th Council remarked to this researcher that the Inuit Tapirisat is "aware of the things that affect Inuit and have Toronto lawyers to advise them". If future Inuit Councillors continue to view the Inuit Tapirisat as the protector of their interests against Ottawa and the multinational resource developers we would expect the effective political power, re. representative government, to be eroded.

However, the Territorial Council affords a common meeting place for the leaders of the Inuit, Indian, and Metis and the potential for the development of political consciousness will be even more pronounced with the addition of more elected members. The result will likely be a more united confrontation front of the Inuit and Indians against the federal metropolis.

Perhaps one of the most probable and important future prospects of the Territiorial Council is that with the 8th Council there will be an increase of members from predominantly native hinterland communities. This could have a two-fold effect. The Council and the Brotherhood and Tapirisat will likely reach an accord or coalition in order to confront the Federal Government to relinquish more political and economic power. The second probable effect would be that a Finance Committee composed of predominantly-white members would not be able to retain the confidence of the native members. As we discussed earlier in the section predicting future political power in the N.W.T., such a situation could reach an impassé whereby the native Counsellors would refuse to vote for appropriation ordinances. If this group contains the majority of Council Members there would be no alternative but to either alter the composition of the Finance Committee or hold another Territorial election. This latter alternative would not be a solution but merely a delay tactic because we would anticipate a similar situation to emerge in subsequent representative Councils.

We conclude, therefore, that not only will Council need to evolve toward at least minimal facets of responsible government but there will also be the continued evolution of a political system in which clearly delineated parties will emerge. From the above analysis we would conclude that it is possible that one of these parties could be the native coalition party and that this party could have the majority of members in the Council. This would be the first situation in Canada where "native power" emerged to the point where they could legally take control of a provincial-type legislative body.

As a final comment, we recognize that the population characteristics of the N.W.T. will change as the pace of resource exploitation escalates. More whites will move into the N.W.T. but, we would speculate, they will constitute almost exclusively a transient work force to which the N.W.T. has become accustomed. Their participation in Territorial politics would be minimal. It is also true that, given the D.I.A.N.D.'s commitment to place a priority on providing jobs to northerners and the nature of the natural resource extractive industries, we would not anticipate the need for large numbers of permanent in-migrants. For example, the proposed Mackenzie Valley Pipeline would require 5,300 workers during the 2 to 3 year construction phase. This entails 4,000 persons in pipeline construction, 800 in camp staff, and 500 in the building trades. Only 126 would be required in the operations phase of this project. The development of oil and gas fields portrays a similar pattern of a migrant work force in the seismic exploration, drilling, and pipeline phases. A relatively small operations personnel would be required (Estimated numbers supplied by a federal Information Officer in Yellowknife).

SUMMARY

We anticipate that confrontations between Council and the Federal Government with respect to political and economic power will continue until the N.W.T. attains provincial status and ownership and control of its natural resources. The major action in these struggles in the next decade will likely involve the native vested interest group in both the political and economic arena.

CHAPTER EIGHT

FOOTNOTES

[1] This level of explanation assumes that macroscopic social science studies can not be explained merely by elaborating composition laws of the effects of different combinations of individual members.

[2] It would be necessary to refine our operationalization of these two independent relationships to facilitate adequate testing of whether their effect is interactive or spurious. Our operationalization and data collection did not permit such an analysis.

[3] In 1970 Chrétien summarized that nineteen of the Carrothers recommendations had been implemented, five had been partially implemented, and "four only have not been upheld." (Debates H. of C., 1970, 6293).

[4] We are referring to constitutional political power rather than motives. It is not implied that the Commissioner always acts as a puppet of the Federal Government but rather this classification points out that the N.W.T. Act provides that he could legally take or be given orders as a federal agent in these jurisdictional areas. Whether the Commissioner actually does act as an agent in these areas is an empirical question and we have earlier considered this point.

[5] It is recognized that the Federal Government has the power to disallow a provincial Act, is the ceremonial head of provincial government through the Lieutenant-Governor, and makes appointments of judges in the provinces.

[6] This researcher recorded, while observing the 47th Session, that "Council seems to be more involved in discussion (argument and counter-argument) than with actually proposing motions and instigating action. -- Butters takes a more pragmatic approach." Later the same day it was observed "some Council Members are more interested in winning a debate on a point than with how responsible the decision is." (June 30, 1972).

[7] In fact, we anticipate that Mr. Trimble may not wish to run for election to another term of Council.

[8] We are not being critical of these research projects but rather use them to demonstrate the increase in federal activities in the N.W.T. related to primary resource exploitation.

[9] Later in this section we will see that the D.I.A.N.D. made a complete turn-about from this view about January of 1974 in response to political and economic expediencies related to the Federal role as metropolis over the N.W.T. hinterland.

[10] We do not wish to debate the merits of their respective positions as it involves the question of whether the Territorial Government should act on behalf of Ottawa in administering the Treaties. We merely would point out that Council did not favor this role as is evinced by a motion, sponsored by Butters and Trimble, which requested the Federal Government to resume employing federal officials to honor treaty obligations to the N.W.T. Indian people (Territorial Debates, 1972a, 248-251).

[11] There is strong evidence to support this contention by the N.W.T. Brotherhood. For example, Father Lusson of Fort Providence has asserted that most of the Roman Catholic missionaries of the Great Slave Lake area feel the legal value of Treaties 8 and 11 is "nil". The local chief in Fort Resolution, for example, was against signing the Treaty. A fellow who was the interpreter for the signing of the Treaty in Fort Providence also expressed the view that the signing was invalid. One of the data sources for the Brotherhood in defense of its argument that the Treaties are invalid will obviously be a compilation of interviews with such witnesses to the signing ceremonies. Whether this evidence will be permitted in court remains to be seen. Delays in such proceedings will mean that the Brotherhood's key witnesses will be fewer in number because of senility and mortality.

[12] We caution that this is not an evaluation that Chrétien and his Department have been motivated to obtain a cheap settlement with the native groups. It rather stems from our basic perspective in which the Federal Government and the natives, as two vested interest groups, are both struggling to maximize their economic power related to the impending resource development. The natives of the hinterland are involved in a confrontation with the federal metropolis and this confrontation is related to economic power.

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APPENDIX A

DISCUSSION OF N.W.T. COUNCIL'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE--PROVINCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES--ON C.B.C. RADIO, JUNE 30, 1972: WORLD AT SIX COVERAGE AND YELLOWKNIFE C.B.C. INTERVIEWS OF SEARLE, BUTTERS, AND TRIMBLE

C.B.C. 6:00 P.M. NATIONAL NEWSCAST BROADCAST TO YELLOWKNIFE, N.W.T., JUNE 30, 1972

A plan for the Special Council Committee are to identify areas where provincial-type responsibilities are presently being handled by the Federal Government and then determine ways and means of transferring those responsibilities to the Government of the Northwest Territories. Its a deliberate bid to circumvent Ottawa and go to the Canadian people to find out what they think of the situation where the Territories has no control over the development of its natural resources and related issues. Mr. Searle is confident that the Committee has the legal power to hold meetings in the south and that's exactly what he plans to do. Earlier in the session he suggested that maybe hearings could be held in Toronto and Quebec City where Mr. Searle believes there might be an interesting reception for the visitors from the North. These southern hearings are a key part of the Committee's rather unusual program. It wants to call witnesses such as people in Alberta who were present when the natural resources of that province were finally released by Ottawa. The Federal Government has repeatedly refused to give the Territorial Members information about what provincial-type responsibilities it still has. The decision to form the Committee is one way of getting around the Ottawa embargo. The members of the Committee include both elected and appointed members of Council underlining the unanimous approach of the Territorial Members. Val Wake, C.B.C. News, Yellowknife.

C.B.C. 6:20 P.M. LOCAL NEWSCAST, (TERRITORIAL ROUNDUP), YELLOWKNIFE, N.W.T., JUNE 30, 1972

Territorial Council has Named its Special Committee to Investigate the Transfer of Provincial-Type Responsibilities to the Territories.

Announcer: The Northwest Territories Council has named its Committee which will deal with the transfer of provincial-type responsibilities to the Territories. On the last day of the present session the Dean of Council, Lyle Trimble, got permission of his colleagues to introduce a motion which named the Committee. They are chairman David Searle of Yellowknife, Tom Butters of Inuvik, Hugh Campbell of Ottawa, Louis Edmond Hamelin of Quebec City, and Brian Pearson of Frobisher Bay. This Committee has been formed as a result of two motions earlier in the session when Council expressed its concern about the growing federal presence in the Territories. The Committee has been asked to identify areas where provincial-type responsibilities are being held by federal agencies and find ways and means of transferring the responsibilities to the Territories. Mr. Searle was asked what will be the next step.

David Searle: We're going to appoint a full time secretary and I'm going to sit down with him and start mapping out the thing just as soon as I can and I shall probably have my Committee back shortly to have a full Committee meeting to just set out exactly what we foresee as the steps to be taken.

Val Wake: Will you have the help of the Territorial Administration as far as secretarial work goes or is that entirely up to you?

David Searle: Full support of the Territorial Government.

Val Wake: Is it likely that we'll hear from this Committee before the session resumes in Frobisher Bay in October?

David Searle: I'm not sure that you will. We may hold a meeting of the Committee before then. We will certainly hold one at that time in Frobisher Bay. If we don't, I'm not altogether certain. That is still to be mapped out. There are a few other considerations as well.

Val Wake: Are you still confident that you will be able to hold hearings in the South?

David Searle: Oh yes, I think we'll hold hearings wherever we want. I don't think there's any legal mechanism to prevent us travelling across our nation.

Val Wake: During debate you did mention Toronto and Quebec City. Was this in jest or are you quite serious about this?

David Searle: Well, I would think they would be rather interesting places to sit because of things that are going on there in a related way. We could get some very interesting and valuable help I should think but for me to say at this point that we would indeed sit there would not be something that I could say at this point and time. Its entirely up to the Committee. As a Chairman, I'm just that.

Val Wake: I was wondering if you could go over the points once again. Why do you feel its necessary for this Committee to hold hearings in the South?

David Searle: Well I think that apart from identifying the areas of legitimate provincial-type service that this Territorial Government should be in, obviously as well we've got to come up with the ways and means of achieving those goals which was another part of the terms of reference of that motion and so, of course, what's gone on historically in other jurisdictions, say Alberta, for instance, when they received their mineral resources. There are volumes on that and there are still people alive who took part in that provincial-federal confrontation that resulted in the transfer to Alberta of its resources which, of course, has made it a wealthy province. It would be pretty helpful to hear from these people.

Announcer: Mr. Searle says there will be no timetable for the Committee but he hopes that it will come out with some major recommendations in about a year.

COUNCIL REPORT, C.B.C. YELLOWKNIFE, 7:03 P.M. JULY 1, 1972

Steve Hooke: Good evening. I'm Steve Hooke and this is the last Council Report for these sittings of the 47th Session. I say these sittings because as you heard on the Territorial News tonight the Council has not prorogued but simply adjourned to meet again in the fall at Frobisher Bay. This procedure was certainly in order because there are still many items still on the order paper to deal with in the 47th Session and, had they prorogued, all progress made on the unfinished items would have been lost. Besides that though, the October meetings give Council yet another platform to continue the fight concerned with the Federal Government to once again start developing politically. That fight got momentum today as the Council named their Committee that is charged with selecting the federally-vetoed information on provincial-type services in the North. What follows is an examination of that Committee's role, importance, and possible chances of success in the months ahead. One of the members of the Committee is Tom Butters from Inuvik and as the Chamber cleared we talked first about the Committee's job ahead.

Tom Butters: I expect the Committee will be rather active. The Committee has been named. There have been no terms of reference worked out except that over a long period of time I think Council has pretty well determined the areas which it wishes to examine. It has charged up the five members named to examine these and although we have not had dates I would expect that our chairman, Dave Searle, will be moving into this area very quickly.

Steve Hooke: This Committee of course is a very highly politically-charged body as in respect of all the other moves that have been going on in Council and how do you see its role, what is your idea of the effectiveness of this Committee when it comes down to, not making a study because obviously that can be done, but I mean the effect it is going to have politically on the Federal Government?

Tom Butters: I can't answer that in how I expect the Federal Government to react. I would hope they would accept the recommendations of this Committee with the utmost seriousness. David Searle was chosen chairman for the very good reason of his knowledge of Council affairs, for his legal background and his knowledge, and the other Council members. You will notice we have Air Marshall Campbell, also a long time member with many ideas about Council and a great contributor to Council, Dr. Louis Hamelin who has contributed many new ideas and aspects, and Brian from the East and myself from the Western Arctic. We feel the Committee is very representative of the Council and the material it produces I would hope, I would expect, that Ottawa would consider most seriously.

Steve Hooke: To pursue it a little further, I meant that by its very existence what kind of affect would you predict it will have on the Federal Government?

Tom Butters: Well, I would think that they would take its presence and its existence with most seriously because in microcosm we we are examining the areas of confrontation that appeared between ourselves and the federal authorities of this session and we're coming back at them and we're coming back with good reasons for our requests and we hope in a mature way and a responsible way which will encourage them to do what they seem to have ceased to do in the last few years which is continue to turn over more provincial-type responsibilities to this administration.

Steve Hooke: The people of the Northwest Territories hopefully have been aware of what's been going on here in Council, the power struggle that's been going on, but I wonder if you could assess the importance here of what you have been trying to do, to break away?

Tom Butters: I can try. What I wonder if the people realize is that the Council of the Northwest Territories and the Administration of the Northwest Territories is really their government. As far as the Council Members are concerned, they give us the power to be here and they can take it away from us. This is where the power of the Northwest Territories lies as does any autonomous government in the elected body that represents them and right now we, the elected members, feel that we are ready for more self-government, we are ready to develop more programs for ourselves and we need the support and backing of every person in the Northwest Territories to give us the strength which they gave us when they elected us and if we don't get this our battle is half lost. We've got to have the support of the entire N.W.T. community. Before I close on this point, this session has been a very unhappy session and almost an unproductive situation because we have been fighting instead of building and maybe the press has noticed this too. There has been a lackadaisical approach and I think this a direct result of the fact that there is a feeling of what the hell, you know, what does it really matter. We've got other things to do and maybe we should be doing those so that the attitude of fighting and confrontation is really not building us anywhere or getting us anywhere. The Committee we hope will chart a new course which will be like a road map of the way ahead so we can see at this point in time we may be here and every member who is putting in their time and they are putting in a lot of personal time on their own will then feel that their contribution is worthwhile. In some cases there is sacrifice. I think that the older members such as Lyle Trimble, such as Dave Searle, Hugh Campbell, and these people have given the Territories and Council a lot and it must be a terrible frustration to them to after all these years of contribution to run into this type of situation.

Steve Hooke: You mentioned, to just go back a little bit, that you were concerned because you needed the support of each and every person in the Northwest Territories and how could that support best be shown?

Tom Butters: Well the we as Members of this Council attempt to answer requests of our constituents and act as best we can for them. We don't always achieve what they ask us to do but we attempt to act for them and if we didn't do that then the electorate would soon get rid of us. Too, the same thing in Ottawa, we can write our Member, we can write our Minister, you can write the Prime Minister. It only costs 8 cents a stamp and I feel that no matter what partisan man person you are write to whoever in that Parliament that you wish to express your opinion about the Territorial Government. I think that this would then make the federal people that we are interested and we are serious about our increasing autonomy.

Steve Hooke: The man chosen to actually make the critical proposal as this political struggle developed was the Dean of Council, Lyle Trimble. Mr. Trimble isn't on the committee but as his assessment shows he places great importance on the body and its work.

Lyle Trimble: I think this Session has been a very important one. Aside from the legislation that we have enacted and other legislation that we have given consideration to but haven't finalized as yet and haven't put through to third reading, I feel one of the perhaps the key thing about this session is that we've come to grips with the whole question of what responsibility does the Commissioner in Council have and what is our relationship with the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern

Development and with the Minister of that Department. And I say "we've come to grips with it", we haven't resolved anything as yet and that is, I suppose, why the session is not proroguing. We can't come to a solution at this time. We're not prepared to adjourn this session without arriving at some solution. And so, the session is just suspended until we meet again and then we'll carry on from where we left off. I feel that the Council members, including myself, are determined that we are no longer going to permit the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development to hamstring the Commissioner and dictate to the Territorial Government what they can do on behalf of Council and what they will not do. We feel that it is reasonably explicit in the Northwest Territories Act what our responsibilities and authority is and we intend to see that we have the right to carry out that responsibility without interference from the Department.

Steve Hooke: Any predictions -- do you think you are going to be successful in this fight?

Lyle Trimble: I think that the Members of Council are a pretty determined bunch and somebody is going to bend and I don't expect the Council to.

Steve Hooke: What kind of toughness and determination seems to be the rule of Council at this time and others as well for success in this bid for responsibility? The all important job of chairing the Committee has fallen to the member from Yellowknife, David Searle. Here are his views on the political implications of the body's work and the difficulty of the task at hand.

David Searle: Well its going to be studying a very sensitive area and I say sensitive as between the Federal and Territorial Governments and Federal Parliament and the Territorial Council. The very sensitive political issues of resources and other provincial areas of responsibility. We're going to identify them. We're going to recommend which we think should come to the Territorial Council and the Territorial Government and of course the ways and means of doing that. Its a very formidable task and one I almost cringe at the thought of starting because you know where is the end when you start something like that? I suppose the end is provincial status. That's really when you can say the Committee has done its work. Not that the Committee itself may stay in existence that long but that's what ultimately the Committee will be looking at.

Steve Hooke: We all know there's an election coming up. Everybody thought it was going to be this spring, then it was this summer, and now they're predicting it for the fall, a federal election, and this Committee could be politically very dangerous for the government in Ottawa.

David Searle: Well, I should think that depending on where we hold our sittings and when we hold them and who appears before the Committee, indeed, there might be some rather interesting things come out and before the Committee and particularly since whatever we do, of course, will be done in public.

Steve Hooke: Is it in the game plan to, to really try and affect the politics on a federal level in order to gain power?

David Searle: Well I don't think, that we're going to, you know, play politics for politics sake. I think, however, we would be remiss if we missed the opportunity to state a case legitimately and to be heard legitimately and do it when we think we can gain the most mileage and the greatest effect on the government. I think that's a responsible kind of answer.

Steve Hooke: Do you feel

David Searle: In other words I'm prepared to say that we'll probably try and be statesmen but to be purely politicians, no.

Steve Hooke: How about your chances of success?

David Searle: Oh, I don't know. We'll see. It depends, you know, on how reasoned we are and how responsible we are and I think and that's why I say we are not going to play politics.

Steve Hooke: Well whether Mr. Searle intends to play politics or not, he's indicated that the Committee will be holding hearings in the South and these proceedings will almost certainly be well attended by the press. The story has all the ingredients of a notion like David and Goliath. Such a situation exists with the tiny Territorial Council fighting for freedom in this free country against the Ottawa juggernaut [inaudible] in an election year. Today's adjournment to October 10 might turn out to be the latest finesse. Robert Stanfield, federal leader of the Opposition, has guestimated that the federal election will be called about October 17th. The stakes are high in this political game and the outcome could affect every Northerner. And that's it for another round of Council report. I'm Steve Hooke. Goodnight.

APPENDIX B

THE POSITION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES AT THE CONFRONTATION MEETING WITH THE MINISTER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT, YELLOWKNIFE, JULY 12, 1972 [SUPPORTIVE DOCUMENTATION WHICH COUNCIL ATTACHED TO THEIR SUBMISSION HAVE NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN APPENDIX B. THIS DOCUMENTATION INCLUDED "INCIDENCE OF WITHHOLDING OF ASSENT TO BILLS IN PROVINCIAL HOUSES," "FEDERAL DISALLOWANCE OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION", MOTION 34-46, INFORMATION ITEM 38-47, MOTION 4-47, MOTION 5-47, "PROVINCIAL-TYPE RESPONSIBILITIES CARRIED OUT SOLELY BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY)", "SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROVINCIAL-TYPE RESPONSIBILITIES PERFORMED BY THE FEDERAL AND TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES", AND "NORTHWEST TERRITORIES ACT, OFFICE CONSOLIDATION, OCTOBER, 1971"]

MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT AND COUNCIL

Yellowknife, N.W.T.,
9:00 a.m., 12 July 1972

AGENDA

1. Relationship between the Commissioner, the Council, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the Minister.
    - (a) as to Legislation and Papers requested by Council to come before Council.
    - (b) as to Money Bills.
    - (c) as to Assent.
    - (d) as to Disallowance.
2. Further transfers of Provincial-type responsibilities from the Federal to Territorial Government.
3. Change in the structure of the Council, i.e., when to be fully elected and to have an Executive Committee.

COUNCIL OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES
CANADA

Yellowknife, N.W.T.,
12 July 1972

AGENDA ITEM NO. 1

The Council is of the opinion that the relationships between the Commissioner, the Council, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the Minister should be defined so that an understanding develops, thereby avoiding conflict. On the Agenda we have defined from (a) to (d) what we consider to be the relevant subjects where these relationships should be clarified.

(a) As to Legislation and Papers requested by Council to come before Council, the position of this Council is that such Papers and such Legislation should not be subject either to the review of the Department nor the approval of the Minister. An example of what we mean arose as a result of Motion No. 34 made in June of 1971, which requested a paper from the Territorial Administration related to the transfer of provincial type services to the Territorial Government. In response to this motion, item (2) of Information Item No. 38-47 stated the Department's position that "any paper such as the Territorial Administration has been asked by the Council to prepare would require his (i.e. the Minister's) approval before becoming a public document." Our response to this was Motion 4-47 wherein we requested that the Minister instruct the Department to desist from fettering and restricting the legitimate actions of the Commissioner and Council.

Our position is that such papers should be freely provided by our administration and that should they result in legislation unacceptable to the Minister, then he should disallow the legislation. On the other hand, should the paper require the spending of money, then the Minister could instruct the Commissioner not to fund the project. Both courses of action are, to our mind, proper but we feel it is improper to prevent us from obtaining the information. The same applies to our legislation.

What this Council would like to know Mr. Minister, is whether you are prepared to honour our request and so instruct your Department?

(b) As to Money Bills, we have no quarrel with S.21 of the N.W.T. Act which requires the Commissioner to first recommend any expenditure of the public revenue. We do, however, have some difficulty reconciling that section with S.12 of the Act which permits the Commissioner in Council to prescribe

Council's own indemnities.

Council's position is that it is not proper for either the Department or the Minister to instruct the Commissioner not to assent to legislation like the Council Retiring Allowances Ordinance, being Bill 26-47. Instead, Council's position is that pursuant to S.12 it is proper for the Council to prescribe, by way of legislation, a retirement plan. The proper position for the Minister to take, we submit, is two fold. The Minister may properly instruct the Commissioner not to put the funds required into the subsequent estimates and further, he may disallow the legislation itself within one year. We suggest that there are no short cuts, such as to instruct the Commissioner when acting in his legislative capacity as "Commissioner in Council" to decline assent.

This Council, therefore, asks you Mr. Minister if you are prepared to adopt the foregoing approach respecting this Bill in order that it might receive assent at the adjourned October session in Frobisher Bay?

(c) As to assent, directly, it is the position of this Council, as a result of competent legal advice sought and obtained, that the Commissioner cannot lawfully withhold his assent to legislation once it is properly introduced and receives first, second and third reading. As a result, we have been advised that it is improper to instruct the Commissioner to withhold assent since he cannot lawfully do so. To emphasize our point may we quote directly from the opinion obtained.

> "To the extent specified in Section 13 the legislative power in the Northwest Territories is vested in the Commissioner in Council. Thus the legislative body in the Northwest Territories is the Commissioner in Council.
>
> The term "Commissioner in Council" is defined in Section 2(b) of the Act as follows:
>
> "2. In this Act,
> (b) "Commissioner in Council" means the Commissioner acting by and with the advice and consent of the Council;"
>
> It follows that the legislative power specified in Section 13 is not vested in the "Council" of the Northwest Territories. It does not as the "Council" have any legislative power. It follows also that the "Commissioner" does not have any legislative power.
>
> The legislative body entrusted with legislative power is the "Commissioner in Council". This is

> a single body. It is not divisible between the "Council" on the one hand and the "Commissioner" on the other.
>
> While the "Commissioner" is entrusted by Section 4 of the Act with the administration of the Government of the Territories under instructions from time to time given by the Governor in Council or the Minister he has no right of supervision or veto in respect of legislation.
>
> If a bill is properly introduced and has received first reading, passed second reading, dealt with in committee and passed third reading the Commissioner should assent to it. He should then see that a copy of the ordinance is transmitted to the Governor in Council within thirty days after its passing, as required by Section 15(1) of the Act. Whether the ordinance should be disallowed is then a matter for the Governor in Council. The Commissioner has no power to anticipate its disallowance by withholding assent."

The question that Council has, therefore, is whether the Minister is prepared to accept the position as above stated?

(d) As to Disallowance, S.16(1) of the N.W.T. Act requires the transmittal to the Governor in Council of a copy of every Ordinance within thirty days of its enactment. Sub-section (2) of S.16 then permits disallowance within one year.

The Council has no quarrel with the right of the Governor in Council to disallow. Statistics compiled by us show that this has been done 112 times in Canada between 1867 and 1963. It is this type of positive action by the Minister which we want rather than the more covert and questionable approach of instructing the Commissioner to withhold assent. The Minister is then standing up and being counted.

The Council's question, therefore, is to ask the Minister if he is prepared, in this way, to stand up and be counted and hence to be seen by all to take the responsibility for his decisions?

You will notice that each of the above positions have been concluded by a question. This Council would be interested in the Minister's response.

COUNCIL OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES
CANADA

Yellowknife, N.W.T.,
12 July 1972

AGENDA ITEM NO. 2

FURTHER TRANSFERS OF PROVINCIAL-TYPE RESPONSIBILITIES FROM THE FEDERAL TO THE TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT

Mr. Minister, recognition is gratefully given to the important contributions made by yourself and your predecessor, the Honourable Arthur Laing, toward the evolution of Territorial responsibility over the past seven years. Likewise, is recognition made of the Territorial Government's increasing ability to discharge such responsibility with competence and dispatch.

The Council of the Northwest Territories recognizes that you, Sir, have always been a strong public exponent and supporter of the principle of government on the ground and especially of the elected bodies, territorial and municipal, existing in the Northwest Territories.

In view of this well established position you will appreciate, Sir, the disquietude with which Council examined Information Item 38 and others, at the 47th Session. While this Item has already been raised by Councillor Searle, it likewise has much bearing on this presentation: Therefore I quote the pertinent section below.

> "THE MOTION RELATED TO THE TRANSFER OF PROVINCIAL TYPE SERVICES TO THE TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT RAISES MAJOR MATTERS OF POLICY WHICH AFFECT THE MINISTER AND CONSEQUENTLY ANY PAPER SUCH AS THE TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN ASKED BY THE COUNCIL TO PREPARE WOULD REQUIRE HIS APPROVAL BEFORE BECOMING A PUBLIC DOCUMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT THE MINISTER HAS GIVEN DIRECTION THAT HE DOES NOT ENVISAGE EITHER NOW OR IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE ANY FURTHER MAJOR TRANSFER OF PROVINCIAL TYPE PROGRAMS SPECIFICALLY IN RELATION TO SURFACE RESOURCES SUCH AS FORESTS ROADS AND LAND EXCEPT FOR THOSE IN AND AROUND COMMUNITIES."

You will be aware, Mr. Minister, that by motion of July 23rd, introduced by the Dean of the Council, Lyle Trimble, and seconded by every member, accepting Deputy Commissioner John Parker, Council has requested that a Special Committee of Council be struck.

(1) to identify and examine all areas of provincial-type responsibility,

(2) to separate the areas of provincial-type responsibility into two areas:

(a) those now being performed by the Territorial administration, and

(b) those now being performed by a Federal department or other Federal agency,

(3) to recommend to Council what areas of provincial-type responsibility now being performed by a Federal department or other Federal agency should be transferred from that agency or department to the Territorial administration.

(4) to recommend to Council what steps should be taken to achieve the objective set out in (3) above, and

(5) in the discharge of the foregoing to hold Public Hearings as well as sittings of the Committee throughout the Territories and elsewhere in Canada as the Committee deems advisable.

This Committee was named on June 29 under Chairman David Searle comprising Air Marshal Hugh Campbell, Dr. Louis-Edmond Hamelin, Bryan Pearson and myself.

In view of the fact that such a Committee has been set up and will be meeting and holding hearings in the near future, I do not wish to comment further on this subject at this time for fear I presume upon the prerogatives of the Committee or in some manner prejudge its findings and recommendations.

However, Mr. Minister, I think I may list below the provincial-type responsibilities as provided in the BNA Act and which are not held presently by the Government of the Northwest Territories.

(1) The Administration of Crown Lands

(2) Forest management and protection

(3) Road and highway construction and maintenance (outside of municipalities or Commissioner's lands)

(4) Protection of the Environment

(5) The power to incorporate certain types of companies with provincial objects

(6) Prosecution under the Criminal Code

(7) Control and administration of non-renewable resources (oil, gas, and mineral resources)

(8) Use of inland waterways for traffic and power development

(9) The ability to borrow on the sole credit of the Province

(10) Immigration

Before closing, Mr. Minister, I thank you for the opportunity to be able to make this position known to you personally and to pose the following question:

Which of the remaining provincial-type responsibilities, wholly or in part, are you contemplating transferring to the Government of the Northwest Territories in the foreseeable future?

Attachments (1) Provincial-Type responsibilities carried out solely by the Federal Government (directly or indirectly)

(2) Summary of Major provincial-type responsibilities performed by the Federal and Territorial Governments in the Northwest Territories.

COUNCIL OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES
CANADA

Yellowknife, N.W.T.,
12 July 1972

AGENDA ITEM NO. 3

CHANGES TO THE N.W.T. COUNCIL

1. Provision should be made to have 14 elected Council members by the next Territorial election.

   Section 8(2.1) of the N.W.T. Act states as follows:

   > "Subject to the approval of the Governor in Council the number of appointed members on the Council shall be reduced at such times and in such numbers as the Commissioner in Council may determine".

   During the latter sessions in the life of this Council, Council proposes to use this section of the N.W.T. Act to enact legislation to reduce the number of appointed members by 4.

   Concurrent with this we ask that amendments be made to the N.W.T. Act to increase the number of elected members to 14 and provision for having 14 electoral districts.

2. There should be an Executive Committee consisting in part of 4 elected Council members after the next Territorial election.

   The Council recommends that amendments be made to the N.W.T. Act to make this possible.

3. The name of the Council of the Northwest Territories should be changed to the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories.

APPENDIX C

DISCUSSION OF CONFRONTATION MEETING BETWEEN THE COUNCIL OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES AND JEAN CHRÉTIEN ON C.B.C. RADIO, JULY 12, 1972: TERRITORIAL ROUNDUP.

C.B.C. 6:20 P.M. LOCAL NEWSCAST (TERRITORIAL ROUNDUP), YELLOWKNIFE, N.W.T., JULY 12, 1972

There's Been an Unusual Meeting Between the Minister of Northern Development and Territorial Council. We have a Special Report.

Announcer: Political and economic development, the two main areas of discussion at an in-camera meeting between the Minister of Northern Development and the Territorial Council. The reason for the wall of secrecy surrounding the meeting hasn't been made clear. The Territorial Councillors received a summons to Yellowknife on Monday and all but one found the meeting with Jean Chrétien to be important enough for them to drop their daily business and rush to Yellowknife. It was originally believed that Mr. Chrétien was going to put Council Members back in line. However, according to the Minister, he's all in favor of Council searching out the direction of its political development.

Jean Chrétien: It was just the technique that I didn't like. But they are proceeding with the Committee, themselves, to that I have no objection. What I could not agree to is for the Commissioner to prepare a study and plan a study for them. You know, I don't know what will be the response of the Government to this study. So suppose that the Commissioner put his views on the policy of the Government and he made public his views on that, you know, and the Council and the Government don't agree and then I'm in an impossible position. So I said to them, "you form your own committee, your committee make the recommendations, the Commissioner is available and my Department is available to give you all the information you need. But it will not be a report from the Commissioner. It will be a report of your Committee. And I will have to deal with that. But you know it was just a mechanical problem.

Interviewer: Have you in fact, then, told the Council exactly what definitions they can operate within. Told them exactly where they can

Jean Chrétien: No, that's their business. That's their business. They are looking into the federal, into the provincial powers. You know the normal provincial powers. And they are telling me what they think they should have.

Interviewer: Well when, then, would you expect that there would be a bit more autonomy toward the Northwest Territories Council?

Jean Chrétien: Oh, I think we came a long way from what we were four or five years ago. We discussed, for example, too this morning the questions of the appointed members on the Council, what I would do. And I said to them that before the next election they have the power under the Act to tell me, officially, if they want to get rid of the appointed members in the Council. And if I want to have more elected members I will have to amend the Northwest Territories Act. And we discussed that. And as far as the question of the Executive Committee is concerned, I told them that I'm watching the situation in the Yukon and, you know, it is not possible at this time to make a move in the Northwest Territories because of the controversy about it in the Yukon. But as far as I am concerned so far I am quite satisfied with the experience in the Yukon and I think sooner or later it is going to be applied to the Northwest Territories too.

Announcer: After the Minister left town the Territorial Council called a news conference to tell its side of the story. The spokesman for the Council, David Searle of Yellowknife, said there were a number of areas of disagreement with the Minister. He outlined one of them.

David Searle: We disagreed as to the transfer of power to introduce that pensions bill. We took the view that we had authority to introduce it because it deals, it dealt with indemnities and that his position was that he could refrain from funding it or he could disallow it if he didn't like it. But we didn't think he could instruct the Commissioner not to assent to our legislation. Now we had a legal opinion that he could assent. He, in turn, had a legal opinion from the Department of Justice which was to the contrary, that said, basically, that the Council couldn't introduce such a bill because it was a money bill and in any case he could properly instruct the Commissioner and, indeed, the Commissioner could properly, even if not instructed, refuse to assent to any piece of legislation. And we took the position that in this day and age that no Lieutenant Governor and certainly no Commissioner can reclaim assent and we further said we would be prepared to test it in the courts if it happens and he said, well he would go back and he would have that our legal opinion checked and his legal opinion checked and try and make a decision as to who was correct in this business of assent and -- but in any case he didn't intend, he said, it seemed to me particularly as a result of our discussion, he didn't intend to withhold assent or cause the Commissioner to withhold assent. Now, the pension bill, and let's make sure we have this correct, its the principle. So just forget its the pension. Its just that its the principle of whether or not in this day and age and under the constitutional set up we have the Minister or the Commissioner can deny the bill coming into effect by refusing assent. That's the issue, its the principle. Let's forget it deals with Members' pensions because that's not true or very good grounds to argue on.

Announcer: Mr. Searle said many members of the Council were surprised at the Minister's attitude toward a study that is to be launched into further political development in the North.

David Searle: We thought that this was such a very bold move at the last Council Session. And it surprised us all, I think, to find that he kept coming back to that and saying that's exactly what I want you to do. And you have the full support of the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, and the staff at their hands to prepare a position on behalf of the Council as to what provincial-type functions should be transferred to the Territorial Government. And I want to see that paper and that's what I want you to do.

Announcer: Among other issues discussed was the possibility of an increase in the number of elected members on the Council. Mr. Searle says the Minister has promised some changes.

David Searle: He gave us agreement in principle with the reduction of the number of appointed members. He wouldn't be completely specific and say whether he would agree -- that he'd go for all four. He felt you might want to keep one for the Deputy Commissioner. He didn't say that but that is the sort of thing he has considered in the past. But he certainly agreed that by the time of the next election it would be appropriate to reduce the appointed members but whether it would be by two or two or four he said he wasn't in a position to state.

Announcer: There were some fears that because of the various stands taken at the recent session of the Territorial Council the position of the Commissioner, Stuart Hodgson, had been jeopardized. Mr. Searle said there was no indication of this at this morning's meeting with Mr. Chretien.

David Searle: No, I don't think the Commissioner's position was jeopardized by what the Council did. I don't think he was even put in any difficult position because the Council kept throwing it back to the Minister. I think the Minister truly felt very badly about the things the Council did at the last session. I think he probably felt hurt more than anything because he felt he just had been so busy that he hadn't been able to communicate as quickly and probably as effectively as he could have.

Announcer: The Councillors felt they made good headway at the meeting if only because the Deputy Minister, Basil Robinson, was on hand. Mr. Searle said it was the first time the Council had the opportunity to meet with the man that actually implements the Minister's policy decisions.

David Searle: We were very pleased to see the Minister sit right here and on his left the Deputy Minister because it is just as important for us to make these points with the Deputy Minister as it is with the Minister.

Interviewer: Were you saying, if fact, that the Territorial Council believes that the Deputy Minister is the control in the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and not Mr. Chretien?

David Searle: No. No, I wasn't going to say that. What I was going to say is let's admit the fact that that's the man who is responsible for carrying out for implementing the Minister's policy decisions. And if the Minister, if what is being done in the field is different from what the Minister wants to be done, that's the man who is responsible because the Minister is a policy person and he has a Department to implement his decisions. And it is very good to point out, at least we thought it was, that the Minister wanted it to be done and it wasn't being done and there's the man that is right here and its his responsibility to see that it is being done. It is the first time we've had a meeting with Mr. Robinson and we thought it was pretty important that he be there.

Interviewer: This is the first time, then, that Council has met with the man who does the day to day business with the North?

David Searle: Yes.

Interviewer: Don't you find that a little shocking?

David Searle: Well, ah, yes I do.

Announcer: One Territorial Councillor wasn't at all happy with the meeting. Councillor Lyle Trimble says Jean Chrétien talked around the issues and nothing yet has been settled.

Lyle Trimble: My opinion of the meeting did not coincide with the opinions of the majority of other members and therefore

I suggested to the other members that perhaps somebody else should speak to the press as the representative of the Council. I personally feel that very little was accomplished at this meeting, if anything. We had three questions which we put to the Minister. We spent three hours in discussion. The Minister did most of the talking and, in my opinion, talked around the questions. I don't feel we came to grips with anything. And I personally feel that what happened today was a carry over from the previous session of Council when the feelings of the Members of Council were getting rather high, almost like a bomb ready to blow off. That bomb didn't go off because the Minister had agreed to meet with the Council members. We met with the Minister now and as far as I'm concerned nothing has been settled. He has given us no answers to any questions, given us no information other than what we already knew. What he has indicated is that by the end of this the life of this Session the structure of the Council will be changed probably by the decreasing of the number of appointed members and increasing the number of elected members but he pretty well told us this a year ago anyway so that's nothing new. He told us that sometime in the future he will consider establishing an Executive Committee for the Northwest Territories similar to what is in the Yukon. Well, he told that to the Standing Committee of Northern Affairs when he first introduced this a couple of years or more ago. In fact, if I'm not mistaken he indicated that within a couple of years of his setting it up in the Yukon he would set it up in the Northwest Territories. Well, that couple of years is over. There is still no indication when. I personally feel that very limited consideration is being given to the people in the Territories and to their elected representatives and that the government by the Federal Government and the federal influence in the North is going ahead without any real consideration for the people in the Territories. And I don't think it is likely to change.

Announcer: Mr. Trimble went on to say that Mr. Chrétien is simply trying to keep the Territorial Council quiet because of the coming election.

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PUBLICATIONS:

(1) Scouting in Canada North: A Re-consideration of its Role in Canada North and the Potential for Expansion of its Activities. Ottawa: Boy Scouts of Canada, 1971.

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